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ABSTRACT 
 
SUBVERTING THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DICHOTOMY: RELIGIOUS 
EXCLUSION AND NATION-BUILDING IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN 
 Çevik, Salim 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Prof. Alev Çınar 
 
July 2015 
 
 
 This study investigates the role of religion in nation building processes of 
Turkey and Pakistan. Current literature on these two countries is divided between those 
who claim that Islam was an essential arm of nation-building and those who claim that 
the role of Islam, if there was any, was merely instrumental and strategic. In that it 
reflects the divide in the wider literature on nationalism; between those who consider 
nationalism as a modern and secular(izing) phenomenon and those who underline the 
importance of pre-modern identities in general and religion in particular in the nation 
formation.  
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This thesis aims to go beyond this dichotomy by pointing that religion in any 
nation-building plays a much more complex role. It can be crucial for nation-building at 
a certain stage, but it may be useless, irrelevant or even an impediment at another stage 
of nation-building. This dissertation argues that since nation-building is a process of 
homogenization, the role of religion can be best analyzed through its contribution to this 
process at the national level.  
Assimilation and exclusion are two means of homogenization and religion often 
contributes to national homogenization by excluding members of different religious 
communities. This is particularly true for the multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, 
with an imperial legacy. 
By understanding nation-building largely as a process of homogenization, this 
thesis builds on the legacy of Ernest Gellner and his works on nationalism. However, it 
aims to go beyond Gellner by bringing the role of religion to the process of 
homogenization. Another important aspect of this study is that homogenization is 
discussed in the context of the emergence of modern state and the transition from empire 
to nation-state.  
 
Key Words: Nation-building, Homogenization, Assimilation, Exclusion, Religion, 
Empires, Modern State 
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ÖZET 
 
DİN-LAİKLİK KARŞITLIĞINI AŞMAK: TÜRKİYE VE PAKİSTAN’DA ULUS 
İNŞASINDA DİNİN DIŞLAYICI ROLÜ 
Çevik, Salim 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar 
 
Temmuz 2015 
 
 
Bu çalışmada Türkiye ve Pakistan örneklerinden yola çıkılarak dinin ulus inşa 
sürecindeki rolü incelenmektedir. Her iki ülke üzerine var olan akademik literatür 
İslam’ı ya ulus inşa sürecinin merkezine yerleştirmekte ya da tamamen dışına 
atmaktadır. Bu yönüyle milliyetçilik çalışmalarında var olan bir ayrım burada tekrar 
edilmektedir; milliyetçilik ya tamamen modern ve laik(leştirici) bir kavram olarak ele 
alınmakta ya da ulus inşa sürecinde din başta olmak üzere geleneksel kimliklere vurgu 
yapılmaktadır.  
Bu tez din ve laiklik temelli bu tarz bir ikili karşıtlığı kabul etmemekte ve din ile 
ulus inşa süreci arasında çok daha karmaşık bir ilişki olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Din 
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ulus inşa sürecinin belli bir aşamasında faydalı iken, başka bir aşamada faydasız hatta 
zararlı olabilir. Bu tez ulus inşasının aynı zamanda bir homojenleşme süreci olmasına 
dayanarak dinin ulus inşasındaki rolünün en sağlıklı olarak dinin homojenleşme sürecine 
katkısı üzerinden incelenebileceğini iddia etmektedir.  
Homojenleşme asimilasyon ve dışlama yollarıyla sağlanabilir. Din ise genel 
olarak dışlayıcı bir araç olarak başka din mensuplarını ulusal kimlikten dışlamak 
suretiyle ulusal homojenleşmeye katkı sağlar. Özellikle imparatorluk mirasına dayanan 
çok etnikli ve çok dinli toplumlarda bu süreç daha belirgindir. 
Ulus inşasını bir homojenleşme süreci olarak ele almakla bu çalışma Ernest 
Gellner’in milliyetçilik anlayışını takip etmektedir. Ancak homojenleşme sürecine dinin 
rolünü de dâhil etmek suretiyle Gellner’in çalışmaları geliştirilmektedir. Bu çalışmanın 
diğer önemli bir yanı da homojenleşme sürecinin modern devletin ortaya çıkışı ve 
imparatorlukların ulus-devlete evrimi çerçevesinde ele alınmasıdır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulus inşası, Homojenleşme, Asimilasyon, Dışlama, Din, 
İmparatorluklar, Modern Devlet 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation treats the relationship of religion and nation-building with a special 
focus on two countries with Muslim majorities: Turkey and Pakistan. These nations are 
seldom analyzed in tandem since they appear as polar opposites in the Muslim world. 
Whereas Turkey represents “the secular state” in a Muslim majority country, Pakistan 
became the first modern nation-state with Islam as the state religion and has served as an 
inspiration for worldwide Islamic movements.1 These characterizations have 
proliferated through media representations along with academic literature on both 
countries codifying the representation of the two countries as opposites. 
Prevailing academic work argues that Turkish nation-building was an 
exceptionally successful project (Lerner, 1959; Lewis, 1961).2 Not only did it secularize 
both state and society, it also replaced religious identity with a state-centric national one 
                                                          
1 As the first Islamic state in the World, Pakistan precedes Iran and Afghanistan by three and five decades 
respectively. Moreover, it was and remains the only country that the meaning and existence of the country 
is explained through solely on religion. However, unlike Iran Pakistan is not and has never been a 
theocracy.  
2 These early assessments have been reevaluated in light of emerging identity crises over subsequent 
decades in Turkey. Today, the glorification of Turkish modernization and nation-building is increasingly 
being challenged. For an example, see Bozdogan and Kasaba, eds. (1997). 
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(Lewis, 1961: 412). This was considered a particularly exceptional achievement in a 
Muslim majority country because it was assumed that secularization and nation-building 
were bound to fail due to the presumed resistance of Islam to secularism (Gellner, 
1996). Gellner even claims that the success of Turkish secular nationalism is a “double 
exception”: it is the exception within the exception. More precisely, the Muslim world is 
an exception in its resistance to secularism with Turkey as an exception within this 
exception (1997: 236). However, if Turkey represents the ultimate success story of the 
secular-national project, Pakistan represents its complete failure. In addition, whereas 
Turkey is celebrated as the most successful example of modernization and nation-
building in the Muslim world, Pakistan has been accorded the epitaph of “failed state,” 
and it is often wondered whether the country will survive or not (Ali, 1983; Rashid, 
2015). Moreover, it is argued that the crisis of nation-building is far more severe than 
that of the state in Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2002). Thus, Pakistan, which bases its identity 
solely on religion, constitutes a certain failure in nation-building.3 Already partitioned 
once in 1971, Pakistan continues to cope with persistent threats from secessionist 
movements. 
This narrative is not only simplistic, it is also misleading. It neither contributes to 
our understanding of the role of religion in these countries, in particular, nor to our grasp 
of the relationship between religion and nationalism in general. In this dissertation, I 
argue that since nation-building is a process of homogenization, the role of religion can 
                                                          
3 It is not simply because Pakistan is considered to have failed in nation-building. Rather, according to the 
dominant paradigm, Pakistan was bound to fail since it very much needed religion to build its national 
identity. For example, Riaz argues that “religion was not only a social demarcator of identity but also the 
basis upon which statecraft had to be built. This is a marker which any nation-state should be fighting 
against” (2002: 55). For other works supporting the same point, see Syed (1982) and Oomen (1994). 
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be best analyzed through its contribution to this process at the national level. 
Assimilation and exclusion are two means of homogenization and religion often 
contributes by excluding members of different religious communities. In both cases, 
religious exclusion formed the very crucial first phase of national homogenization, in 
which Islam was flagged as the defining element of national identity and non-Muslim 
elements were eliminated. Thus religion played an identical role in the nation-building 
projects of both “secular” Turkey and “Islamic” Pakistan. In other words, I argue that 
religion performed a unique function of boundary-drawing in nation-building. Based on 
this limited, yet important, function of religion in nation-building, this dissertation will 
demonstrate that Turkish nationalism is not as “secular” as it is often perceived. 
Likewise, Pakistani nationalism is not as “Islamic” as it is often considered. This 
dissertation, then, also challenges the dominant narrative positing secular Turkey and 
Islamic Pakistan as opposites.   
The narrative that posits Turkey and Pakistan respectively as secular and Islamic 
is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it assumes a monolithic conception of Turkish 
and Pakistani nations and nationalisms. However, national politics is instead a site of 
struggle among competing national(ist) projects (Verdery, 1993; Calhoun, 1997; 
Brubaker, 1996). Thus, when considering Turkish or Pakistani nationalism, we are 
dealing with a contested phenomenon rather than a reified, stable concept. Unless 
otherwise noted, in what follows I refer specifically to the official nationalisms as 
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represented by the rhetoric of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 
Turkey and Pakistan, respectively.4 
Neither this praise of secular Turkish nationalism nor the denigration of Pakistan 
as a failed Islamic state reflect the complicated relations between religion and national 
identity, particularly with regard to the status of religious minorities and the role of 
religion in state affairs. In fact, despite the opposing pictures of secularism and 
Islamism, the status of religious minorities in secular Turkey and Islamic Pakistan 
reveals intriguing similarities. Very significantly, in both countries, non-Muslim 
communities hold minority status in both legal and cultural terms. The Lausanne 
Agreement, the official foundational document of modern Turkey, explicitly defines 
non-Muslims, and only non-Muslims, as minorities (Oran, 2005; Aktoprak, 2010).5 
Throughout Republican history, non-Muslim minorities faced state-sanctioned 
discrimination in various forms (e.g., the Thrace riots of 1934, the wealth tax levied 
during WWII, the September 6-7 riots of 1955, limitations on religious education as 
amplified in the case of the closure of Halki (Heybeliada) monastery in 1971, 
restrictions on the building and functioning of new houses of worship, as well as the 
confiscation of property held by non-Muslim foundations)(see Oran, 2005; Oran, 2011; 
Somel, 2013; Aktar, 2000; Aktar, 2006; Reyna and Şen, 1994). These examples are 
                                                          
4 For an exploration of the nuances of Turkish nationalism, see Bora (2003). In it, Bora depicts five 
different strands of Turkish nationalism. Alternative formulations of Pakistani nationalism can be located 
along a spectrum from a more secular conception towards a more Islamic notion of Pakistani nationalism. 
For these varieties, see Esposito and Voll (1996: 102-123). 
 
5 Through its various rulings in 1980, 1991, 1994 and 2001, the Turkish Constitutional Court declared that 
only non-Muslims may be defined as minorities in Turkey (Reyna and Şen, 1994: 22; İmamoğlu, 2006: 
12-15). Baskın Oran (2005: 63-64) explains how the Turkish delegation at Lausanne insisted that the 
concept of minority would not include linguistic and ethnic groups, which was at odds with the 
conventional legal practice of the time. Moreover, Oran points out that the Turkish government did not 
accept the term religious minority, but strategically insisted on the term non-Muslim to deny any 
possibility of a Muslim minority with a similar legal and cultural status in Turkey.  
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limited to legal and state-sanctioned cases of discrimination, which is not to suggest the 
far more abundant cases of socio-cultural discrimination. 6  
In Pakistan, Islam is the state religion and non-Muslims were considered 
minorities from the very beginning. The presence of and state recognition of minorities 
was enshrined in the flag of the state. Whereas the green color of the Pakistani flag 
represents Islam, the white stripe represents its non-Muslim citizens.7 Today, non-
Muslims in Pakistan have reserved parliamentary seats, separate electorates, and vote 
only for their candidates. In addition, a dedicated ministership is in place for minority 
affairs in the Pakistani cabinet. Despite the constitutional guarantee that each citizen has 
the right to profess, practice, and propagate his own religion, in practice the non-Muslim 
communities in Pakistan have been increasingly marginalized and suppressed (Malik, 
2002; Bhargava, 2004).   
However, the question of minority status is not only about legal protections or 
discrimination faced in these Muslim majority countries. The definition of minorities 
according to religious identity and non-Muslims with a corporate minority status 
suggests that both countries espouse a mono-religious understanding of the nation.8 This 
configuration of national identity along religious lines presents a dilemma for experts of 
                                                          
6 Bernard Lewis points out that “in some respects the participation of the non-Muslims in the public life of 
Turkey actually decreased after the establishment of the Republic, although their legal status on paper was 
higher than ever before” (1952: 39). However, it should again be noted that this legal status was that of a 
protected minority. 
 
7 At its foundation, Pakistan had a significantly higher portion of non-Muslims residing in the eastern part 
of the country. When East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan in 1971, the remaining Pakistan, became 
significantly larger Muslim majority. 
 
8 As Kemal Kirişçi (2000) and Soner Çağaptay (2006) demonstrate through an analysis of the immigration 
policies of the Turkish state, there is a tension between “Turkish citizenship” and “Turkish nationality” for 
non-Muslims of Turkey. 
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Turkish politics given the centrality of secularism for the Turkish state. In the case of 
Pakistan, though the congruence of the national with the religious may be more 
predictable, it is difficult to understand why the secular-minded founders followed such 
a policy. Their unwillingness to accord Islam a central role in the country alongside their 
desire to create an Islamic Pakistan seems contradictory.9  
Recent Turkish studies literature problematizes various aspects of modernity 
treated as secular Kemalist nationalism in opposition to religious reactionism. Though 
modernization is here equated to secular nationalism, academics such as Şerif Mardin 
(1989) and Nilüfer Göle (1992; 2000) have pointed to the modernist nature of various 
Islamic movements. Alev Çınar (2005) further added to this critique by examining the 
nationalist character of Islamic modernization and how it projected itself as both an 
alternative modernity and an alternative nationalist project to the official secular 
nationalist one. However insightful these critiques may be, they still assume a secular 
nationalist project in opposition to an Islamic modernity. Thus, they do not address the 
religious element that is inextricably tied to the secular nationalist project. Another line 
of critique questions the secularity of Turkish nationalism and claims that religion 
gained an increasingly important role in the formation of Turkish national identity. More 
specifically, it is claimed that secular Turkish nationalism evolved into a synthesis of 
religion and nationalism over time (Capeaux, 1998; Griogordis, 2013). Gökhan 
                                                          
9 The claim that Islam is not accorded a central role in Pakistani politics may sound surprising given the 
religion’s centrality in contemporary Pakistan. However, it should be noted that the pervasiveness of 
religion in contemporary Pakistani political life relies more on the policies of Zia-ul Haq (1977-1986) and 
developments in the post-Zia period. It is commonly accepted that in the three decades following 
Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Islam was often used strategically by politicians; it was not allowed a 
major role in the conduct of state affairs (see Hayes, 1984; Baxter et. al, 2002: 171-180). This was 
particularly the case for Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of modern Pakistan. In his biography, Jinnah 
was apparently very much impressed by Atatürk and his secularizing reforms (Bolitho, 1954). 
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Çetinsaya (1999) and Hakan Yavuz (1993) further draw attention to the intellectual and 
historical roots of such an alliance.10 This Islamic element represents an inherent 
contradiction to the ambiguous nature of Kemalism.11 Thus two separate narratives 
emerged: one that equates Turkish nationalism with secularism and the other that reads 
it in an alliance with Sunni Islam. Unfortunately, neither of these narratives is 
satisfactory. On the one hand, the religious element of Turkish nationalism is evident 
and observed primarily through the state’s treatment of non-Muslim citizens. On the 
other hand, secularism, which often takes up radical forms of anti-religiosity, remains 
the dominant aspect of state ideology in Turkey.   
In Pakistan, the critique originates from an altogether different direction. In the 
previous two or three decades, a new generation of historians questioned the Pakistani 
state’s claim of serving as an exemplary Islamic model (Page, 1982; Jalal, 1994; Alavi, 
1987). By pointing to the predominantly secular composition of the Pakistani 
movement’s leadership and by addressing the opposition levied by religious scholars 
(ulama) against the movement, these scholars interrogated the assumed links between 
Islam and the Pakistani movement. Despite official claims, these scholars convincingly 
demonstrate that the leadership envisioned a secular Pakistan. This secular vision for 
Pakistan despite the centrality of Islam in the imagining of the Pakistani nation-state is 
an all too obvious contradiction that demands further explanation through this 
revisionist narrative. Moreover, these analyses are hindered by their reliance on a 
                                                          
10 At this point, it may be necessary to repeat that I am focusing on the official version of Turkish 
nationalism rather than its rivals, which are able to more seamlessly combine religion with nationalism. 
11 For an analysis of Kemalism as a Weltanschauung open to multiple interpretations and contradictions 
rather than a rigid political ideology, see Özbudun, 1981. 
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narrative that focuses on the secular leadership’s instrumental usage of Islam to mobilize 
an essentially religious mass public. Although nationalism, is an elite project, 
particularly in the colonial context, it would be misleading to assume that it is solely a 
top-down imposition upon gullible masses. This analysis also ignores the persistence of 
Pakistani nationalism in the face of many alternatives and structural factors. 
Significantly, defining nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan—or a host of other 
nation-states—as either secular or religious conceals more than it reveals. However, 
such a dichotomy is representative of the literature on nationalism. The emerging field 
of nationalism studies also suffers from such a binary approach in its treatment of 
religion and fails to equip scholars of area studies with the necessary theoretical 
concepts. This dissertation is not intended to be a study of Ottoman-Turkish politics or 
South Asian-Pakistani politics. Instead, it is firmly rooted in the field of nationalism 
studies and approaches the issue from the theoretical perspectives offered by the 
literature on nationalism and nation-building. I hope to demonstrate that a better 
understanding of nation-building will enable us to overcome the shortcomings of the 
approaches developed by the scholars of area studies.  
This, however, can only be done if the nation-building process is contextualized 
within the structural transformations brought (on) by the emergence of the modern state. 
In an attempt to understand the nature of nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan this 
dissertation will thus analyze the emergence of the modern state and its transformations 
from the nineteenth century onwards. In that sense, it is also a study of the sociology of 
the state in colonial India and the late Ottoman Empire. The changing relationship 
between state and society is the key to understanding the nature of nation-building and 
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its relation to religion. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the transitional period—
when the pre-modern imperial state evolved into a modern nation-state. This 
necessitates considering the longue durée, which traces the policies of nation-building in 
concert with the emergence and evolution of the modern state.  
This perspective, I believe, will not only demonstrate the reductionism of 
equating nationalism with either religion or secularism, but will also show that Turkey 
and Pakistan do not present opposite cases of nation-building. Rather, the similarities are 
striking. These similarities can be observed in the changing nature of religious pluralism 
from the pre-modern period through the various phases in the formation of modern state. 
Both processes were initiated in multi-religious contexts. In his 1956 analysis, Furnivall 
observes the vast religious plurality in pre-modern India: 
[…] probably the first thing that strikes a visitor is the medley of peoples 
[…] it is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix, but do not combine. 
Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its 
own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market 
place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different 
sections of the community, living side by side, but separately within the 
same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of 
labor along racial lines (Furnivall, 1956: 304-305).12  
Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis employ this quotation with a note that this 
description is also applicable to the Ottoman Empire (1982: 1). However, this picture 
does not apply to either Turkey or Pakistan in terms of religious pluralism. According to 
the analyses on nominal religious adherence, in 2000, Turkey had a 99.8 percent Muslim 
population whereas Pakistan had a slightly lower figure at 96.7 percent (Fargues, 
                                                          
12 The degree of separateness and clarity of boundaries are probably exaggerated. Current literature 
emphasizes mixture and hybridity rather than clear-cut, fixed boundaries. However, the fundamental 
assumption that these were plural societies remains unquestioned.  
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2001:106-107). This dissertation deals with the erosion of this religious diversity in 
relation to the nation-building process. 
One can say that both the Ottomans and the Indians entered modernity in a 
fragmented society that was categorized and compartmentalized mostly through 
religion. However, religious differences were stressed and exaggerated in ways that did 
not separate the communities into segregated social worlds of their own during the pre-
modern period (Marcus, 1989: 43). As Carter Findley (2010: 65) rightly points out, the 
politicization of these religious identities was as novel as the politicization of ethnicity. 
The novelty leading to the politicization and ultimate eradication of this diversity was 
ushered in with the modern state. Religious identities became religious nationalisms 
along with the process of modern state formation. This dissertation aims to elucidate the 
similarity of secular Turkey to Islamic Pakistan through an alternative reading of nation-
building.  
 
1.1 Problem of Definition 
If this dissertation is primarily a study of nationalism and nation-building in Turkey and 
Pakistan, it would be logical to start by examining the definitions of nation and 
nationalism. Yet, as Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 4) warn, settling on agreed and 
adequate definitions of key terms, such as nation and nationalism, is no easy task and 
presents a daunting challenge to the study of nations and nationalisms. Charles Tilly 
moves a step further by arguing that “nation” is an entirely useless concept and what 
should instead be focused on is the study of the state (1975: 6). In the same vein, Eric 
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Hobsbawm contends that it is impossible to define a nation and instead argues that any 
analysis of nations and nationalism should begin with an analysis of nationalism rather 
than the nation (1991: 9). This is so because a group of people becomes a nation only 
through the ideology of nationalism. In this dissertation, I rely on Gellner’s definition of 
nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent” (1983: 1). This definition links nationalism to the 
state as a political unit as the nation is defined through the nation-state. 
Nationalism represents a new iteration of the relationship between the modern 
state and its subjects, who are collectively defined as a nation only as a result of this new 
form of relationship. Nation-building is thus linked to the formation of the modern state 
and its need to regulate and control its subjects. As John Breuilly (1994: 220) maintains, 
“the idea of the nation as a single, geographically bounded group derives from the idea 
of the state as a single, geographically bounded territory.” Breuilly (1994: 220) also 
points that this new state, with its hitherto unseen monopoly of power and control over 
its boundaries, is no more an agent among others but an institution that imposes a final 
will upon all others. Thus a new relationship between the state and the subjects emerge 
in which state has a much higher capability, authority and legitimacy. In this new 
relationship a direct link between the individual subject and the government is 
established whereas historically this connection between the subject and the government 
was maintained indirectly through communal intermediaries. Aside from this vertical 
attachment between the state and the subject, the modern state also creates a horizontal 
solidarity among its subjects (who were previously segregated into communities) 
transforming them into a nation. This horizontal solidarity is maintained through novel 
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institutions such as mass education and the schooling system, levée en masse and the 
military conscription, strict border controls and custom stations and the national 
(meaning state-wide) media. This vertical and horizontal bonds of solidarities on the one 
hand contributes the emergence of the nation as an imagined community, on the other 
hand through the uniformity of state administration, maintains the homogeneity of this 
imagined community.  
Through this process of nation-formation, religion often plays contradictory and 
conflicting roles. On the one hand, religion provides a useful pool of elements including 
myths, symbols, and cultural traditions that are creatively and selectively appropriated 
by the actors of nation-building. On the other, religion rivals nationalism as a source of 
community and belonging. Moreover, the universalist nature of many religions 
contradicts the limits of the nation and its particularism.13 Thus, religion is both an 
element of and impediment to nation-building.  
Since the nature of modern state and the relation between the state and its 
subjects dictates that nation-building is a process of homogenization, I argue that the 
function of religion in nation-building can best be evaluated with respect to the role it 
plays in homogenization. This is particularly so for multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
societies, i.e. transitions from an imperial society towards a national one. My treatment 
of nationalism and this emphasis on homogenization owes much to the work of Ernest 
Gellner. Indeed, by considering nation-building largely as a process of homogenization, 
this dissertation builds on the legacy of Gellner and his works on nationalism. However, 
                                                          
13 As Benedict Anderson (1991: 6) argues, as “imagined communities,” nations are imagined as limited 
and sovereign. No nation claims or desires to include the entire humanity. This lies in stark contrast to the 
proselytizing zeal of Christianity and Islam, among others. 
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it aims to go beyond Gellner and his modernist contemporaries, including Benedict 
Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm,14 by bringing the role of religion to the process of 
homogenization. Another important aspect of this study is that homogenization is 
discussed within the context of the transition from empire to nation-state. Thus unlike 
Gellner, whose main focus is on the social changes brought by industrialization, the 
homogenization process and the role of religion in this process is discussed in relation to 
the emergence of modern state. 15 
Furthermore, this perspective enables us to better grasp the role of religion in the 
Turkish and Pakistani cases. If we extend this understanding of nationalism to the 
Turkish and Pakistani cases, I argue that religion is a major element of nation-building, 
primarily via its contribution to homogenization. As I have shown above, both Turkey 
and Pakistan underwent a state-sponsored elimination of religious diversity, a process 
that led to the emergence of a religiously homogenous society. In the following 
chapters, I show that the emergence of the modern state, the elimination of religious 
diversity, and the rise of nationalism are interrelated phenomenon.  
                                                          
14 As it will be pointed out in the following chapter, these authors claim that nationalism replaced religion. 
Thus religion has no role in their analysis of nation-building. 
15 As John Hall points “The fundamental insight of Gellner’s theory of nationalism that has been 
neglected is simple: homogenization processes have been central to the history of nationalism (Hall: 
2006:38). However, the problem with Gellner’s formulation of homogenization is his insistence to link 
homogenization to the new social order brought by industrialization. However, as many of his critics 
maintain, in most cases nationalism emerged prior to industrialization. For a detailed analysis of Gellner’s 
works and his theory of nationalism, see Hall (1998). Despite his emphasis on industrialization, at least in 
one of his writings, Gellner argues that by industrialization he means “that entire syndrome of economic 
and social changes which is associated with the diffusion of modern technology, and which is sometimes 
referred to as “modernization,” and which extends far beyond the methods of industrial production in any 
narrow sense”  (1985: 1). Although not prevalent in his other writings such an approach suits better for 
explaining the emergence of nationalism particularly in the non-Western context.    
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In the process of modern state formation, nationalism becomes the ideology that 
creates a bond between the state and a group of people. Nationalism transforms these 
people into nations by creating a shared cultural identity, which is then linked to the 
state. However, this identification can only be done by exclusion. As anthropologist 
Frederik Barth notes, groups tend to define themselves not by reference to their own 
characteristics, but by exclusion, i.e. comparison to strangers (Armstrong, 1982:5). 
Through this process of identification, “nationalism defines a cultural identity for the 
nation only by excluding many from its fold” (Chatterjee, 1993: 155).16 Moreover, 
exclusions are not historical accidents or pathological deviations from a more inclusive, 
liberal nationalism (Kuyucu, 2005: 365); rather, it is purposefully and “crucially 
employed in an attempt to solder core coalitions among those included” (Marx, 2003: 
21). Exclusion, then, is definitive of the nation. It is also crucial to remember that the 
line between inclusion and exclusion is in constant negotiation. 
The primary argument of this dissertation is that the relation between religion 
and nationalism is best understood through the homogenizing function of religion. 
Religion serves this function not only through its relation to national culture, but even 
more so by drawing the boundaries of the nation and thus through defining who would 
be included and excluded into the nation. The homogenization enacted through nation-
building includes both assimilation and exclusion. This is particularly so when nations 
are formed out of diverse, imperial societies. However, even though the equation 
between nation-building and homogenization is well-established in the literature on 
nationalism, the exclusionary function of religion through homogenization is not. 
                                                          
16 This is also an aspect of the parochiality of nations. 
 15 
 
Exclusion is as important as assimilation for homogenization and, in certain cases, 
religion becomes the main criteria for exclusion. This dissertation also argues that such 
an approach is best-suited for understanding Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms since 
religion draws the line of exclusion and inclusion in both cases and nation-building 
relies on the exclusion of various religious communities (e.g. Christians and Jews in 
Turkey; Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistan) from the emerging national identity. I define this 
formation of nation through exclusions of non-Muslims as Muslim nationalism. This 
process of exclusion is analyzed in the context of modern state formation and the 
specific conditions that prioritized religion as demarcating the boundaries of the nation. 
The political principle legitimating this process was Muslim nationalism. In what 
follows, I also hope to codify a more precise definition of this process. 
The nation is not a fixed and static concept, but is in a continuous process of 
reification. The exclusion of non-Muslims from the national status of emerging nation-
states then implies that they are meant to be solely of and for Muslims. In a Gellnerian 
conception, the political unit is congruent with the cultural unit, which, in this case, is 
defined through religion. However, the prominence of religion in nation formation does 
not attribute any substantial power to religion in the conduct of state affairs. More 
precisely, Muslim nationalism is Muslim only in the sense that it is exclusive of non-
Muslim. Hence, it is through Muslim nationalism that Islam becomes ethnicized and 
functions as an identity marker rather than as a belief system or ideology. Thus, the 
contours of Muslim nationalism are entirely in accord with the politics of secularism.17 
                                                          
17 This also means that secularism understood in a limited Rawlsian sense: “keeping religion off politics,” 
is not an adequate protection for religious minorities. A discussion of secularism is beyond the limited 
concern of this dissertation, but the main findings of the dissertation suggest that liberal secularism is an 
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Such an approach enables us to determine the previously neglected role of religion 
(boundary-drawing) in nation-building. As such, it will also enable us to overcome 
simplistic dichotomies between religious and secular nationalisms, thereby 
demonstrating the unique function of religion in the secular process of nation-building. 
This will help us arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the relation between religion 
and nationalism, as well as to better grasp the role of Islam in the nation-building of two 
Muslim countries. 
 
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation 
The first chapter of this dissertation treats the theoretical debates in the literature on 
nationalism with a focus on the role of religion in nation-building. In addition, I will 
contextualize my approach within the wider literature of nation-building.  
This theoretical discussion is accompanied by a detailed review of Turkish and 
South Asian studies. In this literature review, I will outline the debate on the role of 
religion in the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. Specifically, in the 
Turkish case, this entails a thorough discussion of the historiographical debates on the 
emergence of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the transition from empire to 
republic. In the Pakistani case, this includes a detailed analysis of the debates over 
Partition and the role assigned to religion in the process leading to Partition.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
insufficient means of protecting religious minorities. This is in line with some recent contributions to the 
literature on secularism (see Bader, 2007; Chatterjee, 1998; Nandy, 1995).   
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The chapter concludes with conceptual clarifications of possible points of 
misunderstanding. The terms used through this dissertation such as Muslim nationalism, 
religion, religious syncretism, and communalism are subject to debate and without 
providing their exclusive definitions it would be impossible to clarify the major claims 
of the dissertation. This section deals primarily with an analysis and definition of 
Muslim nationalism. The essentially secular and modern character of Muslim 
nationalism is delineated in order to avoid further confusion.   
The modern state constitutes one of the key parameters of the analysis provided 
in this dissertation. Therefore, to better understand the key features of the modern state 
and how it enabled the emergence of the above-mentioned concepts and phenomena, the 
second chapter examines the pre-national communities under empires. By analyzing 
empires, I hope to demonstrate how religion has been an essential element of social 
organization and state society relations, as well as how these relations were structurally 
different from the modern form of nation-states. This contrast between empires and 
nation-states are analyzed through the existence or non-existence of direct control of the 
state over its subjects, which is linked to the issue of diversity and pluralism. By 
demonstrating the diversity of an imperial social setting and contrasting it with the 
modern nation-state, the chapter reveals the crucial role of homogenization in nation-
building. Therefore, this chapter helps explicate the theoretical arguments developed in 
the first chapter and offers historical background for the following chapters. Aside from 
a general discussion of empires as a political system, particular attention is given to the 
Ottoman and Mughal Empires, which set the tone for pre-modern administration and 
society in their respective realms. By examining the pre-modern imperial period, one 
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can gain a better understanding of the transformation that took place as a result of 
modern state formation in the nineteenth century. As the chapter will show, empire is no 
clearer a concept than nation or nation-state. Yet, by comparing and contrasting these 
terms, we may arrive at more stable definitions of the nation-state and empire.  
The third and fourth chapters form the core of this dissertation and analyze how 
religious exclusion paved the way for the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire and the Indian subcontinent. Since nation-building is explored through 
homogenization in this dissertation, these chapters investigate the role of religion in 
these processes, particularly in terms of the exclusionary aspect of religion. 
 In both cases, as everywhere else in the world, the emergence of nationalism is 
linked to the formation of modern state. Thus, the politicization of religious 
communities and the emergence of religious nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and in 
the Indian subcontinent are discussed in the context of modern state formation. I will 
argue that since it is harder to sustain plurality in a modern state, neither the Ottomans 
nor the British (in India) could reconcile religious plurality with a 
centralizing/intervening modern state. The process of modern state formation led to the 
politicization of religious identities and the formation of religious nationalism. 
Moreover, assessing the differences between the modern state in India and the Ottoman 
Empire, a modernizing colonial empire and a universal modernizing empire, 
respectively, enables us to compare and contrast the religious nationalisms that emerged 
in these two cases. 
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This attempt to explain the emergence and dominance of religious nationalism 
builds on the arguments of the second chapter on empires. It considers nationalism as a 
transition from empire to nation-state, which suggests that modernizing reforms, such as 
a centralized administration, the creation of uniformity, equality through political 
reforms, direct rule through the extension of state power, and the creation of a 
collaborative network (by the colonial state) are all related to each other. Considered 
together, these reforms transformed empire in a manner that paved the way for 
nationalism. 
The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation by examining the homogenizing 
policies of the post-nation-state period. This dissertation argued that the role of religion 
in nation-building can be best understood through its function of homogenization. It will 
be helpful to observe if and how homogenization policies differed between the 
transitional period that paved the way for the nation-state and the post-nation-state 
period. Though with exceptions, it could be argued that exclusion dominates the process 
of transition from empire to nation-state while policies of assimilation gain importance 
in the period following the formation of the nation-state. In the conclusion I return to 
this and undertake a brief discussion of assimilationist politics in the Turkish and 
Pakistani cases. Religion, while continuing its function of exclusion, can also be 
instrumentalized as a mean of assimilation. However, the main venue of assimilation in 
the nation-state period is related to language. This is an important aspect of the relation 
between religion and nation-building. The dissertation then concludes with a discussion 
on the generalizability of the arguments developed for Turkey and Pakistan while also 
incorporating a discussion of topics that may be discussed in future studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
In 1935, Jawaharlal Nehru, a prominent figure in the Indian nationalist movement and 
future Prime Minister of India, wrote a series of articles while incarcerated. These 
articles would appear in The Modern Review, a Calcutta monthly.18 In these writings, 
Nehru addressed various problems of the nationalist movement in India and devoted one 
of his articles solely to the question of communalism. In his discussion on the role of 
religion in the modern life, Nehru referred to Turkey as an exemplar for Indian Muslims. 
Nehru argues that under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey, “[…] has 
ceased to be an Islamic country in any sense of the word.” In addition, Nehru claims that 
the Turks, who take pride in the Turanian race, gave up their religious identity for the 
sake of a national one (1935: 504). For Nehru, not only does nationalism very clearly 
develop at the expense of religious outlook, but Islam is considered as incompatible with 
notions of race. For Indian Muslims, the implications of this model were clear: do not 
support communal parties like the Muslim League (ML), stop pushing for communal 
                                                          
18 Jawaharlal Nehru, “The Solidarity of Islam,” The Modern Review, (1935) Vol 58, No 5, pg. 504-505. 
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policies (such as quotas, federation, separate electorates, or autonomy), and support the 
secular/supra communal policies of the Congress movement.  
Soon after the publication of Nehru’s article, Mohammad Iqbal, considered the 
intellectual father of Pakistan, offered a rebuttal (1936) [1977]. In it, Iqbal argued that 
the Turks had not given up their religious identity wholesale, but had instead deemed it 
synonymous with national identity. This symbiosis in the Turkish model represented a 
perfect convergence of religion and national identity. Iqbal thus urged Indian Muslims 
to follow the Turkish model. For Iqbal’s contemporaries, the implications of this 
interpretation were quite clear: religious and national identities are equivalent and 
inseparable. Iqbal’s directive also calls for Muslims to refrain from supporting the 
Congress party, which does not recognize religion as concomitant to national identity. 
Instead, follow the ML.  
Both Iqbal and Nehru, each nationalist in his own way, portray a static and 
reductionist picture of Turkish nationalism. Their debate, however, reflects the 
continuous struggle to define Turkish nationalism, as well as the larger divide when 
considering modernity, nationalism, and religion. In his brief analysis of Turkish 
modernization, Nehru, an ardent supporter of secularism and modernism, reveals his 
position that religion is fundamentally incompatible with both modern life and 
nationalism. A Nehruvian vision of Turkish nationalism remained dominant as long as 
the postulates of modernization theory were left unchallenged, which was the case in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
 22 
 
It is significant to note that Nehru and Iqbal were not the only ones who paid 
particular attention to the Turkish experience. Turkey presented an important case for 
the modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s. Daniel Lerner shared Nehru’s belief 
in the dichotomy between religion and modern life. In his classic Passing of a 
Traditional Society, Lerner argues that the core of Turkish modernization was choosing 
between “Mecca and mechanization” (1958: 405). In another classic, Emergence of a 
Modern Turkey, Bernard Lewis declares that the choice has been made successfully. 
According to Lewis, in Turkey, “God had been replaced twice: as the source of 
sovereignty, by the people, and as the object of worship by the nation” (1961: 479). 
Both of these works enjoyed a broad audience, beyond students of Turkish politics. 
Lerner’s work (and to certain extent Lewis’s) became an essential fixture in courses on 
modernization and is considered a founding text of the modernization thesis. The 
Turkish experience was studied not only through the hegemonic framing of 
modernization theory, but also contributed immensely to the formation of modernization 
theory more generally and to its claim of universal applicability more particularly. With 
Niyazi Berkes’s Development of Secularism in Turkey, these works firmly established a 
Nehruvian reading of Turkey through the dominant lens of modernization theory 
(1964).19   
The dominant theme in these works was to consider the inevitable clash between 
religion and secularism, arising out of the juxtaposition, in mutually exclusive terms, of 
modernity and religion. I refer to this prevailing reading of Turkish nationalism, which 
                                                          
19 The period of1958-1964, which include the publication dates of these three works, also represents the 
peak of modernization theory in the social sciences.  
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is in line with the official narrative of Kemalism, as the “replacement thesis.” Moreover, 
as will be outlined below, this approach to the relationship between nationalism and 
religion is not unique to Kemalism, but is part and parcel of the modernist strand in the 
literature on nationalism. These modernist approaches remained dominant as long as 
belief in Turkish modernization continued. While the unresolved problems of Turkish 
modernization—including conflict with the Kurdish minority and questioning the role of 
Islam in public life—continued to dominate Turkish politics, the adherence to the 
modernist reading grew increasingly fraught. 
The modernist reading of Turkish nationalism had two distinct dimensions: 
empirical and normative. Empirically, it was assumed that Turkish nation-building was 
essentially an anti-religious endeavor accompanied by policies of “assertive secularism” 
(Kuru, 2009). Normatively, this dichotomy was endorsed and was justified on the 
grounds of Islam’s presumed incompatibility with the ideals of modernity and 
nationalism (see Gellner, 1996; Gellner, 1997). The modernist strand was criticized on 
both empirical and normative grounds. While the dichotomy portrayed between 
modernity and religion was questioned on normative bases. Subscribing to the view on 
multiple modernities, (see Eisenstadt, 2003), Şerif Mardin (1989), Nilüfer Göle (1992; 
2000), and Kemal Karpat (2001) criticized this dichotomy and pointed to the modernist 
impulse of Islamic alternatives.20 Alev Çınar adds an empirical dimension to this 
normative critique by demonstrating that the Islamic opposition also couches itself 
within an alternative and rival nationalist project (2005). However, these critiques did 
not challenge, but rather emphasized the empirical claim of the modernist narrative—the 
                                                          
20 Also see Findley, 2010 and Heper, 1997. 
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official Turkish nationalism, Kemalism, is an essentially secular project in mutually 
exclusivist terms vis-à-vis religion. 
At this point, the empirical criticism of the modernist narrative enters the picture. 
These critiques argued that such a portrayal of the state and Islam as disparate and 
separable is empirically misleading because the Kemalist state sought to regulate and 
utilize religion rather than eliminate it completely. Eric Zurcher (2010: 271-284), for 
instance, claims that Islam was employed in the service of the state throughout the 
Ottoman period. Despite its rhetoric declaring a rupture with the Ottoman past, the 
Kemalist establishment, for its part, continued in the tradition of their predecessors. 
Without neglecting the central importance of secularism in the Turkish political system, 
Ümit Cizre (1996) claims that the Turkish state maintained a strategic relationship with 
Islam. Adopting a “double discourse” against Islam enabled the Turkish state to 
integrate Islam into the political system without abandoning its radical secularism. This 
approach to the interaction of the state with Islam had critical implications for the 
reading of Turkish nationalism. Given the presumed role of Islam as an arm of the 
Turkish state, it is argued that Islam became a crucial element of Turkish national 
identity. Initially developed by a group of conservative intellectuals (see Kafesoğlu, 
1985), the Turkish-Islamic synthesis soon became the official creed (Capeaux, 1998; 
Grigoriadis, 2013). Thus, instead of the modernist reading that focused on a struggle 
between official secular nationalism and its religious rivals, the new reading proposed 
an alliance of religion and nationalism. This presented an entirely different reading of 
Turkish modernization, one that is more in line with Iqbal’s reading. However, it is 
 25 
 
important to note that this alternative reading often considers the increased role of 
religion as a deviation from the original creed. 
While this religious element is often considered a deviation emerged during the 
multi-party politics era (see Jaschke, 1972), there has been a recent surge in works 
highlighting the presence of religious elements in 1920s and 1930s Kemalism (Poulton, 
1997: 114-130; Yıldız, 2001; Özkırımlı and Sofos, 2008: 161-173; Çağaptay, 2006). 
These important contributions reveal the paradoxical relationship between secular 
nationalism and Islam. However, this religious element is difficult to elucidate in the 
context of an assertive secularism, which is often accepted to be a paradox of 
Kemalism.21 These works focusing on the early Republican period remain mostly 
descriptive, with explanations relying on historical contingency. These analyses, then, 
cannot be extended to examine other marginalized communities, such as the Alevis, or 
to other historical settings. 
In contradistinction to the Turkish case, there is little disagreement that Islam 
played a major role in the formation of Pakistan. After all, Partition was organized 
according to religious criteria—with Pakistan formed by unifying the Muslim-majority 
provinces of British India.22 In this regard, Pakistan differs from the majority of post-
colonial states because its formation was based on an identity rather than on the 
territorial arrangements of the colonial state (Schuman, 1972: 295). Moreover, unlike 
Turkey and many other countries, Pakistan lacked criteria other than religion that would 
                                                          
21 For an analysis of Kemalism as a Weltanschauung open to multiple interpretations and contradictions 
rather than as a rigid political ideology, see Özbudun, 1981. 
22 Bengal and Punjab, provinces that had slim Muslim majorities, were also divided along religious lines. 
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be incorporated as part of its definition of an inclusive national identity. What remains 
unclear is how the significance of religion would be translated into daily politics.   
At the time of its formation, those who found themselves contained within the 
borders of the new state of Pakistan spoke thirty-two different languages belonging to 
five major linguistic families. The country was made up of five different provinces with 
ethnic and regional loyalties, which were quite powerful (Esposito, 1980: 14). In this 
diverse community, Islam was the only commonality. Therefore, Islam and Muslim 
nationalism were integral to the notion of Pakistani nationalism (Baxter et al. 2002: 71). 
Though religion is considered crucial to national identity, there is little agreement as to 
what this would entail. The idea of Pakistan came to mean different things to its 
different constituencies. As a result of this confusion, a perennial identity crisis haunted 
Pakistani politics leading to the partition of the country in 1971 and ongoing tensions. 
Esposito and Voll, for instance, emphasize that, “Pakistan has struggled throughout its 
history with the meaning of its Islamic identity” (1996: 102). 
The ongoing debate on the role of religion in the conduct of state affairs is 
closely related to and reflected in the historiographical debate on the role of Islam in the 
formation of Pakistan. The official Pakistani historiography considers Pakistan as the 
culmination of a centuries-old Muslim existence on the subcontinent. (see Qureshi, 
1969; Qureshi, 1977 and Aziz, 1967) Understandably, this view is supported by the 
Islamic oriented scholars (see Mujahid, 2001) and particularly ones affiliated with the JI 
(see Ahmad, 2006). However, this view is not confined to Islamists alone, but is found 
in the work of many scholars who attribute religion with a central role in Partition 
(Sayeed, 1968; Malik, 1960; Minault, 1982; Metcalf, 1982; Gilmartin, 1988 and Shaikh, 
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1986). In the 1980s, this Islamic reading of the formation of Pakistan was increasingly 
criticized by a new generation of historians (Page, 1982; Jalal, 1994; Alavi, 1987, 2002; 
Malik, 2008). These scholars claimed that Partition could be explained without referring 
to religious ideology. Instead, the focus was concentrated on British political designs, 
the elite politics of the Indian subcontinent, or even on a series of historical accidents. A 
sharp division runs through the South Asian Studies literature between “those who 
maintain that the role of Islamic ideology in the conduct of Indian Muslim politics was 
either illusory or wholly instrumental, and those who argue that Islam was the only 
explanatory factor behind partition and Pakistan” (Shaikh, 1986: 539-540). This division 
also marks the well-known debate between Paul Brass (1974; 1977; 2000) and Francis 
Robinson (1974; 1977; 2000),23 which evolved into one of the fundamental debates in 
the literature on nationalism.   
Debates on Jinnah exemplify the divide between Islamists and secularists in 
Pakistan, who each have their own image of Jinnah (Ahmed, 1997). Critiquing and 
questioning Jinnah’s dietary habits,24 for instance, have had significant effects on 
contemporary Pakistani politics. For many, Jinnah is either “an Islamic visionary who 
created the first Muslim nation-state or he is the arch secularist who, by some ironic 
twist of fate, managed to create a confessional state” (Sayyid and Tyrer, 2002: 57). It 
                                                          
23 This debate attracted attention far beyond South Asian Studies. The positions of these authors fit the 
debate between the constructivist and primordialist strands of the literature on nationalism. One article 
from each author was included in one of the most important compilations on nationalism (Smith and 
Hutchinson, 2000). However, it is important to recall that Robinson, particularly through his later 
formulations, does not fall squarely into the primordialist camp.  
24 Specifically, questions arise as to whether Jinnah ate ham or not, and whether he drank wine or not, 
which led to further speculation as to whether or not he began abstaining from alcohol at a later point in 
his life. 
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could be argued that a similar focus on the cult of Atatürk is evident in Turkey with 
Islamic groups appropriating him as part of their movements, albeit with a more 
religious personality. However, there is much more room for debate in the case of 
Jinnah. His untimely death soon after the formation of Pakistan makes his record on 
issues of Islam and politics more ambiguous. Moreover, during his very short tenure as 
the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah made contradictory statements that provided 
ammunition for the arsenals of both camps. While the secularists often refer to his 
speech at the inaugural session of Constitutional Assembly, delivered on August 11, 
1947, the Islamists argue that it should be contextualized among his statements 
committing to the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state. In his historic speech, Jinnah 
declared: 
Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and 
prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of 
the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in 
co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to 
succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every 
one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what 
relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste, 
or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, 
privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will 
make […] Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, 
and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus, 
and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, 
because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political 
sense as citizens of the State. 
In fact it is difficult to see under which context his seminal 11 August speech could be 
interpreted rather than a perfect statement of political secularism, yet it is equally true 
that before and after this speech Jinnah made various references to the Islamic nature of 
Pakistan.   
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The centrality of the debate on Jinnah’s piety and his religious views for 
Pakistani national ideology arises out of the assumption that only religious people assign 
a role to religion in the construction of national identity, which is based upon a binary 
reading of its as being either Islamic or secular. The significant function played by 
religion in the formation of secular national ideologies is often overlooked. Moreover, it 
is this very perception that treats the simultaneous existence of an assertively secular 
political system along with clear Islamic influences as part of Turkish national identity 
to be a contradiction. In both countries, the debate on the relation of religion and 
national identity is mistakenly placed in a replacement versus synthesis nexus. 
Moreover, the larger debate in the nationalism literature seems to be trapped in a similar 
oppositional nexus. 
 
2.1 Literature Review on Religion and Nationalism 
Nationalism studies had long been affected by a binary opposition between modernists/ 
constructivists/instrumentalists and perennialists/primordialists/ethno-symbolists 
(Smith, 1971; 2000; Özkırımlı, 2010). This divide likewise shaped the debate on the 
relation between religion and nationalism. However, I will not examine the details of 
this divide. As Antoine Roger points out, this division offers little because the central 
arguments of the modernist camp are incomparably better articulated and well-founded 
(2008: 3). In its approach to nations and nationalism, this study situates itself firmly 
within the modernist-constructivist camp. It attaches crucial significance to the birth of 
the modern state as a new type of relationship between the modern state and its subjects. 
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In this sense, nationalism as an ideology is historically modern and the nation, as a 
community, is a modern social construct. Both are directly related to the formation of 
the modern state and its desire to regulate and control its subjects. This is not to deny 
that people organized communally before the advent of nationalism or that they had 
primordial attachments. The modernist view does not claim that there was one 
homogenous human community fragmented into nations by the advent and spread of 
modernity. Rather, the claim is that the nation is a new form of human classification, 
with the link between primordial attachments and modern nations provided by the 
discourse of nationalism (Özkırımlı, 2010: 202).25  
The latter point was particularly crucial for the emergence of Muslim 
nationalism in the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire. People referring to the 
pre-modern significance of Islamic identity for Muslims often equate this primordial 
sense of Islamic belonging with the modern notion of Muslim nationalism (Karpat, 
1972; Aktürk, 2009; Robinson 1974; Shaikh 1986). However Muslim nationalism 
entails a political claim on behalf of Muslims within a given territory by departing from 
the social and religious significance of Islam in the lives of the individual Muslims. It is 
only in this light that the opposition of the Indian ulama to Muslim nationalism and the 
significance of the modern state can be understood. As Talal Asad rightly points, an 
association of Islam with state power is the result not of Islam’s commitment to 
nationalist ideas, but of the modern nation-state’s enforced claim to constitute legitimate 
social identities and arenas (2003: 200). As the emergence of nations and nationalisms is 
                                                          
25 For a brief but illuminating analysis of this point see the exchange between Anthony Smith (1996) and 
Ernest Gellner (1996a) on the question of “Do Nations Have Navels?”  
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primarily linked to the new relationship between the state and its subjects, Muslim 
nationalism has appeared only under this guise. 
However, this divide in the literature on nationalism is not productive for the 
purposes of this dissertation because the analysis offered by the modernist camp lacks a 
deep engagement with the function of religion in nation-building. Without dealing with 
the larger debate between the modernists and the primordialists, I will provide a brief 
summary of the two approaches on the relationship between religion and nationalism 
and reveal the shortcomings of the existing literature. Thereafter, I will analyze the 
relationship between religion and nationalism. This analysis also identifies the guiding 
principles of this dissertation, as well as my approach to the inquiry on the relationship 
of religion and nation-building in the Turkish and Pakistani cases. 
 
2.2 Religion and Nation 
The relation between nationalism and religion remained understudied by scholars of 
nationalism until the 1990s. The modernist school considers religion—like other pre-
modern identities, such as ethnicity and language—as irrelevant to the growth of 
nationalism. Even when the relation between religion and nationalism is discussed, this 
discussion is done “from the perspective of ‘nationalism as a religion’ a thesis that is 
much common to nationalism studies and nationalism literature” (Çıtak, 2004: 31). 
Thus, the relationship between religion and nationalism is considered to be a simple 
process of replacing or substituting nationalism for religion. Anderson (1983) 
exemplifies this modernist approach in his identification of the importance of the 
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vacuum created by secularization for the evolution of nationalism. Gellner (1983) 
similarly takes a modernist stance by considering nationalism “as the replacement of 
religion as the cultural framework of the emerging capitalist economy” (Çıtak, 2004: 
34). However, both authors point to the significance of the Reformation as contributing 
the decay of religion. Religion is associated with nationalism not by its existence, but 
instead by its absence or decay. In other words, nationalism is more concerned with the 
decay of religion than it is with its existence. In this view, nationalism is a secular 
religion, an unintended consequence of Protestantism, which plays a significant, but 
“negative role” (by creating an institutional or moral vacuum) for the birth of 
nationalism. 
While modernists consider nationalism from the perspective of the secularization 
thesis,26 more culturalist and primordialist approaches consider religion as a component 
of a particular nationalism, for which they seek religious roots. Peter Van der Veer’s 
(1994), Adrian Hastings’s (1996) and Liah Greenfeld’s (1992) works are important 
attempts at explaining the emergence of nationalism with regard to religion. As opposed 
to the modernist secularization thesis, religion is considered central to the construction 
of the nation. Among the three authors, Hastings and Greenfeld also emphasize 
Protestantism, not as a decay of religion, but a transformation of “traditional” religion 
that eventually culminates in the birth of nations and nationalisms (a positive role). 
                                                          
26 One reason for the rise of alternative approaches to the relationship between nationalism and religion is 
the apparent failure of the orthodox secularization thesis. Until the end of the twentieth century, it was 
assumed that religious beliefs and identities would diminish as modernity transformed society. However, 
the persistence of religious practices and the worldwide resurgence of religion has weakened faith in the 
secularization thesis. To see the shift from the secularization thesis to the desecularization thesis, see 
Berger (1964) and Beger (1999). For the most influential work on the secularization thesis and its 
critiques see Casanova (1994).  
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According to Anthony Smith (2003), in these disparate approaches, “the relation 
between nationalism and religion is perceived as an evolutionary framework that sees an 
inevitable movement whether evolutionary or destructive from the one to the other” 
(quoted in Mihelj, 2007, emphasis added). While the modernist school considers this 
movement destructive, culturalists deem it evolutionary. 
However, it is crucial to note that most authors concentrating on the significance 
of religion as part of a developmental progression to nationalism are speaking primarily 
of Protestantism. In particular, is argued that Protestantism contributed to the birth of 
nationalism through individualization, the institutional decay of church authority 
(Gellner, 1983), by creating a moral vacuum (Anderson, 1983), through the 
vernacularization of religious texts (Hastings, 1997), or the particularization and 
diversification of churches (Greenfeld, 1990). Emphasis has also been placed on the role 
of Protestantism, either negatively or positively, in constructing national identities that 
led to the search of a “functional equivalent of Protestantism” (Mihelj, 2007) in the non-
Western context,27 a search in which the Muslim World was believed to constitute an 
exception. 
An alternative approach classifies nationalisms as either secular or religious 
nationalisms. Mark Juergensmeyer claims that religion’s incompatibility with the values 
of the secular West deems it irreconcilable with secular nationalism. However, it is clear 
that religions create their own nationalisms and contemporary politics is often viewed as 
                                                          
27 The crucial role attributed to Protestantism in Western modernity is not limited to the study of 
nationalism. In fact, since the influential work of Weber, many aspects of modernity, including capitalism, 
democratization, and nationalism, are linked to Protestantism in some manner. 
 34 
 
a battleground between secular and religious versions of nationalism (1993; 1996). This 
insightful point demonstrates the nationalist character of many religious movements 
across the globe. Still, Juergensmeyer’s theory is insufficient in its fixed demarcation 
between religious and secular nationalisms. Juergensmeyer further neglects the 
paradoxical role of religion within secular nationalisms.  
Anthony Marx presents the most convincing account of the role of religion in 
civic and secular nationalisms (2003). According to Marx, religious exclusion forms the 
basis of Western civic nationalism. The presence of homogenous populations in three 
major Western European nation-states was possible only through the coercion and 
exclusion of religious minorities, including Muslims and Jews in Spain, Protestants in 
France and Catholics in England. However, his is a historical account limited to these 
three states, which refers to a contingent affair of the struggles of the Reformation and 
Counter Reformation. 
Though this study is situated in the modernist camp, it moves beyond the 
modernist approach when scrutinizing the relation between nationalism and religion. 
Moreover, the two cases and debates discussed in this dissertation reveal the limitations 
in explaining the complex relationship between nationalism and religion. How can we 
explain the secular elites’ emphasis on religion in the construction of national identity? 
Is it primarily tactical? If so, how is it that the most radically secular nationalism in the 
Muslim world continues to incorporate many religious elements? On the other hand, if 
Pakistani national identity was derived completely from religion, how can we explain 
the half-heartedness of Pakistani elites in positioning religion as the basis of national 
identity? As these questions show, the role played by religion in nation-building is an 
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extremely complicated one. The prevailing paradigms in area studies are incapable of 
treating these complicated questions. Moreover, the burgeoning field of nationalism 
studies has yet to provide area specialists with adequate theoretical tools.  
Based on the above literature reviews, the reader may identify three disparate 
dichotomies that coincide in three separate fields: Ottoman/Turkish Studies, South 
Asian/Pakistani Studies, and nationalism studies.28 This dissertation rejects an appeal to 
binary oppositions that delineate the parties of the debate between those who consider 
religion irrelevant and those who consider it as vital to nation-building. On the contrary, 
it argues that the role of religion is not unilinear (destructive or evolutionary), but is 
instead a very complex process with varying degrees of importance—crucial at times 
and irrelevant at others. The key factor determining the role of religion in nation-
building is that of homogenization. 
 
2.3 Religious Diversity and Homogenization 
The first Christian King of the Magyars, Saint Stephen (998-1038), told his son St. 
Emeric (Imre) that “a country unified in language and customs is fragile and weak” 
(Jazsi, 1961: 39). Karen Barkey similarly argues that both the Romans and the Ottomans 
believed that “difference added to the empire, [it] didn’t detract from it” (2008: 110).  
This attitude stands in stark opposition to European state-making, which resulted in the 
formation of modern nation-states. In Western Europe, the emphasis was on 
                                                          
28 It should be noted that some of the works cited above do not conform to these dichotomies—they 
instead attempt to overcome or, more often, bridge them. 
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homogeneity rather than diversity and this homogeneity was considered a prime source 
of strength.29 
However, this emphasis on homogeneity raises a fundamental contradiction 
between state formation and nation-building. It is almost inconceivable that a state 
would forgo any territory willingly.30 Nation-states are no exception. Benedict Anderson 
defines the transition from empire to nation-state as an attempt at “stretching the tight 
body of the nation to the rest of the empire” (1991: 86). However nationalism is an 
exclusionary ideology that transforms a strictly delineated community into a nation only 
by excluding many from the definition of nation (Chatterjee, 1993: 155). These two 
goals are clearly contradictory: a larger geographical territory undeniably entails the 
incorporation of diverse individuals and communities, which results in greater 
heterogeneity. Nationalism, however, emphasizes homogenization at the expense of 
those considered different. 
Whereas drive to expand necessitates the broadest definition of the nation 
possible— territorial or civic, the ideology of nationalism often yields a more narrow 
                                                          
29 Nationalism presupposes homogeneity as a virtue over diversity. Fischer Lundgree and Stein Rokkan 
scrutinize this assumption in their contribution to the classical volume edited by Charles Tilly (1975). 
Lundgree and Rokkan’s argument focus on two key propositions: 1) a homogenous population is more 
likely to remain loyal to a regime led by members of its own community; and, 2) the centralized policies 
of extraction and control were more likely to yield a high return to the government where the population’s 
daily life was organized in relatively uniform ways. Thus, a single successful policy could easily be 
generalized to all parts of a state (Tilly, 1975: 79). For Gellner, homogeneity is vital to the efficient 
functioning of modern industrial society. However, Gellner does not claim a direct correlation between 
homogeneity and efficiency. As Arash Abizadeh rightly argues in his 2002 APSR article, “Gellner is not 
necessarily committed to the position that the more homogenous society, the more efficient economy; 
rather he is committed to the position that there is a minimum baseline of cultural homogeneity that is 
required. It is just that, that baseline is very high” (505). 
30 There are quite a few exceptions when states pursue a policy of downsizing. For a collection of essays 
on these exceptions, see O’Leary et. al (2001). 
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definition, based on religion, ethnicity, or language. The tension between territorial 
expansion versus a constricted definition of the nation underlies the basic causes of 
conflict in diverse nation-building processes. As Prasenjit Duara argues argues, nations 
should be understood as relationships based on inclusions and exclusions (1995; quoted 
in Eley and Suny, 1996: 151). The decision of where to draw the line of inclusion and 
exclusion is a major source of nationalist conflict. Alternative nationalist projects often 
differ on how to define and delimit the nation. Conflicts between irredentist, separatist 
and pan movements, civic and ethnic varieties of nationalisms, as well as religious and 
secular nationalisms are part and parcel of the disagreement between the contradictory 
impulses of enlargement and homogenization. This contradiction is particularly 
important for our discussion, as it also reveals the point at which religion is either 
functional for nation-building or when it is an impediment. According to Eric 
Hobsbawm, nineteenth century liberal nationalism was especially noteworthy due to its 
power of unification and enlargement (1991: 39). This unification attempt was not 
confined to the oft-cited examples of Germany and Italy. Rather, in their attempt at 
modernizing, empires would include their entire citizenry as part of their newly 
propagated imperial nationalism. However, in every case of nation-building, an elite 
attempt at fostering cultural unity accompanied efforts of political unification (Esherick 
et. al, 2006: 5). 
The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion play their part in the contradiction 
between enlargement, territorial expansion, and homogenization. There are three 
policies that a modern state can follow with regard to the diverse nature of its citizenry: 
assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion (Mylonas, 2012; Aktürk, 2012). 
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Assimilation is the only policy that enables homogenization without excluding any 
individual. Thus, from the perspective of state elites, it is the most preferable and most 
often observed policy of nation-states and nationalizing states. At times, when 
assimilation may not be an option, states either accommodate this diversity by either 
assuming a multi-cultural order or maintaining their mono-cultural definition of the 
nation by instead excluding the perceived inassimilable elements.31 However, 
accommodation should not be included as part of the strategies of nation-building. 
Mylonas, who offers accommodation as a policy of nation-building, defines it as a 
situation “where the ‘differences’ of a non-core group are more or less respected and 
institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place. The host state 
grants the status of ‘minority’ to that non-core group” (2012: 22). However, the very 
fact that accommodation is accomplished by granting minority status means that these 
groups are not incorporated into the nation-building process. Accommodation is instead 
a mere strategy with which to negotiate diversity, not one of nation-building (which 
essentially aims to expel this diversity). Members of the accommodated communities, 
then, are citizens, but not nationals of the state. If a narrow notion of legal citizenship is 
taken as a criterion, accommodation should be defined as a form of inclusion. However, 
if the sociologically more relevant criterion of nationhood is instead considered, 
accommodation indeed represents a form of exclusion. 
                                                          
31 If the nation is understood as a form of practice, accommodationist policies entail a deviation from it. 
Thus, accommodation is a policy that I would associate with multi-nationalist states. There are two 
different forms of assimilationist policies: 1) assimilation to the cultural values of a dominant group; or, 2) 
assimilation of each and every group to a newly emerging, neutral cultural milieu. In practice, both 
demand the subscription of the entire nation to one cultural element. It is also clear that many 
accommodationist policies within the nation-state form are thinly veiled forms of assimilation.  
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The literature on nation-building often focuses either on the means of 
assimilation (a modern education system, military service, social mobilization, the 
emergence of a common market, the economic rationality of assimilation for minorities, 
and, of course, the deliberate efforts of states in cultural engineering (Gellner, 1983; 
Deutsch, 1953; Conversi, 2007; Rokkan, 1975; Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973; Laitin, 
1998; Brubaker, 1996; Birch, 1989; Poulantzas, 1978) or on the policies of exclusion 
with a focus on how and why it turned violent (Horowitz, 1985; Rae, 2002; Snyder, 
2000; Mann, 2005; Bulutgil, 2009). Harris Mylonas analyzes why states varyingly 
prefer either exclusion or assimilation by referring to international factors such as the 
foreign policy goals of the state and its alliance preferences (2012). Each of these works 
is useful, and I do not intend to challenge them in general. Instead, I take a more modest 
approach and argue that the elements of differentiation between groups have a decisive 
impact on the policies of assimilation or exclusion. 
Here, with regard to assimilation and exclusion, there is a major difference 
between religion and language—two major markers of identity. The nineteenth century 
has demonstrated that large-scale conversion from a major institutionalized religion to 
another is near impossible. No such conversion took place among believers of 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism or Hinduism throughout the modern era. Where large scale 
religious conversion did take place, as in South Korea and large parts of Africa, it was 
from animistic or local religions to Christianity or Islam. More recently, conversion in 
Russia and Albania saw a shift from atheism to Christianity or Islam, respectively. 
Despite large-scale conversion from animism and atheism to established world religions, 
the transfer between these religions is far less likely. In light of such experiments, even 
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the zeal of missionary activities is often limited to intra-confessional conversion, such as 
that of Armenians to Protestantism or Catholicism (Salt, 2002; Lindner, 2009). This 
suggests that assimilation is not an option when it comes to the management of religious 
diversity states either accommodate or exclude, with the adaption of the latter strategy as 
contingent upon the failure of the first. Secession should also be considered a form of 
exclusion from the point of view of seceding. Any group demanding secession on the 
claim of having a distinct national identity does not only exclude itself from the larger 
political community, but, since it is modeled on the notion of a homogenous nation-
state, it also excludes the out group members from the seceding national identity. 
Therefore, each secession based on the self-determination of one minority creates new 
minority problems.   
The two nation-building cases that this dissertation deals with exemplify the 
failures of accommodation through religious plurality and subsequent exclusion. There 
are various reasons for the failure of accommodation, and they are scrutinized in the 
third and fourth chapters. However, it is crucial to recall that the emergence and 
structure of the modern state, with its unifying and homogenizing impulses, make the 
tolerant accommodation of diversity highly unlikely. 
The following observations can be made with regard to religion and language in 
the policies of assimilation and exclusion: 
1- The first priority for states is to maintain the largest territory possible along 
with its population; 
2- The state first aims to assimilate the population within the territory; 
 41 
 
3- Linguistic assimilation is often easier to achieve. In most cases, attempts are 
then made for co-religionists to be assimilated linguistically; 
4- Religious assimilation is easier within the same religion or from a local 
religion towards a major institutionalized religion. Therefore, nationalizing 
states often try to eradicate or blur sectarian differences; 
5- It is quite difficult to assimilate from a major institutionalized religion to 
another; 
6- If it is impossible to assimilate (either religiously or linguistically), and the 
state sticks to its mono-cultural definition, the second option is to pursue 
exclusion; 
7- If exclusion is impossible without territorial loss, then there are two options: 
1) either downsize the territory (partition); or, 2) widen the definition of the 
nation; 
8- Partition may take place on religious (India-Pakistan) or linguistic bases 
(Pakistan-Bangladesh); 
9- The broadening of national identity may either result in a shift from ethnic to 
civic nationalism, (India after partition, recent debates in Turkey on 
“Turkiyelilik” which can be translated as being a member of Turkey, as 
opposed to being a Turk) or from a religious nationalism towards a secular 
one (Albania, Germany, Eastern Arabs). 
If the state is unable to either assimilate or exclude its linguistic minorities, it is then 
forced to shift towards a more civic version of nationalism to prevent any loss of 
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territory. If the state is unable to either assimilate or exclude its religious minorities, it is 
then forced to secularize national identity. 32 
If we look at nation-formation in Turkey and the Indian subcontinent, we 
observe unique policies aimed at the homogenization of religious and linguistic 
diversity. Pakistan and Turkey were both formed according to a notion of religious 
homogenization through religious exclusion. In 1912, a large Christian minority (20.2 
percent of the population) inhabited the area comprising modern Turkey. However, in 
the succeeding decade, which saw the emergence of modern Turkey, the Christians of 
Anatolia experienced a religious cleansing through mass killings, forced deportations, 
and the Lausanne Agreement (a creative measure of enforced population exchange). As 
a consequence of the religious cleansing of Anatolia, the 1927 census estimated that the 
non-Muslim population represented a mere 2.2 percent of the total population. Through 
nationalization, religious homogeneity was primarily dealt with through exclusionary 
mechanisms, albeit some ethno-linguistic plurality was accommodated under the banner 
of Muslim nationalism. With the inception of the nation-state in 1923, this linguistic 
diversity was subjected to assimilationist policies. 
Though the advent of the modern state in the nineteenth century was a turning 
point in state-society relations and the emergence of national forms and ideologies, the 
rise of the nationalizing state of modern Turkey represents yet another. While the first 
                                                          
32 Though no universal structural explanation has yet to account for the circumstances under which 
exclusion is more preferable than accommodation or partition, contingency often shapes the struggle 
between assimilation and exclusion. Demography, however, certainly plays a role. In order for exclusion 
or assimilation to be viable alternatives for the state, it needs a sufficient core population, staatsvolk 
(O’Leary, 2001), which means it should be able to tolerate the loss of the excluded and should have a 
realistic expectation that future members could be assimilated into the core population. 
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phase of nationalization was based on the religious exclusion of non-Muslims, the 
second phase was primarily based on the assimilation of intra-Muslim plurality. In line 
with the above observations, “non-assimilable” religious groups were excluded while 
“assimilable” Muslim minorities, be they sectarian (Alevis) or ethno-linguistic (Kurds, 
Albanians, Arabs, Circassians, Lazes, etc.), were the main targets of the assimilationist 
policies of the nationalizing state.33 
While the religious homogenization of Turkey was done through violent and 
non-violent means of shifting the people, in Pakistan, this was accomplished primarily 
(though not exclusively) by shifting borders. When Pakistan was formed as an 
independent state, its territories were arranged so as to include as many Muslims and as 
few non-Muslims as possible—a sort of religious gerrymandering. While Pakistan was 
formed through the unification of the Muslim majority provinces of the Indian 
subcontinent in the northwest and northeast, with one thousand miles separating the two 
wings of the country. Bengal and Punjab, which had slight Muslim majorities, were 
divided in a way that ensured the Muslim homogeneity of Pakistan. Although each these 
provinces was populated almost entirely by the same ethno-linguistic community, they 
were divided on the basis of religion, with only the Muslim majority parts of West 
Punjab and East Bengal incorporated as part of Pakistan.34 After this shift in borders, the 
                                                          
33 Namık Kemal’s views on the spread of Turkish among non-Muslims and Muslims reflect this attitude 
of exclusion vis-à-vis non-Muslims and assimilation for Muslims. According to Kemal, “it is impossible 
to encourage the spread of our language among Greeks or Bulgarians, but it is surely possible among 
Albanians and Lazes, namely Muslims. If we set up regular schools in their countries and carry out the 
programs which are now not fulfilled, the Laz and Albanian languages will be utterly forgotten in twenty 
years.” (Arai, 1992: 3). 
34 At this point, one may argue that leaving these territories out were not part of the Muslim League’s 
project, but were forced to accept it (see, for instance, Jalal, 1994). At one point, Jinnah defined Pakistan 
as moth-eaten Pakistan after it was clear that West Bengal, which included the major port of Calcutta and 
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population exchange, inspired by the Turkish-Greek case, became a serious option under 
consideration for Pakistan and India. Despite neither the Pakistani state nor the Indian 
state enforcing such an exchange, Partition saw one of the largest population transfers in 
history. Approximately fourteen million people suddenly found themselves on the 
wrong side of the line after Partition and migrated—a violent process, which cost nearly 
one million lives. Just as in case of Turkey nearly a quarter century ago, Pakistan was 
formed as a relatively homogenous Muslim state with enormous ethno-linguistic and 
sectarian diversity. Similar to the Turkish state, the Pakistani state was fashioned as a 
self-consciously nationalizing state in which the real aim was to become a solid and 
cohesive nation. This process entailed the formation of a society with one language, one 
religion, and one culture. Thus, the formation of the nation-state in Pakistan, similar to 
Turkey, was followed by a policy of linguistic homogenization that backfired and led to 
the subsequent succession of East Pakistan in 1971 as Bangladesh. 
By considering nation-building as a process of homogenization, it is then easier 
to understand the relationship between religion and nationalism. The key concept that 
determined the conflicting roles of religion was homogenization. This was particularly 
true for multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, which was particularly the case when 
transitioning from an imperial society to a national one. In this process, Islam is 
employed by political entrepreneurs (no matter what their personal allegiance to religion 
might be, if any) to foster the sense of homogenous society. Thus it has a definite, albeit 
                                                                                                                                                                          
East Punjab, would not be included in Pakistan. However, it is undeniable that Jinnah would have 
expected this once he argued that Pakistan would be a state for Muslims. The Muslim demand to include 
non-Muslim regions into Pakistan is based primarily on economic reasons, and the desire to include a 
major port like Calcutta in Pakistan.  
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limited role in nation-building. Since Islam used as a tool of homogenization, it loses its 
functional role as soon as religious homogeneity is secured and, at this point, Islam is 
replaced by efforts aiming at ethno-linguistic homogeneity. The success of this phase 
depends on the conditions of state formation. The first phase for creating a homogenous 
society is to exclude non-Muslims and then assimilate the different ethnic communities 
of the Muslim faith to that of the majority ethno-linguistic community. Religion is 
necessary for the first phase, but unnecessary for or even harmful to the second phase. 
Thus, nationalization (homogenization) followed similar patterns of religious 
exclusion and linguistic assimilation in both countries. At this point, it should be noted 
that although the basic parameters of this process can be best analyzed through a two-
phase historical analysis, these processes are ongoing and never complete (since perfect 
homogeneity is never achieved). Both phases then continue to operate simultaneously. 
This leads to a persistent tension in examinng the true role of religion for defining 
national identity. The inclusion of Islam as an inherent part of national identity, along 
with its simultaneous suppression, is one of main reasons for the enduring anxieties in 
considering the role of religion in national identity. 
This dissertation focuses primarily on the process of religious exclusion, with 
only cursory remarks on the policies of assimilation (including religious assimilation 
targeting minority sects or ethno-linguistic assimilation). The process of homogenization 
and its first phase, religious exclusion, was pursued due to the modern state’s inability to 
safeguard religious diversity. Thus, as a process, religious exclusion began before the 
emergence of these two nation-states and was indeed what led to their formation. I 
define this ideology as Muslim nationalism. Taking the famous Gellnerian definition of 
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nationalism as the congruence between the political unit and the cultural unit (1983: 1), I 
argue that these politics may be labeled “Muslim nationalism.” The cultural unit in this 
case was defined as religious commonality—as opposed to speaking the same language 
in the Gellnerian scheme. Moreover, the political unit would emerge as corresponding to 
this religious identity. Ultimately, what results would be a state for solely Muslims, 
which would not incorporate any other significant religious community.35 The different 
circumstances of these two Muslim nationalisms correspond with what Charles Tilly 
defined as “state led nationalisms vs. state seeking nationalisms” (1975: 133-134). 
Therefore, the political developments in each case expose considerable variations; 
however, both cases still fit the category of Muslim nationalism.36 
Determining the role of religion in nation-building process has important 
theoretical implications for the treatment of the dichotomies of ethnic and civic 
nationalisms, as well religious and secular nationalisms. This dissertation destabilizes 
the dichotomy of religious and secular nationalisms by revealing a very crucial function 
of religion, which cannot be labeled as either religious or secular. 
Another minor contribution pertains to the ethnic-civic dichotomy in the 
nationalism literature. This is probably the most persistent dichotomy used in the 
literature of nationalism. The widespread usage of this dichotomy arises out of its 
usefulness rather than its accuracy. This dichotomy often helps to project a notion of 
                                                          
35 It is important to note that this state is not necessarily an Islamist one. It would be a state for Muslims, 
but not necessarily an Islamist one. This is a vital distinction and though there are similar cases throughout 
history, it often escapes attention. A short discussion with comparisons to the Israeli case is provided at 
the end of this chapter. 
36 It is possible to formulate the Turkish case as a form of state-led Muslim nationalism in contrast to the 
Pakistani case, which is more accurately described as a state seeking Muslim nationalism. 
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“good” nationalism (western/civic/territorial/secular/democratic/old/emancipatory) 
versus “bad” (eastern/ethnic/ blood-based/religious/exclusionary/new/authoritarian) 
nationalisms. It is assumed that although the former nationalism fit realities, in the latter, 
realities were forced to fit the nationalist paradigm. Thus, while the former was liberal 
and peaceful, the latter was authoritarian and violent. In reality these distinctions are 
based on strategies of homogenization rather than on the notion of homogenization itself 
(Brubaker, 1996).37 Nationalism, both in its civic and ethnic forms, is a homogenizing 
ideology. Very crucially, in civic nationalisms, it is homogenization through 
assimilation while in ethnic nationalisms, it is homogenization through exclusion. Thus, 
ethnic nationalisms hold the potential to turn more violent, yet state coercion in civic 
nationalism, even in the paradigmatic cases of Western Europe, should not be neglected 
(see Weber, 1976). 
Though widely used, this dichotomy is similarly criticized (see Yack, 1996; 
Kymlicka, 1995). The critiques do not claim that these concepts are entirely 
unproductive or misleading. However, the critiques maintain two points: 
1) No nationalism is entirely civic or ethnic. Rather than treated as two distinct 
types, this dichotomy should be considered a spectrum along which various 
nationalisms are located—with some leaning more to the ethnic or civic poles 
than others; 
                                                          
37 Brubaker who is responsible for the penetration of this dichotomy in the literature by his 1994 work on 
the comparison of French and German nationalisms repulsed the usage of this dichotomy later on. He 
rightly points out that nationalism is primarily about culture. However, if culture is considered an ethnic 
element and civic nationalism is considered a means of political allegiance devoid of culture, no 
nationalism would qualify as civic. In contrast, if culture is considered a civic virtue and ethnicity is 
understood simply as blood ties and descent, then almost no nationalism would qualify as ethnic 
(Brubaker, 1999). 
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2) Even if we consider that nationalisms are not civic or ethnic, but somewhere 
along the spectrum, we should remember that these positions are not constant. 
Any nationalism can take on a more ethnic nature at some point and become 
more civic at another or vice versa.  
I agree with both criticisms and consider them to be important contributions for better 
understanding the ethnic-civic dichotomy. However, based on the above observations 
and my analysis of these two nation-building cases, I would add that any nationalism 
might simultaneously occupy multiple positions on the spectrum. Thus, nationalisms in 
Pakistan and Turkey are based on the exclusion of non-Muslims (typical of ethnic 
nationalism) and the assimilation of Muslim elements to the mono-cultural concept of 
nation propagated by the nationalizing state (typical of civic nationalism). Moreover, 
both strategies target specific communities and are applied simultaneously. Turkish and 
Pakistani nationalisms reveal different levels of ethnic and civic elements 
simultaneously.  
 
2.4 How Muslim is Muslim Nationalism? 
It is clear that religion played a central role in the formation of the nation. However, I do 
not claim that it was purely a religious movement. I define the role of Islam in national 
identity as a negative component of national identity, which means that it is used only as 
a means of exclusion from the national community, but is not a criterion used to 
positively define national identity. National identity is religious in the sense of being 
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anti-Christian and anti-Hindu, but is not used to define who is a Muslim. This helps 
elucidate the emphasis of secular nationalists on Islam.38 
Such an approach will help us understand why religion is perceived within a 
nationalist framing by modernist elites. It will also allow us to understand why religion 
was later abandoned by the very elite who instrumentalized the use of religion as a stage 
of nation-building. Moreover, this approach will also facilitate an understanding of why 
religion harbored such importance among secular elites as the defining criteria of the 
nation and why the secular elites had been so antagonistic towards and skeptical of the 
non-Muslim minority. Thus, this dissertation will offer an alternative and novel 
narrative on the relation of religion and nation-building, which will reveal the contextual 
nature of the relationship and the various functions religion serves as an instrument of 
homogenization. By presenting parallel lines of development in two unique cases, I will 
offer some general explanations of the evolution of nationalism in the Muslim world.39 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 The ascendancy of Islam in the national identity of Pakistan compared to Turkey can be better 
understood as the result of the ascendancy and continuing centrality of anti-Hindu sentiment and the 
perceived Hindu threat in Pakistan compared to the intensity of anti-Christian feelings, and the perception 
of Christian threat in Turkey. This is partly because Pakistan was an offshoot of the giant Indian body 
politic. Thus, in terms of demographic, military, and economic means, India was undoubtedly more 
powerful than Pakistan. In contrast, Turkey was the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire. Its main Christian 
adversary at the time of state formation Greece, was a miniscule power compared to Turkey. For the 
centrality of anti-India sentiment for Pakistani national identity, see Bangash, 2015: 19-29. 
39 However, despite several very similar lines of evolution in national identity in the cases of Turkey and 
Pakistan, there have produced very different results. Some possible explanations for this difference are 
explored at the conclusion of the dissertation. 
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2.5 Conceptual Clarificatons   
Religious exclusion 
It should be clear that the term religious exclusion in the Turkish and Pakistan contexts 
implies the formation of national identity through the exclusion of non-Muslims. It 
should not be assumed to entail the exclusion of religion from politics and the public 
sphere. 
What does religious nationalism mean? 
The concept of religious nationalism has appeared more recently, as the dominant 
modernist view of nationalism would consider it an oxymoron. Hastings, Greenfeld, 
Smith, Juergensmeyer, and Van der Veer each employ this term in their work. However, 
the meaning in each remains somewhat ambiguous. The source of this ambiguity is 
partly due to the fact that most researchers use the term religious nationalism as part of 
their own agenda and may not be referring to the same phenomena. We can point to two 
different and, to a certain extent, contradictory usages of the term. For instance, it is 
possible to define the concept through either religion or through nationalism. The first 
usage (Hastings, 1997 and Juergensmeyer, 1993) defines a religious community, which 
may also be nationalist. Despite the universalist tendency of many world religions, a 
religious community can also hold nationalist political ambitions as well. This is 
particularly the case when ethnicity and religion coincide and religious conflict soon 
gains a nationalist coloring (as in the Irish case). Most anti-colonial nationalisms also 
follow this tendency (Razi, 1990). 
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The second usage treats the notion of religious nationalism as a form of 
nationalism. The religious qualifier signifies the functionality and importance of religion 
for nationalist leaders, who invoke religion to garner support or, as most right wing 
politicians do, to demand more religious influence as part of the definition of the nation 
(Van der Veer, 1994; Smith, 2003). My usage of the term is more closely related to the 
latter usage. I also define religious nationalism as a specific type of nationalism. 
However, I try to emphasize religion as an identity marker, rather than adherence to a 
particular faith (see Jalal, 2000). Thus, religious nationalism is related to the community 
of believers, not the belief itself.    
What is Muslim nationalism? Is it unique to Islam or are there also Christian or Jewish 
nationalisms?  
In line with my understanding of religious nationalism, I employ Muslim nationalism as 
a type of nationalism rather than a new form of religiosity. This diverges from other 
definitions, such as that of Jenny White (2013), who uses the concept to define a 
religious movement.  
Moreover, Muslim nationalism is not necessarily related to piety. As is evident 
in many of the cases discussed in this dissertation, Muslim nationalism has functioned 
as a political tool of secular elites both in Turkey and Pakistan. In this role, religion is 
important not as a faith, but as a marker of identity. It creates boundaries between 
identities (or bounded identities). In this regard, Muslim nationalism resembles the 
emerging Christian Right in Europe. Over the previous two decades, we have been 
witnessing the emergence of what may truly be called Christian nationalism. For 
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instance, In France, although society has been secularized in many spheres of life and 
with church attendance at a minimum, Christianity has remained at the very center of 
political life. Christianity in France does not represent a matter of faith, but instead 
serves as an identity marker. In the French case, Christianity has functioned to exclude 
the undesired elements from national identity, rather than performing the cohesive 
function that religion has often taken in the early stages of nation-building. The 
exclusion of Muslims from French identity, in particular, and from European identity, in 
general, can accurately be referred to as Christian nationalism. Here, similar to Muslim 
nationalism, the cultural unit expected to be congruent with the political unit is defined 
in religious terms instead of ethnic and linguistic ones.  
The Zionist project provides an even better example of religious nationalism 
deployed as a tool of secular nation-building. In Der Judenstaat (1896), Theodor Herzl 
describes the Zionist utopia. However, the mistranslation of the title into English as 
“The Jewish State” reveals the nature of religious nationalism (the accurate translation 
should be “The State of the Jews”). In essence, Herzl’s project does not address the 
religious nature of the state to be established as a Jewish homeland. At the time of the 
early Zionist movement, Zionist members were thoroughly secularized. Thus, there was 
no desire to make Judaism relevant to the functioning of the new state. In that sense, it 
was not a Jewish state, but would become a state of and only for Jews. Once again, 
religion helps forge bounded identities and the limits of the nation rather than function 
as a belief system. Although it may also serve a function of cohesion—not in terms of 
faith but in terms of identity—its main function was to exclude the Muslims, Christians 
(incl. Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Quakers, etc.), and Druze who were already residing 
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on the land where “The State of Jews” would be established. Today, despite the 
increasing importance of orthodox Jewry in Israeli social and political life, a large 
segment of the Israeli population remains secular. According to the latest statistics, forty 
percent of the population officially declares themselves to be atheist or agnostic. 
However, the religious exclusion of Muslims persists, evidence that religious 
nationalism based on the exclusionary function of religion is by its very nature a secular 
project.      
 
2.5.1 Religion as Boundary Drawer 
This is a study of nationalism, not of religion. Thus, it is not focused on how Islam, 
Hinduism, or Christianity approaches nationalism and the religious treatments of the 
issue. Instead, its focus is on the emergence of nationalism through the transition from 
an imperial system to a centralized modern state, and how a religiously delineated 
national identity became dominant through this transition. However, since religious 
nationalism is at the center of this study, two things should be clarified with regard to 
the notion of religion.  
1) Since this study is about nationalism rather than religion, there is no specific 
concentration on Islam. Muslim nationalism is chosen as the focus of the 
study to preclude religion from becoming a variable; 
2) The main argument of this study is to scrutinize the function of religion as 
an instrument of homogenization in nation-building. There has been a recent 
surge of works that take a critical stance against such an instrumentalist 
 54 
 
approach and instead invite us to take religion more seriously. According to 
Oberoi, “The common proposition that religion was an ideology for 
attaining social goals among certain privileged social groups (or for the state 
elite) does not by itself exhaust the phenomenon of religion” (1994:  20).  
One complication with the instrumentalist view is its elitism, which accords no agency 
to the ordinary man in making history. The masses are not always vulnerable to 
manipulation by elites, and successful social movements are those in which the elites 
and the masses meet. However, this study focuses on the elites precisely because 
nationalism begins as an elite project 
While in Lahore, a religious scholar originally from Uttar Pradesh in India (UP) 
related to me that he was fully aware of the material sacrifices he was making when he 
participated in the movement for Pakistan: “There was nothing to gain materially, and I 
was aware and willing to make that sacrifice for the cause of religion.” There is no 
doubt that he and many others considered the call for Pakistan as a religious cause. It is 
not uncommon for people to make sacrifices for a cause, whether religious or otherwise, 
and to reduce humanity to a totality of interest-maximizing rational actors would be 
misleading. I do not intend to question the intention or sincerity of these people, which 
is not an object of study. However, this study has a more modest and limited concern: it 
attempts to analyze the function of religion in nation-building by contextualizing the 
actions and policy outcomes of nation-builders through different phases of political 
action.   
Another problem in the study of religion is whether there were clearly marked 
religious communities in the pre-modern period or not. Part of the problem is related to 
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the syncretic character of Hinduism. Unlike the monotheistic religions of Middle 
Eastern origin, it is difficult to define Hindu ideology and a bounded Hindu community 
that follows it. The Vedas, Upanishads, and other sacred Hindu texts do not define a 
religion called Hinduism. Hinduism, as a term, was coined only in the nineteenth 
century. It was under British rule that “communities like the Shaivites, Vaishnavites, 
and Lingayats, each with their own history and specific view of the world tied together 
under the blanket category of Hinduism” (Oberoi, 1994: 16). Census operations also 
reflect an attitude that soon created the Hindu majority within India (Cohn, 1984).  
Thus, religion was essentially treated as a local practice. Even Islam in India, 
with its Sufi overtones, was highly syncretic, making it difficult to differentiate Muslims 
from Hindus. Ambiguity and fluidity were the hallmarks of the Indian socio-cultural 
environment and religious affiliations were equally uncertain. This owed much to the 
nature of Hinduism and its offshoots, such as Sikhism. However, two points are 
paramount: first, it is not necessarily unique that the syncretic tradition of Hinduism 
resulted into a syncretic religious tradition in India. Studies of the early Muslim arrival 
to Anatolia reflect an equally syncretic relation between Christians and Muslims, as well 
as between Islamic teachings and the pre-Islamic Shaman cultures of Turkic nomads 
(Kafadar, 1995). It was through the administrative organization of the Ottoman Empire 
that clearly segregated religious communities emerged and a gulf between Muslims and 
Christians became visible. Secondly, even in India, elements of orthodoxy were evident 
just as much as syncretism. The clear distinction seems to be related to the difference 
between urban and rural areas, thus related to the effects of administrative systems and 
the existence of a high culture. Francis Robinson’s interesting study reveals that the 
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madrassa curriculum of the Ottomans and Mughals were almost identical through the 
Middle Ages (1997). Despite the syncretic efforts of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, Islam 
and Hinduism (or its local branches to be more precise) were clearly divided in terms of 
religious teaching and social organization. A study on urban Hyderabad during the 
Mughal period reveals that Muslims and Hindus were aware of communal differences 
and had a complex notion of distinct communal identities. They lived together “not as 
enemies but certainly not as friends” (Kakar, 1996: 10).40 
Plurality of religious identities went through a process of homogenization and 
unification in the process of modernization, particularly through the modern state’s 
desire and Enlightenment-inspired rationale to classify and measure. A new cultural 
elite, representative of this enlightened vision, campaigned aggressively for a 
puritanical, singular tradition. Towards the end of nineteenth century, Arya Samaj and 
Brahmo Samaj, among the Hindus, and Sing Sabha, among the Sikhs, conducted zealous 
missionary campaigns to “purify” their respective religious traditions and defended a 
singular tradition in contrast to the multiple identities of the pre-modern period. The 
struggle between a puritan understanding of Islam and its more syncretic versions 
predate modernity and was reflected through the struggle between Akbar and Ahmad 
Sirhindi (popularly known as Imam-i Rabbani). The evolution of Mughal royalty from 
Akbar to Aurangzeb was in itself a story of the increasing purification of religious 
teachings. However, in the midst of massive Sikh and Hindu religious revivalist 
campaigns, as well as the spread of Christian missionary activities, the modern period 
                                                          
40 Once again, the similarities between the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire are striking. 
Referring to Sudhir Kakar’s description of Hyderabad, Bruce Master argues that “that characterization 
would be appropriate for the cities of Ottoman Arab world as well” (2001:38). 
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also reflected the emergence and spread of many revivalist Muslim movements in North 
India and Bengal. The Faraizi movement in Bengal and the intellectual and political 
tradition of the heirs of Shah Waliullah in North India are cases in point. However, these 
were essentially religious campaigns, and, as I hope to demonstrate in the relevant 
chapters, they have little connection with the Muslim nationalism that led to Partition. 
Muslim nationalism is a specific type of nationalism related to nationalism rather than 
Islam.    
 
2.5.2 Indian Communalism or Nationalism? 
The word communalism is often used to define the state of politics in the Indian 
subcontinent. Its departure from nationalism or religious nationalism remains vague. 
Though it is used to characterize religiously-defined political conflicts in India, it is 
almost never applied to similar conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or Ireland. In this 
sense, communalism seems to be an Eastern version of nationalism. However, I believe 
that there is a more substantial difference, and will utilize Muslim nationalism and 
Muslim communalism in deliberately distinct meanings. Muslim communalism refers to 
communal politics based on the demands for special prerogatives, such as separate 
electorates or quotas, for the Muslim community in India. In that regard, it resembles the 
consociational/confessional model of contemporary Lebanon, in which each community 
has its share in the political system according to census data. However, all religious 
communities, however neatly and exclusively defined they may be, operate under the 
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same political unit. Nationalism, however, mostly concerns separate political 
institutions. Religious nationalism is also related to separate political institutions.  
Therefore, in the case of India, Muslim nationalism emerged as a political 
ideology only after Iqbal’s famous demand for autonomous Muslim majority states in 
1930. This only became an important and viable political alternative after the Lahore 
resolution of 1940, when Muslim communalism was an effective political force in 
certain provinces beginning in late nineteenth century.41 Muslim communalism, on the 
one hand, was demanded by the elites of Muslim minority provinces and concentrates 
on minority privileges. Muslim nationalism, on the other, was about territorial 
arrangements and autonomous political institutions, and was then demanded by Muslim 
majority provinces. Even though Muslim communalism was vital to the success of 
Muslim nationalism, the two phenomena are distinct in their political organization, 
support bases, as well as their political agendas and demands. 
                                                          
41 A clear religious consciousness can be traced back several centuries. However, it should not be 
conflated with nationalism or even communalism. Thus, pointing to violent clashes between Muslims and 
Hindus before modernity does not connote the pre-existence of communalism. Though I will pursue this 
in more detail in the next chapter, at this point I argue that religious awareness should be linked to 
political institutions and a share of power to be considered communal. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRES AND NATION-STATES 
 
 
This chapter forms an analysis of empires and imperial societies. It is not merely a 
historical study of a political system; rather, empires are analyzed as a form of pre-
modern political organization with the purpose of contrasting and comparing them to 
modern states. Through this comparison, it will be revealed that the relationship between 
the state and society in the pre-modern era was fundamentally different from that of the 
modern state. This difference is traced through the degree of direct state control over its 
subjects, which is linked to issues of diversity and plurality. This dissertation 
understands nation-building as homogenization and by contrasting the diverse and 
pluralist nature of empires with the uniformity of the modern nation-state, the crucial 
link between modern state formation, homogenization and nation-building will be 
revealed.  
In addition, this dissertation argues that the task of religion in nation-building is 
linked to its function of homogenization and mostly focuses on the exclusionary role of 
religion in the transition from empire to nation-state. Thus, this chapter analyzes empires 
and nation-states to reveal the process of homogenization accompanying the transition 
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from the Ottoman Empire and British Raj to Turkey and Pakistan. Since the primary 
focus is on the role of religion in homogenization, special attention is given to religion 
in pre-modern polities and its alteration in modern state formation. The discussion with 
regard to empire will be further substantiated through an analysis of state-society 
relations and the role of religion in the Ottoman and Mughal Empires. Since 
homogenization is contextualized within modern state formation and the transition from 
empire to nation-state, the study of these two empires also offers historical background 
for Turkish and Pakistani nation-building. 
There is a strong tradition in scholarship on nationalism of contrasting empires 
with nation-states. Since nationalism is taken as one of the primary reasons for the 
collapse of empires, empires and nation-states are considered antithetical to each other, 
in fact “mortal enemies,” (Kumar, 2010: 119). Two seminal works that have shaped our 
understanding of nationalism and nation-states both point to this contrast. While the 
historical teleology of Ernest Gellner (1983) definitely locates empire with the political 
culture of pre-modernity, Benedict Anderson (1983: 93) points to “the inner 
incompatibility of empire and nation.”42 The convention of contrasting empires and 
nation-states holds in scholarship that both denounces and celebrates the birth of the 
nation-state. The first critique of the idea of nationalism and nation-states—a fierce 
critique—in the English language came from Elie Kedourie, a conservative historian 
with nostalgia for the bygone empires and the imperial system. (See Kedourie, 1960; 
Kedourie, 1971) While Kedourie longed for the imperial system, Rupert Emerson 
                                                          
42 Here Anderson echoes Hannah Arendt who declared the “the inner contradiction” of the two principles 
of nationalism and imperialism (Arendt 1958: 153, quoted in Kumar 2010: 122). 
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(1960) was celebrating the demise of empires and the birth of nation-states. Emerson’s 
From Empire to Nation begins with the creed, “Empires have fallen on evil days and 
nations have risen to take their places.” The tendency to celebrate the nation-state has 
been particularly strong among the mainstream American political science that had pride 
in the country’s origins as a republic that gained independence from an empire.  
The convention of contrasting empires and nation-states, however, does not 
translate into scholarship on empires. Empires as political systems received only scant 
attention from political scientists. One reason for the lack of attention was the negative 
connotations attached to the concept of empire. Partially triggered by the Cold War 
conditions, the labeling of the Soviet Union as an empire (in some cases pointing to the 
anomaly of its existence in an age of nation-states) or indeed as an “empire of evil” 
loaded the idea of ‘empire’ with derogatory terms such as oppressive, backward, pre-
modern…etc. (For an early but sophisticated version of this genre see Niebuhr, 1959). 
Another reason for the lacuna in scholarship, as Alexander Motyl (2001: 3) pointed out, 
was the “conceptual sloppiness of the left.” As the scholars with leftist leanings failed to 
differentiate between the concepts of empire and imperialism, they associated empire 
with the latest stage of capitalism. As a result, they either excluded all pre-capitalist 
empires from their scope of study or claimed that these pre-modern empires were 
capitalist in one way or another. 
Due to these derogatory connotations loaded onto the idea of the empire, Shmuel 
N. Eisenstadt’s (1963) The Political Systems of Empires remained for decades as the 
only seminal work on empires. Yet even in this work, the examination of empires 
clearly remains a historical study on the development and evolution of political systems. 
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Empires, defined as “the historical bureaucratic societies,” are perceived as belonging to 
a distant past; thus not really relevant to the political problems of our age. In this lacuna 
in the scholarship of the concept of empire43, Michael W. Doyle’s 1986 study of 
Empires stands out as a particularly important study on the subject. Not only as, “a voice 
in wilderness” (Motyl, 2001: 1), but also as a precursor of the forthcoming literature.   
As problems of the nation-state system became more evident in the post 1991 
era, empires as political systems began to receive increased attention from scholars. This 
new interest resulted in a series of valuable publications that proposed an examination of 
empires and their political systems as systems that could hold solutions to the problems 
of the contemporary age (Howe, 2004; Barkey and Von Hagen, 1997; Motyl, 2001; 
Barkey, 2008; Esherick, Kayalı and Van Young, 2006; Ferguson, 2004, Maier, 2006; 
Cooper, 1997; Cooper, 2005). In most of these works, empires are described as political 
units that managed to govern diversity much more effectively and peacefully than the 
nation-states. Contrary to the previous convention of naming empires as “prisons of 
nations,” this new literature points to the “opportunity structures of the empires” 
(Comisso, 2006). The more nation-states became the norm in international political 
system, the more empires were portrayed negatively.  As the euphoria of nationalism 
fades, nostalgia for empires replaces it.  
                                                          
43 But not necessarily of imperialism, which have always been a central topic particularly among the 
Marxist writers. Here I am referring to the study of empires as a distinct form of political organization, not 
as a structure of power. Pre-modern forms of power and sovereignty and how it is different from modern 
forms of power and government continued to attract attention from the scholars of power. For the seminal 
work, see (Foucault, 1964). Yet, their discussion is only tangentially relevant for this study. 
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Although most empires are known for their longevity,44 even for their claim on 
an “everlasting state,” the twentieth century witnessed the collapse of every empire on 
the world map (Mann, 1990: 3). Despite this, empires continue to leave their marks on 
contemporary history since the nation-states, as successors to empires, inherit many 
characteristics and problems of their respective empires. As we attempt to understand 
the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan, we are inevitably obliged to go 
back to the imperial history and to the period of transition from empire to nation-states 
as the elementary processes of nation formation. This chapter will examine the common 
qualities and structures of empires, the nature of imperial societies and their legacies in 
the successor nation-states. This chapter will also be an attempt to define the ways in 
which empires have shaped the formation of the successor state. More specifically, a 
discussion of the imperial model in South Asia and the Ottoman Empire will be offered 
as two case studies. Thus, it will also provide the historical background for the two 
nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. 
However, before dealing with the imperial background of two countries, a few 
points should be clarified. As mentioned in the introduction, the main idea that guides 
this dissertation is that the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan are also 
processes of transition from empires to nation-states. Although both Pakistan and 
Turkey can be considered post-imperial countries, Turkey is not a post-colonial country 
where as Pakistan is. It will be revealed in the following chapters that this is a 
                                                          
44 This is a recurrent theme on the recent literature on empires. Karen Barkey (2008: 15-27) goes to the 
extent of claiming that, it not interesting that empires finally collapsed but that they lived for so long, thus 
she proposes that more important topic of study is their longevity rather than their decline. 
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significant difference that is reflected in the differences between the nation-building 
processes of the two states.  
There is no ambiguity in defining Turkish nation-building process as a transition 
from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. The issue is a little more complicated 
when it comes to Pakistan. The lands that make up Pakistan belonged to the Mughal 
Empire in the middle ages and in early modernity. By theeighteenth century the British 
had come to dominate the subcontinent primarily through the East Indian Company. The 
Mughal Empire continued its existence, albeit on a much more limited scale, on the 
subcontinent simultaneously with the Company and several other small scale princely 
states. It was only after 1857 that the British government took the full responsibility of 
the subcontinent and terminated the juridical authority of the Mughal Empire. The 
period after this event in 1857 is known as the British Raj (literally meaning, rule) in 
which the Indian subcontinent is ruled by a colonial empire. 
In this study, I understand the British Raj as an empire in itself; not only because 
of its vast size or its imperial characteristics recently attributed to it by some scholars 
(c.f, Metcalf Thomas:2007), but also because Pakistan was not simply a post-colonial 
state that gained its independence from the colonial masters of the Western Europe post 
WWII. Pakistan also broke away from a political body that would control the Indian 
subcontinent. Therefore, Pakistani nationalism was not only an anti-colonial nationalism 
but it was a peculiar type of sub-nationalism in a colonial setting (Breuilly, 1994: 206-
213).  In fact, in the years preceding the independence the issue at stake was not whether 
Pakistan would be able to gain independence from the British- it was becoming clearer 
by then that British would not be able to maintain its hold on the subcontinent-, but the 
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problem was whether Pakistan would ever be able to come into existence separate from 
the giant political body of the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, the British Raj was not 
only an empire in the political sense. It was an empire, perhaps more so, in the social 
sense. For most of their rule, British did little, and indeed had no interest, to change the 
social make-up of the subcontinent they inherited from the Mughals.45 Although their 
various decisions had been crucial in the politicization of identities and thus were crucial 
for the formation of the nation-states in the subcontinent, the British were acting in an 
imperial society they inherited from the Mughals. It becomes clear in this context that 
Pakistan constitutes a case of transition from an empire to a nation-state.  
Yet there is still another important difference between Turkey and Pakistan. 
Turkey was carved out of the central parts-or the metropole- of the empire whereas 
Pakistan was not the center of the Raj. It had been carved out of areas that might be 
defined as the peripheral to Delhi. The difference is not merely geographical; Turkey 
inherited a state from an empire; in a sense it lost an empire. Pakistan on the other hand 
gained independence from an empire- in a sense it is a defector of the empire. This 
means that Turkish nationalists possessed a state while they were dealing with the 
nation-building process whereas in the Pakistani case state building and nation-building 
were undertaken simultaneously. This difference had largely shaped the nation-building 
processes in the post-independence era and as it will be pointed in the conclusion 
                                                          
45 There was always a debate among the British officials on the extent of British involvement and reform 
in the Indian society. This debate is best reflected in the Anglicanist and Orientalist debate on the 
education policies in India. While Anglicanists pushed for a complete Western education, the Orientalists 
favored the continuation and advancement of the traditional Indian education. For this divide see Robb, 
2002: 137-143. 
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chapter, they are crucial for an understanding of the divergences between the Turkish 
and Pakistani nation-building processes.    
 
3.1 Empires46 
The concept of empire is hard to define. Many definitions have been offered by political 
scientists and international relations experts; all of them with certain virtues but also 
certain deficiencies. According to the three most sophisticated and most referenced 
definitions offered so far, an empire is:  
(1) a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect rule. 
The central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each 
major segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates the two major 
elements of indirect rule: (i) retention or establishment of particular 
distinct compacts for the government of each segment; and (ii) exercise 
of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy 
within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, 
tribute, and military collaboration with the center. (Tilly, 1997:3) 
(2) a hierarchically organized political system with a hub like structure—
a rimless wheel—within which a core elite and state dominate peripheral 
elites and societies by serving as intermediaries for their significant 
interactions and by channeling resource flows from the periphery to the 
core and back to the periphery. (Motyl, 2001:4) 
(3) a “negotiated” enterprise where the basic configuration of 
relationships between imperial authorities and peripheries is constructed 
piece meal in a different fashion for each periphery, creating a patchwork 
pattern of relations with structural holes between peripheries. In that 
construction we see the architecture of empire emerge: a hub-and-spoke 
structure of state-periphery relations, where the direct and indirect 
vertical relations of imperial integration coexist with horizontal relations 
of segmentation. (Barkey, 2008:1) 
                                                          
46 The arguments in this and next subtitle owe mostly to these works: Maier, 2006; Barkey and Von 
Hagen (eds.) 1997; Motyl, 2001; Barkey, 2008; and more than others to the edited volume of Esherick, 
Kayalı and Van Young, (eds.) 2006. 
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A good definition should be valid for every empire, and it should also be able to 
differentiate empires from other political formations. The problem with such a definition 
is two-fold: 1) problem of inclusion: empires are among the most common forms of 
political organization in the pre-modern era47 and they represent a diversity that could 
not possibly be included in a definition to stand true for all these diverse political 
settings. 2) The problem of differentiation: As Walker (2006) has pointed out; the main 
difficulty is differentiating empires from multi-national states, particularly from ethno-
national federations. Based on these difficulties Walker goes as far as to offer a nominal 
definition: accepting political institutions that defined themselves as empires as empires. 
Even such a nominal definition is not void of problems. On the one hand, some of the 
political bodies that would be defined empires, as we understand them, did not define 
themselves as empires. Most importantly the Ottomans never called themselves as the 
Ottoman Empire, but instead preferred names like the ‘Sublime State’ or the 
‘Everlasting State.’ On the other hand, it would be very hard to accept Byzantium 
Empire prior to its collapse in 1453 as an empire though it continued to fashion itself as 
an empire (Motyl, 2001: 59-61). 
As no definition can possibly pass the above tests of inclusion and exclusion, I 
am not claiming to provide a definition devoid of the same problems. However as a 
working definition through this dissertation I understand empire as a large and 
                                                          
47 Absolutist kingdoms, tribal confederacies, feudal states, patrimonial states and city states are other 
forms of political organizations. Wimmer and Yuval (2010:870) provides a good chart showing the 
percentage of the world’s surface area occupied over the past two centuries by empires, modern nation-
states, and other political institutions. The dominance of the empires is clear as late as 1815, when almost 
sixty percent of the entire world surface was controlled by empires. In less than two centuries, this area 
diminished to zero.  
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composite political structure formed by a conglomeration of peoples and territories. 
These conglomerations stand side by side and are linked indirectly to the political 
center. Center has limited control over these territories and communities and rules them 
only through intermediaries. This indirect rule provides the peripheral communities with 
internal autonomy resulting to a plurality of administrative rules and regulations 
throughout the empire. These central elements of empires can be better understood if 
they are contrasted with more familiar modern political structures. Perhaps, a more 
accurate understanding of empires may be formed by examining what they are not and 
how they differ from other political entities. This necessitates a classification of various 
political entities and this can be done either on chronologically or territorially.  
Territorial classification puts empire on the one extreme of a spectrum. Empires 
are big. They command vast areas with diverse populations. At the other end of the 
spectrum, there are city states.48 In this context, it is the modern day states, or the nation-
states that represent a midway between the small-scale city states and large scale 
empires. This detail is important to understand the formation of nation-states as they 
come to existence either through the unification of various city states (the typical 
examples being Italy and Germany) or through the dismemberment of empires (the most 
typical case being the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire).49   
Chronological classification groups political organizations according to the level 
of complexity of their political systems. Clearly reflecting the dominance of orthodox 
                                                          
48 Even then, there are complex cases like Venice and Athens, who were city states, but through their 
overseas conquests also established colonial empires (Doyle, 1986) 
49 It is this classification which puts the nation-state and empire in a stark contrast and defines them in 
mutually exclusive terms. 
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modernization theories in 1950’s and 1960’s, in these works such as Niebuhr (1959) and 
Eisenstadt (1963), empires represent a somewhat middle ground between the primitive 
political entities and the modern states. They have a certain level of complex political 
system, which is more developed than clan or tribe based states, but their system is not 
as differentiated and developed as the modern states.50 This approach as we will see in 
the next section is crucial to grasp the centrality of traditional elites and religion for the 
imperial systems.  
 
3.2 Empires vs. Nation-States 
In either classification, compared to nation-states, empires appear more complex in 
terms of the composition of its population and territory but less developed when it 
comes to effective control of the people and territory. The concepts of core and 
periphery, indirect rule and ethnic or religious diversity are elements that are common to 
almost every definition of empire. What follows is an examination of empires with 
regard to these common elements. The aim is to lay out the contrasting points between 
empires and the nation-states without overlooking the variations within the empires.  
 
 
 
                                                          
50 In the historical trajectory provided by Niebuhr (1959: 1) the history is divided into five steps rather 
than three; from primitive community to the city state, empire, nation-state and modern super-state. 
Empire again represents a middle ground in this trajectory. 
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3.2.1 Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism 
Compared with nation-states one of the most distinctive aspect of empires is their 
hierarchical nature, as opposed to the theoretically egalitarian nature of the nation-state. 
Many different manifestations of the hierarchical nature can be traced in the political 
structure of the empires. In its most visible form, almost every empire is a monarchy 
(with the exceptions of the French and Roman Empires after the declaration of republic). 
Monarchy and the nobility associated with the throne underline and institutionalize the 
inequality in the society. In contrast, nationalism is tied with republicanism to the extent 
that the emergence of the idea of nationalism is often associated with the French 
Revolution. Equal citizenship is the key for both the republican values and the national 
solidarity. 
Another manifestation of hierarchy in the imperial systems is observed in the 
distinction between the metropole or the core and the periphery. A distinctive feature of 
the empire is that an empire is a form of domination in which a strong core/metropole 
dominates and rules the periphery.51 The system is based on the exploitation of the 
resources of the periphery in favor of the core. Although, the residents of some regions 
in the nation-states, particularly regions populated by groups of different ethnicity or 
identity, complain—in many cases rightfully—that their region is being dominated and 
                                                          
51 This however, doesn’t mean that the distinction was simply and sharply drawn between the center and 
the periphery. At certain cases there was also a hierarchy among the peripheries. As already mentioned the 
Raj had immense power of its own and distinguished from other colonies (peripheries). Senegal had a 
distinctive position in the French Empire, while Hijaz had always retained a privileged position in the 
Ottoman Empire. So in many cases, what we see is not only a hierarchy between the core and periphery, 
but multiple hierarchies throughout the empire. This point is also related with the administrative 
contradistinction of empire and nation-states discussed in the next subtitle. 
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exploited by the core, nation-states work to undo this imbalance.52 At least in theory, 
this is a temporary situation that is eventually cured. The redistributive policies in 
nation-states work in the opposite direction; resources are shifted from the well-off parts 
of the country to the poorer regions with the final aim of eradicating any economical 
hierarchies within the country.53  
While the nation-states, at least in theory, strive to create equality among their 
regions, the distinction between the core and periphery is essential to the definition of 
empire. The “core” here might refer both to the geographic core as also sometimes 
called as the metropole, and to the ruling group of people. In either case, the separation 
between the core and the periphery presents itself in many variations. The most well-
known example is the difference between contiguous land based empires and maritime 
sea empires.54 The distinction between the core and periphery, both in territory and 
                                                          
52 If the state elites fail to eradicate this diversity, the process often leads to emergence of a counter 
nationalism in the exploited regions. Economic exploitation of a certain region with in a nation-state is 
defined as “internal colonialism” and had been a significant factor in the emergence of sub-state 
nationalisms in many contemporary cases. For the relation between internal colonialism and nationalism 
see, Hechter 1977; Nairn, 1977. 
53 Philosopher David Miller (1993) has therefore defended the nation-state from a leftist point and argued 
that nation-states enable the redistribution of wealth better than other political entities and therefore 
should be defended by the left not despised.  
54 Even in such a seemingly clear difference the distinction is relative rather than absolute. Land based 
empires can and had also dealt with acquiring overseas territories. While building the largest land based 
empire in Europe, Napoleon was simultaneously forcing his chances on overseas territories like Egypt, 
while England, the prima face example of a sea based empire had also absorbed Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland in what is so often called ‘internal colonialism’ (Khoury and Kennedy, 2007). Similarly Ottomans, 
a definitely land based empire had waged, though unsuccessfully, a struggle with the Portuguese to 
dominate the Indian Ocean. Certain empires such as the German Empire at the end of nineteenth century, 
with its large possessions in the continental Europe and its overseas colonies in Africa and East Asia can 
be considered as a mixture of land and sea empire (Motyl, 2001: 19). Based on such accounts, the 
importance and even the validity of this distinction had been questioned (Cooper, 2005; Khoury and 
Kennedy, 2007), but despite such cases of ambiguity the distinction is both real and important. We will 
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population, is obvious in the sea based empires, where the core is usually populated by 
an entirely different group of people than the periphery. While the geographic and ethnic 
definitions of the core easily overlap and are clearly distinguishable in sea-based 
empires the land based empires show an interesting amount of variety in that regard. 
First of all, the territorial distinction between core and periphery is blurry in the land 
based empires. Subsequently, it is more difficult to talk about a dominant ethnicity. 
Instead, the ruling core is most often defined by their adherence to a certain culture, 
ideology or religion.55  
Land based empires also show a great deal of variation when it comes to 
defining the core. The size of the core changes from empire to empire. For instance the 
core of the Ottoman Empire is much larger compared to that of the Mughal Empire. But 
even then, the core of the empire might change over time. The Ottoman core shifted 
from Istanbul and the Balkan provinces to Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces. 
Throughout the Ottoman history, one can also notice the transformation of the imperial 
elite; while the empire relied more on the Greek elements in the early stages, subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                                          
soon come to an important aspect of this division in the patterns of tolerance, inclusion and 
accommodation prevalent in the contiguous land empires and maritime sea empires. 
55 Russians and Ottomans both objected to any ethnic definition and instead preferred a ‘composite palace 
culture’ unlike the colonial empires, open for the inclusion of conquered people. (Esherick et al., 2006: 
12) Similarly, Romans may have despised barbarians, but once they accepted Roman law and classical 
civilization, they would be politically integrated into Rome (Doyle, 1986: 121). Mughals, themselves 
outsiders to the subcontinent, never referred to ethnicity as a marker of ruling core. For them, the crucial 
cultural element of that ‘composite palace culture’ was the use of Persian. This even included the Hindus. 
Thus, despite the central role of Islam in the Mughal Empire, the Hindu elites, as long as they command 
Persian, had always been a part of the ruling elite. These examples also show that the core feels a 
considerable civilizational superiority towards the periphery. However, despite certain exceptions like 
Han Chinese or Shi’i Safavids, land based empires do not try to forcefully assimilate the periphery to their 
higher civilization. Yet unlike the colonial empires, they keep the way open for the peripheral elites to 
willingly assimilate into this high culture and become part of the core. 
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centuries reflected the increasing importance of Muslim and Turkish elements56 in the 
imperial core (Esherick, et al, 2006: 11).  
In any case, a geographically defined core constitutes lands that are adjacent to 
the capital and for that matter, one also needs to underline that the capital city in 
imperial systems has a much more important role than the capitals in the nation-states. 
As the seat of throne, the capital is the only city which legitimately and definitely is part 
of the core, in a sense “core of the core” (Meinig, 1986: 370 quoted in Motyl, 2001:13). 
Thus, people in the capital city were always more privileged than other subjects. For 
instance, in the Ottoman Empire, even after the egalitarian reforms of Tanzimat, which 
aimed to create larger uniformity within the empire, the Istanbulites were exempt from 
both conscription and taxation57 (Findley, 2008: 24). 
 
3.2.2 Various Kinds of Rule vs. Uniformity in Ruling 
Providing such privileges to the residents of the capital may sound strange for the people 
of nation-states, however, these differential treatments were quite common among 
empires. Indeed, it can be argued that another important difference between nation-state 
and an empire lays in the fact that empires employ various kinds of rule throughout their 
territories and populations, whereas nation-states strive for uniformity in their rule 
                                                          
56 Yet, Turkish should be better understood as the Muslim elements of the empire that learned the court 
language; Turkish. This shift starts with the end of devshirme system in late sixteenth century and gains 
another momentum during the Abdülhamid II era.   
57 Another place that was and remained exempt from taxation and conscription was Hijaz, due to its 
special religious importance.  
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(Pomeranz, 2005). Although it is not uncommon that nation-states may treat a region 
differently (usually due to the lack of complete interpenetration), in theory this 
difference is a temporary aberration. On the other hand, empires are conglomeration of 
territories all having different levels of relation with the imperial body politic. Aside 
from the already mentioned difference between the core and periphery, it is common for 
the empire to have special treaties with certain regions of the empire. In that sense, the 
periphery of the empire also reflects a variation with regard to the level of their 
incorporation to the system. This is partly due to the fact that imperial growth takes 
place over a long time through piecemeal conquest of already existing polities (Tilly, 
1997:3). This not only creates enormous diversity in the organizational structure for the 
peripheries, but also results that imperial frontiers are poorly defined. Unlike nation-
states whose territory is mostly fixed and clearly demarcated from other nation-states, 
imperial territories are subject to continuous change and in most cases an imperial 
territory is surrounded by a chain of tributary states and princedoms with varying levels 
of incorporation to the imperial center (Kasaba, 2006: 200-201). Thus empire is not a 
simple domination of a core over a single periphery, but it is a conglomeration of many 
peripheries, each of them connected to the core at various degrees. Different treatments 
need not necessarily be territorial. Empires can apply special treatment to different 
communities. The most obvious example of such a differential treatment is the millet 
system employed by the Ottomans, in which the legal arrangements were communal 
rather than territorial. Thus one can also say that Ottomans were not simple 
conglomeration of territories, but it was also a conglomeration of communities scattered 
throughout the empire.   
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Diverse treatment of communities and territories in the empires is actually a 
result of the fact that empires employ indirect rule. While the nation-states with their 
modern bureaucracy rule their territories and subjects without any intermediaries, 
empires are either unwilling or unable to penetrate the territories they rule at the level of 
nation-states (Eisenstadt, 1962; 1963). Once again referring to the core and periphery 
distinction, an empire has a strong center and rules over the periphery through the 
peripheral or communal elites.58 Thus incorporation of peripheral elites is crucial for the 
maintenance of the empire. In Johan Galtung’s and Alexander Motyl’s formulation, 
peripheral elites represent “the center in the periphery.” As such, empires are not mere 
forms of ruthless domination, where the core benefits exclusively to the detriment of the 
periphery. Instead, it is a more sophisticated form of domination-relation, where both 
the interests of the center and the “center in the periphery” coincide. Empires are able to 
continue their rule and owe their longevity to this delicate balance. Therefore, Karen 
Barkey (2008: 1) defines empire as a “negotiated enterprise,” pointing out that this 
balance is maintained through a complex set of negotiations between the core elites and 
the peripheral elites and the terms of the arrangement are continuously re-negotiated. 
The empire’s integrity would be under threat if the core loses the consent of the 
peripheral elite either; i) through the divergence of interest between the core and the 
peripheral elites. For instance, many historians claim that the fall of Mughals started 
with the rule of Aurangzeb as Aurangzeb lost the consent of many Hindu elites, through 
his re-incorporation and strict application of previously abolished jizya taxes; ii) or 
through the emergence of a new peripheral elite which challenges the “center in the 
                                                          
58 Nation-state, particularly the more republican French version (thus the Turkish version as well) also 
insists that “no communal structure would stand between the republic and its citizens” (Taspinar, 2004). 
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periphery.” In the Ottoman Empire, since the end of eighteenth century, newly emerging 
lay leaders posed the greatest threat to the Ottoman rule, while the religious community 
leaders remained by and large loyal to the Ottoman rule. Particularly the Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul had remained as a pro-Ottoman force throughout the 
nineteenth century while there were many independence movements on the side of non-
Muslim communities of the empire. Ottoman territorial integrity only fell under threat 
when the authority of the Patriarchate was challenged first by the newly emerging lay 
leaders of community, mostly merchants empowered by their increasing wealth, and 
later by the low level clergy which led to the disintegration of the Greek Orthodox 
Church and the emergence of new Orthodox Churches such as the Bulgarian Exarchate 
in 1870.59   
 
3.2.3 Cosmopolitanism vs. Homogeneity 
This level of diversity takes us to another important feature of empires; the composite 
and cosmopolitan nature of the empires. Once again the contrast between the nation-
states driven by their quest for uniformity and homogenization is striking. Multi ethnic 
and multi-religious society is a common feature of empires, whereas at least in theory, 
nation-state is the political body that is congruent with one cultural unit (Gellner, 1983: 
1) and thus it is a state “of and for the nation” (Brubaker, 1996).  
                                                          
59 In certain ways Ottomans unwillingly contributed to this result. In their desire to reform what they 
considered to be a corrupt leadership, Ottomans undermined the authority of their prime partners; millet 
leaders, thus contributed to the emergence of lay leaders. For a detailed analysis of how the Ottoman 
reforms had transformed the balance of power in the millet system, and finally created a major challenge 
to Ottoman sovereignty, see Davison, 1963: 114-136.   
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At this point, Dominic Lieven (2007: 409) reminds us not to forget that, “it was 
far easier to sustain a civilized acceptance of diversity in a pre-modern empire in which 
government did not aspire to do much more than fight wars, raise taxes and preserve 
order.” Therefore, diverse and cosmopolitan nature of imperial societies is also a result 
of the lack of penetration by the imperial states. Building on this point, David Laitin 
(2009: 616) claims that “diversity is not a defining aspect of empire; rather it is an 
implication of its structure.” As such, cosmopolitanism, differential rulings and the 
indirect rule over periphery and hierarchy are all related with each other.   
Although acceptance of cultural diversity is a result of the political system of 
empires, they still show variation in their treatment of diversity. Once again land based 
empires are more open to diversity and they keep routes open for the peripheral elites. 
Provided that one accepts, adopts and defends the imperial ideology (Roman law, Islam, 
Orthodoxy, Communism or Capitalist democracy in Roman, Ottoman, Russian, Soviet 
and American empires) a peripheral elite member can get to very high positions within 
the imperial structures. Particularly in the first three centuries, the bulk of the Ottoman 
administration and most of the grand viziers were recruited from the conquered peoples 
in Balkans. The Romans even surpassed the Ottomans in that sense, and after a century 
of the conquest of Spain, a Spaniard became the Roman Emperor, whereas the overseas 
Spanish Empire in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries blocked the career ways of the 
peripheral elites and transformed them into creoles. This as Anderson (1991: 47-66) 
famously shows saw the roots of nationalism in this colonial empire. The contrast is also 
helpful in explaining why the millennium old experience of land empires didn’t result in 
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the new imaginations of political community in terms of nation where as in a few 
centuries the colonial administration made such alternative imaginations possible. 
Given the cultural diversity as almost a given situation for empires, Karen 
Barkey (2006) provides three alternative strategies employed by empires to manage this 
diversity; toleration, co-optation and incorporation.  Ottoman millet system, which will 
be discussed more in detail, provides an excellent case of toleration where different 
communities were tolerated to keep their distinct, though inferior position and their 
leaders remained in control over the community without being forced to convert to the 
imperial ideology. However, it should not be forgotten that toleration is not 
unconditional. The social order in the empires is based upon a 
hierarchical compartmentalization of communities and toleration is conditional upon 
the sustainment of this order. Thus anything that threatens; i) hierarchy (such as 
the enrichment and upward mobility of non-Muslim traders), ii) compartmentalization 
(such as the blurring of the group boundaries as in the cases of Alevis, Alawites, Druzes 
etc), iii) order within community (such as emergence of reformers like Sabbathai Sevi 
within the Jewish community) is considered anathema and dealt harshly. Thus, those 
individuals and communities that do not fit with the established social categories face 
with the heavy hand of the empire rather than its toleration. On the other hand the 
devshirme system which enables the peripheral elite to incorporate to the power center 
of the empire, provided that they accept the imperial ideology (convert to Islam in the 
Ottoman case) is an example of incorporation strategy. The Mughal emperor Akbar’s 
attempt of creating a syncretic religion with elements from both Islam and Hinduism is 
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also another attempt of incorporation, whereas the more common policy of appeasing 
Hindu elites and their recognition by the Mughal emperors is a case for toleration.   
 
3.3 Legitimation, Religion and Language 
We have so far contrasted nation-states and empires on the social, political and 
administrative aspects of their systems. All these differences between empires and 
nation-states are most clearly reflected in their legitimizing ideologies and virtues. In 
this section, we will compare how the imperial states and nation-states legitimized 
themselves in general, and in particular, we will look at the function of religion and 
language as sources of legitimacy. Different social and political roles attributed to 
language and religion in an imperial state and a nation-state will enable us to better 
grasp the differences between an imperial and a national setting.  
Ernest Renan has famously defined nation as a “daily plebiscite.” It is the entire 
citizenry who participates in the plebiscite and such a definition points to a high level of 
belonging and participation. Thus, nationalism often develops a “militant sense of 
shared identity, including linguistic and sometimes religious identity. Nation-state will 
be strong on indices of belonging. In general and allowing for a great range, nations are 
better at equality, empires at tolerance” (Maier, 2006: 29). Empires lack- ever if they 
aspire to- such high levels of identification and belonging and this lack of belonging 
provides another angel to understand the structure of empires.  
We have already mentioned that political forms can also be classified 
chronologically through their level of complexity, and as such empires fall somewhere 
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between primordial polities and modern polities. In the chronological classification of 
Eisenstadt, empires or “historical bureaucratic societies” in his terminology, differ from 
previous regimes like patrimonial polities or city states as the complexity of the imperial 
system has created a differentiated society in which power is centralized outside the 
domains of communities, traditions and ascriptive lineages. However, the society is not 
as differentiated as the modern states. Although lacking the communal belonging of the 
previous polities, empires also lack the completely differentiated modern political forms 
such as independent citizenry. In the absence of such modern political forms, individuals 
were still members of traditional societal groups as well as being members of the 
political community and traditional power centers such as religious establishment and 
aristocracy were still providing power and political representation (Eisenstadt, 1962). 
Thus both the more primordial political bodies and the modern political bodies rest on 
the identification of the people and the political power; either through ascriptive 
identification or through modern forms of identification achieved through modern 
political ideologies (nationalism) and modern forms of political membership 
(citizenship). In contrast, we have already seen that Barkey (2008) defines empires as “a 
negotiated enterprise” between the elites. It is the lack of belonging and limited 
differentiation of society that necessitates the crucial role of elites in the formation of 
empires. And “because empires are about elites, they are also about inequality and 
stratification. They remain or become hierarchical institutions, stabilizing gradients of 
power geographically and gradients of status and reward within their component 
societies (Maier, 2006). As hierarchical relations are indispensable to an empire, empire 
is also a form of domination. As we have seen, it represents the domination of a ruling 
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elite over the rest of the society, of the core over the periphery and in most cases (most 
particularly in sea empires) of an ethnic group (or peoples to be nation) over another 
ethnic group. This form of domination had been justified by a universal ideology that 
enabled empires to keep the elites united and rule over diverse societies for long 
centuries.  
In theory, nation-states rule through the consent of its citizens. This consent is 
maintained through a very high level of identification of state and the people through 
popular participation of people. Nationalism and its virtues of equality and populism 
provide the ideological justification of the identification of state and people. Compared 
with nation-states, empires demand less, so they need less in terms of ideology and 
belonging. However, inherent inequality of the system and low indices of belonging 
necessitate that empires also needs some sort of legitimating ideology and belonging. 
However, unlike the nation-state this belonging is limited to the elites and need not 
reach to every individual (in lack of a concept of modern citizenship). In that sense, 
empires also lack the communal belonging of city states and patrimonial empires. They 
display a certain level of differentiation, but lack the ideological vigor and belonging of 
nation-states. In this context the supranational imperial ideology serves a “symbolic 
expression of rule, the glue that offered the spiritual cohesion of the elite upper classes 
of the empire, encouraging their participation”60 (Barkey, 2008: 99). 
                                                          
60 However this participation is limited both in depth but also in scope. As Eisenstadt puts it “The 
continuity of these systems was contingent upon a constant balance between the political activity of some 
segments of the population and the non-involvement in central political issues of the greater part of the 
population. The limited political involvement could assure some of the more flexible political support, 
while the apathy, in its turn, was necessary for maintenance of the traditional legitimation of the rulers” 
(1962: 279). 
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Thus, a universal ideology is essential for the universal empires. Even Walker’s 
above quoted “self-referential definition suggests an important aspect of imperial rule: 
the conscious and confident projection of an imperial ideology and institutions” 
(Esherick et al, 2006: 6). Throughout history, elements of this universal ideology have 
showed variance. In the colonial empires it was the claim of mission civilisatrice that 
colonial elite argued for justification of their rule. Twentieth century portrayals of 
Soviets and USA as empires would also point to their ideological orientations as the new 
secular religions; and the legitimizing device of the empire. Aside from being universal, 
these ideologies also connected the core elites in Moscow and Washington with the 
“peripheral elites” in different capitals. But in most traditional empires it was religion 
that served as the most efficient component of the imperial ideology. There is no doubt 
that religion was the most important part of the identities of individuals in the pre-
modern ages, but it was also an essential feature of state structure as well. First, the 
rulers justified and legitimized their sovereignty through religion. Second, the society 
and state-society relations were mostly established within the confines of religious rule 
and under the observation of religious elite. When one refers to the significance of 
imperial ideologies and institutions, the inevitable implication of this emphasis would 
bring religion into the discussion, as “every empire had appealed to religion to justify its 
rule” (Esherick et.al, 2006:11). And neither the Mughals nor the Ottomans were 
exceptions to these general rules. The British Raj as a colonial power however wasn’t 
concerned with religious justification for the British Rule, yet they considered that 
deference to Islam and Hinduism is crucial for the maintenance of their rule. As we will 
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see later on, in the final analysis, it was the British who contributed most to the 
solidification and exploitation of religious identities in the subcontinent.  
Although religion might play a role in the shared identities created by the nation-
states, nation-states mostly emphasize common language to justify their shared identity. 
In order to clarify the differences between the ideological leanings of empires and 
nation-states, we can also look at the contradictory roles of religion and language in 
empires and nation-states. 
Religion with other elements of tradition provided not only a justification but 
also a sense of universality essential for empires. In Karen Barkey’s (2008: 99) words, 
“Many imperial states maintained authority over their populations through the 
legitimation of a supranational ideology that included a religious claim to be protectors 
of a world religion: Islam or Christianity, for example, which they connected to an 
elaborate ideology of descent and lineage”61 (emphasis added). In contrast to the central 
role of religion in empires, Benedict Anderson claims that nationalism has filled the 
vacuum left by religions. As such, there is a deep connection between the origins of 
nationalism and secularism, although later emergence of religious nationalisms all 
around the world makes this link dubious now. Even when religion served as an 
important aspect of national identity such as in the Balkan nationalisms, this had been 
only possible after the collapse of the universal (imperial) churches and the emergence 
of the local-national churches.62 Similarly, the idea of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state 
                                                          
61 When empires confronted each other in the international arena, they developed such ideologies partly in 
relation to each other, as was the case with the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. 
62 “A whole tradition of Balkan national historiography is premised on the assumption that Orthodox 
Christianity and the Orthodox Church played a major role in nation-building…(In reality) It was the 
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could be imagined only after the universal concept of ummah had been institutionally 
and symbolically destroyed with the abolition of Caliphate. As the most extreme form of 
a unity of religion and state, the linkage between the state of Israel and the quasi 
universal Judaism creates an anomaly in the international political system. Israel’s claim 
to represent the world Jewry undermines its position as a member of modern nation-
state system, as this claim creates ambiguity in the definition of citizenship in Israel and 
also creates hierarchies among its subjects. Aside from being a colonial settler country 
in twentieth century and lacking clearly delineated territories, its claim to represent a 
world religion contributes to the anachronic nature of Israel in modern political system 
(Massad, 2007).  Thus, while religion had a central importance and had a universal 
outlook in empires, in the modern nation-state system, it either lost its significance or it 
had been particularized and lost its universalizing mission.  
Language is another realm where the difference between the nation-state and 
empire in terms of legitimation and ideologies is most significant. In the imperial 
system, there is no need for a common language that unites the entire society. In 
contrast, language is the tool of differentiation and stratification of the society. 
Moreover, languages like Latin and Persian serve as universal identification that unites 
elites from different communities. Thus in a sense they are part of the universal aspect 
of the empire as people from different groups can be included to the core once they 
acquire the palace language. We have already pointed out that Persian was key to the 
inclusion into the Mughal elite. This enabled the Hindus to take part in the high 
                                                                                                                                                                          
eventual abandonment of the ecumenicity of Orthodoxy, and the ‘nationalization’ of the churches, that 
brought intense national conflicts into the life of the Orthodox Church and nurtured the assumption 
concerning the affinity between Orthodoxy and nationality” (Kitromilides, 1989: 178-179).  
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administrative roles in the Mughal system and to be part of the ruling elite. (For a more 
detailed analysis of the role of Persian in the Mughal system, see Alam, 1998). 
Similarly, Romans allowed the barbarians to become Roman and enter the ruling elite 
once they acquired Latin and Roman law. When we look at the nation-states we see an 
entirely different picture. While language was an instrument of stratification and 
hierarchy in empires, in nation-states it serves for unification and equality.63 However, 
national languages lack the universal aspect of imperial languages and create boundaries 
among the elites (of different nationalities). While imperial languages united different 
elites and stratified the elites from their folks, in the nation-state language serves to unite 
the elites and the common people while simultaneously creating divisions among 
different elites. Thus, language is a good example of the ideological differences of 
empires and nation-states; one universal, inclusive and outward looking; the other 
particular, exclusive and inward looking.    
 
3.4 Nation-ness and Empire 
All in all, empire is a political system that is hierarchical, non-uniform in its ruling 
mechanisms and structures, and open to diversity with its cosmopolitan multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious nature. These features are in stark contrast to the nation-states’ 
egalitarianism, direct and uniform means of rule, their tendency to homogenize, and 
                                                          
63 However, there are important exceptions as language doesn’t serve this function in Pakistan. Rather 
than being an egalitarian force, use of language is quite hierarchical (priority given to English, then to 
Urdu and finally to vernaculars) and deeply attached to class issues. (For the linkage of language and 
class, see Rahman, 1998) That’s why language in Pakistan has so far been a source of division as well as 
unification. This is the one of the most important problems in the nation-building process in Pakistan.  
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“one nation one state” principle. Such a contrast, underlined by so many scholars in the 
nationalism literature is certainly important but considering that few nation-states really 
fit into the homogenous egalitarian claims, “this contrast is relative, not absolute” 
(Kumar, 2010: 131). Empires and nation-states have a common historical trajectory, as 
“most nation-states, or what became nation-states, are, like most empires, the result of 
conquest and colonization” (Kumar, 2010. see also, Niebuhr, 1959). As mentioned 
throughout the discussion above, despite their theoretical rejection of the imperial 
elements, in reality most nation-states have features that resemble empires; they mostly 
include more than one nation. Despite their claim to uniformity, there are strong 
deviations in terms of the ruling of certain regions, some groups almost always complain 
that they are dominated and exploited by the center, etc. At the same time, throughout 
their drive for increased centralization, empires gained features of nation-states such as 
higher levels of egalitarianism, uniformity and direct rule. Esherick, Kayalı and Van 
Young, (2006: 12-16) point that, facing the threatening success of European nation-
states, “the ruling elites (of empires) responded (to strains of modernity) with economic 
and political reforms akin to those of the nation-state projects of Western Europe, thus 
throughout the nineteenth century they displayed a pronounced trend toward national 
and ethnic self-definitions.” Based on such observations, they warn us that, “the 
objective distinction between the old empires and new states are often murky at best.” 
(2006: 3). Considering such ambiguities, Kumar (2010: 134) argues that “the behavior 
of states may tend at one time towards empire, at another time towards a concern with 
nation-ness.”  
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However, such ambiguities within the political trajectory of the same state do not 
necessarily mean that we should give up the distinction between empires and nation-
states as “the distinction between imperial and nationalist ideologies seems real and 
significant” (Kumar, 2010: 131). Both empire and nation-ness are still useful as 
analytical categories even though neither of them perfectly fits the political realities. In 
this regard, both empires and nation-states should be considered as ideal types in the 
Weberian sense. As a scholar who dealt extensively with such conceptual problems, 
Alexander Motyl (2001: 20) rightly points that “reality may be messy, but that is all the 
more reason to use concepts that are less so.” As such no state would perfectly fit the 
definition of either empire or nation-state (no nation-state has complete equality or 
uniformity whereas through their centralization attempts, empires show some features of 
nation-states) but nevertheless the distinction between imperial ideology with its 
emphasis on diversity and nation-state ideology with its emphasis on uniformity 
provides us a useful tool to evaluate the policies of states (Maier, 2006). Accordingly, 
most empires would evolve towards being a nation-state, in the process of 
modernization, yet up to a certain point we would still define them as empires with their 
perceived similarity to the ideal type of an empire rather than a nation-state.    
This point is crucial for a balanced understanding of the evolution from an 
empire to nation and also the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. “This 
perception might be one way of considering the fact that empire and nation can, at 
different times, alternate in the striving of states... The tension between nation and 
empire could often be seen within the same country, including some of the most 
powerful, at the same time” (Kumar, 2010: 131). This also fits the findings of the most 
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recent scholarship on the alternative policies that dominated the political scene both 
during the late Ottoman period and also during the period that led to the succession of 
Raj and the partition of South Asia (see, Zurcher, 2000; Hanioğlu, 2006; Desai, 1990). 
This point is important also for the structuring of this dissertation. Following chapters 
all deal with the alternative political options pursued by the political elites. The 
emphasis in chapter 4 and chapter 5 is on the politicization of religious identity and the 
ascendancy of Muslim nationalism in the Ottomans and among the Indian Muslims. The 
concluding chapter points to the marginalization of Muslim nationalism in the form it 
existed during the transitionary period in favor of a narrower, more linguistic and 
particularistic national identity, thus in the overall, these chapters give us a picture of an 
evolution initially from plural imperial polity towards an imperial version of national 
identity which was later homogenized on religious grounds and finally further 
homogenization upon the formation of nation-state through ethno linguistic assimilation. 
However, the reader should be aware that, in any of these periods the pursued policy 
was neither fully dominant nor consistent. At each point, there were always alternative 
policy options, defended by various members of the political elite and implemented at 
varying degrees of success by them. In that sense, this evolution shouldn't be taken as a 
strongly chronological linear evolution. Rather it is a process full of contradictory 
moves, containing the seeds of alternative ways; roads that have not been taken 
(Comisso, 2006). Despite the lack of such chronological consistency, the wider map of 
the “roads taken” still provides a consistent move towards augmenting homogeneity; 
once again with alternative policies (defended and maybe even pursued with less 
success than the actual path taken) at each point.        
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That is why this study avoids a strict periodization and instead takes a thematic 
approach. It is not possible to certainly distinguish at which point the Ottoman state 
stopped being a prime case of imperial polity and “opted-out of empire” (Barkey, 2008: 
264-296). This evolution, though more real than apparent, took place in the course of a 
large time period, with many drawbacks and contradictions. Similarly, at the realm of 
ideologies, it is not possible chronologically to differentiate at what point more imperial 
ideologies like Ottomanism had been dominant and at what points alternative modes of 
nationalist projects such as Muslim nationalism and Turkish nationalism had been 
dominant. Instead, the recent scholarship points to the simultaneous existence of these 
ideologies among the political leaders and the state policies. (For the first article that 
pointed to this approach, see Zurcher, 2000. This point had been recently enforced by 
another important scholar of late Ottoman period. See Hanioğlu, 2006. A very intriguing 
comparison of alternative national-imperial project and the paths taken and not taken 
with regard to the German and the South Asian-Indian cases, see Desai, 1990).   
Such an approach will also enable us to understand the seemingly contradictory actions 
of political elites. If we see empires and nation-states as variable forms of the “political 
imagination,” alternative possibilities that were open to political elites depending on the 
circumstances of the times (c f. Cooper, 2005), then pursuing empire or pursuing 
“nation-ness” could be a strategic choice shaped by the available state capabilities 
(Kumar, 2010: 120). This coexistance of both options and the tension between them 
stems from the contradictory impulses of enlargement and centralization-
homogenization as already discussed in the previous chapter. While providing us with a 
better understanding of the seemingly contradictory motives and actions of the political 
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elites, this approach still enables us to see the wider picture of transition from an empire 
towards a nation-state. 
 
3.5 Empire in the Context of Ottomans and South Asia 
What implications does the discussion on the nature of empires have on the relations 
between state and religion in the Ottoman realm and in South Asia? At this point, we 
might need to look at how the imperial structures in these realms dealt with such 
features of empire as hierarchy, stratification, dominance, and indirect rule. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the role of religion and the relations between state and 
religion as well as the role of religion in the social relations are particularly important 
for us. We have already seen that religion is important both as a legitimizing device of 
the empire (and the inherent inequalities of the empire) and also as a universalizing 
mission; an imperial ideology suitable for the universal pretensions of the empires. This 
same rule applies even more vigorously to the Ottomans and Mughals.  
In the study of empires, Ottomans had mostly been compared with the Mughals, 
but almost never with the British Raj. The reasons for that seems apparent; the Mughals 
and Ottomans share a lot in common as Islamic universal agricultural empires, while the 
British Raj is a different style of empire; a part of the western colonial empire systems 
of modernity. In his seminal study “The Venture of Islam,” Marshall Hodgson (1974) 
had identified Mughals and Ottomans (along with the Safavid Empire in Iran) as the 
“gunpowder empires,” referring to the significant changes in the technology of warfare, 
which made the existence of such strong centers of power possible. Moreover, these 
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empires had been successful partly due to their ability to “control forms of religious 
knowledge deployed for the maintenance of hegemony and legitimacy” (Khoury and 
Kennedy, 2007: 235). In the period of the three empires, religions came to be again 
institutionally and even intellectually associated with the state and its fate (Hodgson, 
1993: 194). This increased importance of religion for the states ruling in the early 
modern period is by no means unique to the Islamic world. Despite the common 
assumptions to the contrary, the early modernity (circa 1500-1800) has brought 
increased unity between church and state rather than church and state separation in 
Europe as well as through the Islamdom.64 Ottomans and Mughal Empires co-existed in 
this time span that is often called as early modernity (whereas Ottomans survived into 
modernity and Mughals gave way to British Raj). 
Moreover, it is not only their existence in the early modern period that singles 
out the Ottomans and Mughals. They are further differentiated from other Islamic 
experiences as “in the Ottoman Empire and in the Indic Timuri Empire, Islam was on 
relatively new ground, ruling a population which in majority was not Muslim” 
(Hodgson, 1974: 7).65 This necessitated skillful management of this religious diversity 
and the non-Muslim populations leading to an increased toleration and to a high degree 
                                                          
64 The declaration of cuis regio, eius religio (whose region, his religion) by the Westphalia agreement 
indeed paved the way for the creation of national churches even more connected with the state than 
previous universal Roman Catholic Church. Thus it would be fair to say that “modernity is perhaps not so 
much about the separation of church and state as it is about the control and identification of the former by 
and with the latter” (Tezcan, 2009:566). 
65 As Karen Barkey (2005: 10) reminds us “at first, while the Ottomans conquered land in the Balkans, 
they acquired a predominantly Christian population and it is only with the expansion of the empire into 
Arab lands in the sixteenth century that a balance between Christian and Muslim populations was 
reached.” She also argues that this high population of non-Muslim population in the Ottomans and 
particularly at the heartlands of the empire had pushed Ottomans to develop a unique imperial model that 
enables them with co-optation and tolerance. 
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of the incorporation of the non-Muslims to state administration. For that matter, the 
Ottomans and Mughals share a similar attitude of tolerance, though they employed 
different strategies for this policy. However, as it will be discussed below, in both cases, 
the solution for the religious diversity was found within the dhimmi (zimmi in Turkish) 
concept of Islamic law.  
Based upon many such resemblances and being contemporaries, both the 
Ottomans and Mughals had been often considered to have similar state structures and 
thus they are considered to be “comparable,” notwithstanding the recent emphasis on 
their differences (see Dale, 2009; Bayly 2007: 332). Moreover, British Raj, another 
contemporary of the Ottomans should be included in the spectrum of comparison as the 
apparent differences between the British Raj and the Ottomans would decrease once we 
have a more nuanced grasp of the Raj (Bayly, 2007: 332). Even the most apparent 
division of a sea based empire and contiguous land based empire had lost its 
significance as the British Empire in India transformed from limiting itself to coastal, 
fortified entrepots such as Bombay, Calcutta towards taking control of the large lands 
(Adas, 2010). At the time the British had legally established the British Raj, contiguous 
land base of the British Indian Empire was larger than the entire Ottoman Empire. 
Moreover, the Raj transformed itself in time to a land based agricultural empire whose 
basic revenues relied on land taxes. Again in terms of its military structures, rather than 
relying solely on naval power, nineteenth century British India had one of the strongest 
army in the world as it was directly controlling one of the largest land based empires 
(Khourry and Kennedy, 2007).  
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Even more important is the fact that British Raj reflected the same features of a 
centralized cosmopolitan agricultural empire both in terms of its administration but also 
in terms of the problems it faced through its assertion of central authority. In sum, “both 
empires ruled vast territories that were inhabited by peoples of widely different faiths, 
customs, ethnicities, and more; both made accommodations to these differences even as 
they sought to erase them; both advanced a universalizing mission while acknowledging 
its limits; both asserted authoritarian powers and conceded local autonomy” (Khoury 
and Kennedy, 2007: 234). Moreover, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, British 
refrained from transforming the society they inherited from Mughals well until the 
nineteenth century. It was only then the British transformed themselves from the role of 
colonial merchants towards the role of empire builders. It is only in the nineteenth 
century that they took decisive steps to rule their empire in ways qualitatively different 
from their Mughal predecessors. This century was also a century of transformation for 
the Ottoman state and in this process both empires faced similar challenges particularly 
with regard to decentralized and diverse nature of their society. These points will be 
discussed in detail in the following two chapters since their methods of managing that 
diversity at a time of top-down modernization had led to increased politicization of 
religion.66 
Indeed the commonalities around the idea of empire and the similarities between 
the structures and policies of the Ottoman Empire and the British Raj had already 
                                                          
66 At this point it should also be kept in mind that increasing importance of religion for the British Empire 
was not limited to its “Indian branch.” Indeed, if we gave up the binary distinctions of religious east and a 
secular western modernity we will see that religion was central to the British Empire both in India and 
England. See Van der Veer, (1999).   
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attracted the attention of some scholars and manifested by the devotion of a special issue 
to the comparisons of these two empires in 2007 by the Journal of Comparative Studies 
of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In their editorial article Dina Rizk Khoury 
and Dane Kennedy define the aim of this special issue as to “de-orientalize” the 
Ottomans and “orientalize” the British in the hope of restoring continuities and 
connections between the history of the Ottoman Empire and the British Raj.” In a 
similar fashion my aim in this comparison is to point out how these similarities had 
constructed similar paths for the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. 
 
3.5.1 Ottomans 
“Whoever claims that all people are equal must be hopelessly mad” wrote a resident of 
Ottoman Aleppo in eighteenth century in his personal notebook among other sayings 
(Marcus, 1989:37).67 Like in all empires, inequality was inherent to the social and 
political fabric of the Ottoman Empire. It was a society that was both hierarchical and 
stratified on many levels. The basic hierarchy among the society was between the ruling 
elite composed of civil officials, religious and military leaders who exercised authority 
in the name of the sultan and ruled over the re’aya (literally meaning flocks).68 Like in 
every society there were other levels of hierarchy as well between rich and poor, literate 
and illiterate, urban and rural and so on. Aside from these common hierarchies, the 
Ottoman society was also hierarchical in terms of religion; Islam being the religion of 
                                                          
67 Based on his other notes, Marcus suggests that he is probably Christian. 
68 The standard reference books for Ottoman social history are Inalcık, 1973 and Inalcık and Quataert 
(eds), 1994. 
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state and the court was superior to other religions. Thus, the societal pyramid of the 
Ottoman Empire was structured along two axes—horizontal and vertical. The vertical 
axis separated Muslims from the other monotheistic religions, while the horizontal one 
divided the society into different social classes. The ruling elite, who are defined by 
Peter Sugar (1977: 34-43) as “Professional Ottomans,” were recruited from all three 
recognized religions (Bieber, 2010:14).  
From its inception to its demise Ottomans remained an Islamic Empire, although 
the central role of Islam became more prominent in the process of empire formation and 
through the rivalry between the Catholic Habsburgs and became more clearly defined as 
the Orthodox Sunni Islam through the rivalry with the Shi’i Safavids.69 The traditional 
Islamic law constituted the basic component of the legal system aside with the Sultanic 
law, and at least in principle the latter had to be confined to the limits and the dominance 
of the former. Despite variances in their individual piety, all the sultans had publicly 
endorsed and glorified Islam as Ottoman ruling institutions were defined and legitimated 
in preeminently Islamic terms and Islamic appeals motivated Ottoman soldiers (Findley, 
2010: 64). In his detailed study of the power structures within the Ottoman Empire, 
Colin Imber gives particular attention to the legitimizing tools of the Ottoman dynasty. 
Giving a chronological order of different narratives and tools, both secular and 
religiously inspired, implemented by the dynasty to legitimize its rule, he concludes that 
                                                          
69 Obviously the process was reciprocal, and the same rivalry shaped and sharpened the religious ideology 
of the Habsburgs and Safavids.  
 96 
 
those of Holy Warrior70, successor to the Seljuks and Caliph were the most efficient and 
enduring ones (Imber, 2002: 114-127). 
Religion was central to the societal organization as it constituted the primary 
mode of affiliation in the traditional societies. Despite the ethnic diversity of the empire, 
the religion prevailed over ethnic boundaries; at least certainly so until the nineteenth 
century. Thus an ethnic Albanian could be a Muslim Greek Orthodox or Roman 
Catholic and these identities primarily shaped his or her social relations. No ethnic 
consciousness comparable to nation-states existed (Hanioğlu, 2008: 24-27). 
Accompanying ethnic diversity there were linguistic diversity as well. However, 
“language couldn’t offer a safe marker of identity as languages were associated with 
different social and occupational contexts and not necessarily with ethnicity.” For 
instance, Ottoman Turkish (distinct from folk Turkish), was the main language of 
administration while Greek was the lingua franca of commerce in the entire East 
Mediterranean (Özkırımlı and Sofos, 2008: 16). As common to many other empires, 
Ottomans also had a multi layered language system. “One might say that the empire had 
one imperial language for the bureaucratic elite (Ottoman Turkish), three major lingua 
francas (Turkish, Arabic, and Greek), and a host of local languages split into a variety of 
dialects. The absence of widely read publications perpetuated the linguistic 
fragmentation of the empire.” The evolution of Ottoman Turkish is particularly striking. 
“In a way, Ottoman resembled Latin as used in medieval or early modern Europe as it 
supplanted Persian as the literary language of the cultured upper classes.” However, 
                                                          
70 As the Holy Warrior, The Ottoman Sultans waged war against other Muslims as well as non-Muslims. 
In order to justify war against non-Muslims the Ottoman Chroniclers presented their Muslim adversaries 
as either hindering the Holly War (through alliances with the Christian enemies of the empire) or as 
heretics even infidels (most notably in the case of war against the Shi’i Safavid dynasty) (Imber, 
2002:121) 
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those who used the Ottoman language were not necessarily Turks. Rather, they 
constituted the educated upper classes of a variety of Ottoman groups. Thus, to a certain 
extent the language formed a transnational link bonding elites together within the empire 
and alienating them collectively from their respective peoples (Hanioğlu, 2008: 34-36). 
The insignificance of language and ethnicity as markers of identity is also revealed 
through the censuses. The first official census of 1830 was based entirely on religion 
while ethnic or linguistic differences were almost completely ignored (Karpat, 1985).71 
Aside from Islam’s official dominance, 1830 census points to the demographic 
dominance of Muslims as they constitute the majority of the population. Although there 
are no reliable censuses before this date, it is safe to say that once again, the 
demographic weight of Muslims increased through the formation of empire and 
especially in the early sixteenth century following the conquest of Arab lands. However, 
even then, Christians constituted more than one third of the population. Thus, they 
constituted a very sizeable minority that could not be easily discarded. Moreover they 
constituted the majority in the European lands of the empire including the Balkans; the 
core of the empire. The apparent importance of religion in the social life accompanied 
by a very sizable non-Muslim population led to a very delicate management of this 
religious diversity known as “millet system.” 
Referring to the millet system as a tolerant form of rule compared with the 
oppressive and violent rules in Europe dates back to John Locke’s A Letter Concerning 
                                                          
71 The Ottoman disregard on ethnicity and nationality in classifying the society continued throughout the 
nineteenth century. This can be read as a deliberate attempt of the state which considered ethnic emphasis 
as detrimental to its survival. However, to a certain extent, this attitude is reflective of the centuries old 
tradition of a society divided along religious lines rather than ethnic lines. For this discussion, see Davison 
(1977). 
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Toleration and Voltaire’s Toleration (Barkey, 2008:109). Since then, millet system had 
been a subject of academic inquiry and controversy as it has been either portrayed 
perfectly harmonious society or as a society where savage Turks had repressed the 
Christians and Jews. The recent portrayal of Islam as an essentially oppressive religion 
in the wake of 9-11 by the pundits of Western academia and their subsequent 
contribution to the debates on the “clash of civilizations” also contributed to the 
increased attention on the millet system of Ottoman Empire as a model of toleration.72 
In their attempt to refute the arguments of Islam as an essentially oppressive religion, 
eminent scholars like Alfred Stepan (2001) and Karen Barkey (1994) declared that the 
millet system was much more open and tolerant compared with its contemporary 
Western European models. As Anthony Marx (2003) had demonstrated while the 
Ottomans were institutionalizing a new model of coexistance, European states were 
going through a stage of religious exclusion that had been influential for the 
development of nationalist(or proto-nationalist) feelings. Will Kymlicka (1992) even 
looked upon the millet system as “a model of pluralism and tolerance” that might be 
relevant for the contemporary societies. Although accepting inequality between Islam 
and other religions, millet system was a fairly tolerant system that enabled Ottomans not 
only forcefully rule but also to incorporate the non-Muslims at varying levels. 
Millet (millah in Arabic) is a term used in Quran to denote religion, and in the 
Ottoman system millet refers to confessional communities who were led by their 
religious leaders. These communities possessed a high degree of autonomy in the 
                                                          
72 Ironically the most important study in the field that dominated the literature for more than two decades 
is an edited collection, co-edited by Bernard Lewis, (and Benjamin Braude) (1982); one of the pioneers of 
the Islamic exceptionalism thesis. 
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conduct of communal affairs such as the collection of religious taxes and financing and 
maintaining of religious services, maintaining a communal legal order based on 
respective religious law particularly with regard to private law. Another aspect of millet 
system that would eventually become crucial in the age of nationalism is that millets had 
educational autonomy as well. They had their own educational institutions which was 
financed and directed by the community and thus were not subject to government 
regulation. 
Historians had been discussing different aspects of millet system, to the extent of 
questioning whether it existed at all, and if existed the extent of its institutionalization 
and penetration of the society. The conventional wisdom (see Karpat, 1972) dates the 
millet system to the reign of Mehmed II, and attaches it a central importance in the 
construction of Ottoman state system as Ottomans established themselves as an empire 
and an heir to the Romans. Some scholars severely questioned the validity of the 
common norm which dates the construction of three different millets to the policies of 
Mehmet II and even defined this dating as a myth. (Braude, 1982) Whatever might be 
the merit of these discussions, for the purpose of this dissertation it would suffice to 
mention that millet system (even though not officially declared and institutionalized 
with this name until the nineteenth century) had been a consistent (though arranged on 
ad-hoc bases) feature of Ottoman’s way of coping with the religious diversity of their 
subject populations. 
Until the emergence of millet system the Ottoman system’s relation with the 
non-Muslims were shaped by the classical teachings of Islam. The system was tolerant 
and non-Muslims had protection and religious freedom, but they had no administrative 
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power. There was no organized and institutionalized system seeking for the 
incorporation of non-Muslims to the political system of the empire (Karpat, 2006: 351). 
In that respect millet system represents a special kind of arrangement within the limits of 
Islamic dhimmi concept. 
Upon the impact of Islam in the institutional developments and arrangements in 
the Ottoman system, the relationship between the Muslim communities and non-Muslim 
communities can be described on three word “ separate, inequal and protected” (Barkey, 
2008:120). Particularly for the future legacy of this system on nation-building the notion 
of separateness is crucial. Here religion is the primary marker of identity and the millet 
system was aiming to maintain such separateness. Minna Rozen (2002) and Ahmet 
Refik (1998) cites fermans belonging respectively to sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
that tries to maintain the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and warns 
against the blurring of this distinction (quoted in Barkey, 2008). This distinction had 
been tried to maintain by “physical markers of difference” (Barkey, 2008: 121), symbols 
of domination and subordination (Kenanoğlu, 2004) and even through preventing 
physical proximity (like forbidding the building of a church or synagogue or even non-
Muslim houses close to a mosque). In that regard even the neighborhoods had been 
effectively separated. The state added further to the sense of separate corporate 
existence in the minority communities by treating them as units with collective 
administrative responsibilities such as imposition of various taxes as lump sums on 
entire communities or holding the entire community responsible for the conduct of its 
members (Marcus, 1989: 43). Different millet were treated like corporate bodies and 
allowed their own internal structures and hierarchies; indeed the Ottoman state 
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encouraged this by dealing exclusively with their leaders rather than individual members 
(Poulton, 1997: 48). 
Taken into consideration such aspects, millet system represents an ideal form of 
imperial rule over distinct but separate communities through intermediaries. Millet 
system is central to the Ottoman indirect rule of different religious communities, and as 
such it should be understood as an administrative strategy on the behalf of Ottomans to 
rule efficiently over such a diverse society. In that regard Karen Barkey (2008) 
effectively uses the “legilibility” concept developed by James Scott (1998). Through the 
creation of millets, Ottomans transformed their religious diversity into legible units that 
enables them to maintain control and effective mobilization of resources. It is not 
surprising that both the Austrian and Russian imperial ideologues had examined millet 
system as a possible solution to their problems of heterogeneity.  
 
3.5.2 Mughals and Raj 
It is now almost a cliché in the South Asian Studies to point out that empire has been a 
constant feature of the Indian subcontinent (Bose and Jalal, 2004:3). With its triangular 
geography surrounded by the Indian Ocean on two sides and the Himalayan Mountains 
on the north, the subcontinent represents a geographical unity. Within this unity exists 
an almost endless sea of differences (of faith, ethnicity, language, culture) making the 
subcontinent simultaneously a unity and one of the most diverse societies on earth.73 
                                                          
73 This diversity is still valid in modern India, as well, which makes it hard to define India as a nation-
state. It certainly has some imperial character not only with regard to its diverse society but also with 
regard to administrative plurality and indirect rule. Therefore political scientists have often pointed to 
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Thus, regionalism with its local identities and autonomous local rulers on the one hand 
and empire formation and the imperial unity on the other hand had been two opposing 
forces at work in the history of subcontinent.74 Initially Hinduism75 (and Sanskrit) and at 
a later stage Islam (and Persian) had been two important features of imperial-ness in the 
subcontinent by creating a degree of social and cultural unity among the elites. This 
produced an ever larger bond through the localities in the subcontinent notwithstanding 
many diverse and different local practices (Robb, 2002: 8). Mughal Empire is one of the 
series of imperial structures in the history of subcontinent and they represent the most 
typical features of an empire; they rule over a wide region from a very strong center 
(albeit, this center is quite small in terms of its geographic reach in comparison to the 
Ottomans or to many other empires: mostly limited to Delhi, Agra and Lahore) through 
the use of intermediaries. Their subjects are extremely diverse in belief and culture, but 
remained by and large autonomous and maintained their diversity. These centrifugal 
forces worked mostly in accordance with the central authority but the struggles between 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Indian exceptionalism, or needed to define India on particular terms. A recent attempt by leading 
comparativists Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz (2011) is to define India as a “state-nation” rather than a 
nation-state. 
74 It is precisely this imperial character of managing plurality is the constant feature of all empire building 
processes in India. Stanley Wolpert’s (2000: 39) account of Gupta dynasty that ruled India between the 
fourth and sixth centuries stands true for the remaining of Indian history as well as for other imperial 
forms outside the subcontinent: “By leaving local customs and mores alone, interfering as little as possible 
with the private, familial habits of people in disparate provinces and limiting imperial rule to the 
collection of taxes and overall maintenance of security against invasions, Guptan monarchs assured their 
prosperous tenure for almost two centuries. Much of the secret of their success was the “weakness” of 
their rule, its minimally intrusive nature.”    
75 Indeed, Hinduism itself through its millenniums long existence showed an adaptability and flexibility 
towards other cultures and belief system. As empires are conglomeration of different peoples and 
territories, Hinduism is a conglomeration of different cultures and belief systems. 
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the central authority and local forces also make up an important dimension of the 
Mughal history. 
“The Mughal Empire, like other pre-modern political systems of that scale, 
operated by a hierarchic distribution of authority among different levels of society.” The 
Mughal emperors were called as shahinshah, “king of kings” pointing to the level of 
power distribution and implicitly acknowledging the existence of peripheral power 
centers (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 29). Indirect rule through local rulers called 
zamindars were central to Mughal administration. Zamindars, who were equivalent of 
Ottoman ayans, were responsible for the maintenance of order and the collection of 
taxes in their respective areas as well as providing arms when necessary. It was 
Aurangzeb who strived for more central control, thus it is his desire to remain as the 
only power holder of the subcontinent more than his religious policies have created 
unrest and tensions among local power holders. Following his rule is the start of the 
emergence of regional kingdoms, which would formalize the diffusion of power.   
Hierarchy was not only an administrative reality. Similar to the eighteenth 
century Ottoman man, people in South Asia laid no claim on equality as well. 
Stratification and hierarchy had been a consistent feature of the life at Indian 
subcontinent as the society was organized around castes and tribes. Louis Dumont’s 
famous study Homo Hierarchius (1970) defined a Hindu society through its creation of 
hierarchies, although the recent scholarship underscored that his presentation “as if 
Hindus constituted a particular kind of humanity” (Robb, 2002: 19), is both exaggerated 
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and gives the castes a distinctive and stable character that they do not possess.76  
Nevertheless, caste hierarchies and occupational stratification stood against any illusion 
of egalitarianism. 
With the supremacy of Islam in Indian political life starting at the latest from the 
twelfth century onwards, religion became another criterion of hierarchy and 
stratification. Despite many syncretic tendencies Islam had always been an important 
arm of the Mughal state. The Mughal Emperors had assumed the title of caliph, 
representing the centrality of Islam to their rule (Malik, 1963: 20-21).77  Even a ruler 
like Akbar who showed no signs of personal piety (at least after 1585) referred to Islam 
as a mean of justification (Robb, 2002: 94). However, from a comparative analysis the 
distinguishing aspect of Mughal rule is not the centrality of Islam in state affairs but 
exceptionally high level of Hindu incorporation to state administration. “The Mughal 
Empire fostered a society in which, under a Muslim lead, Muslims and Hindus shared in 
                                                          
76 The confusion mostly arises due to the differences between varna and jati. Varna is the four fold caste 
hierarchy described in Hindu scripture; Priests (Brahmins), Warriors (Kshatriyas), Traders (Vaishyas) and 
Cultivators (Shudras). At the bottom lays the Untouchables who do not belong to any castes, thus referred 
as outcastes. Varna is an ideal described in Hindu scriptures, but in practice caste as experienced by 
Indians means jati. Jatis are essentially local groups with a known local order of hierarchy which is far 
more complex and also more fluid than the four-fold division in literary descriptions. Moreover, jatis can 
raise higher in the ladder of hiearchy. This often happens due to increasing economic prosperity followed 
by the cultural adoptation of higher castes, a process defined by scholars as Sanskritization. Furthermore, 
entirely new jatis can emerge due to migration or splitting of older groups. But it is crucial to note that it 
was group mobility, validated according to the conventions of the system, but not individual mobility. By 
this way it is possible to claim that allowing group mobility made this hierarchical system more resilient 
than strict literal descriptions would enable (Brown, 1984: 19-22).  
77 However, as Malik (1963: 20-21) points, this also meant a denial of an outsider authority (like the 
Ottoman sultans who also declared themselves as the universal Caliphs). However, we see that with the 
demise of the Mughal authority and the rise of British as the new masters, the concept of a universal 
caliph had started to resonate with the Muslims of India. The importance of this concept of being a part of 
the universal ummah and the centrality of a caliphate would prove essential to the later development of 
Muslim nationalism in India.  
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a common political and cultural life which in important sectors they carried out in 
common.” The emperor Akbar, the first to have an effectively long reign, tried to create 
and Indian version of Islam that would eventually incorporate with Hinduism. This 
attempt failed, in fact created a strong backlash of Islamic revivalism; but “Indian Islam 
remained nonetheless a world to itself, in which - in contrast to the practice in the 
Ottoman Empire, which also possessed large non-Muslim populations - non-Muslims 
did not even pay the legal poll-tax. Indian Islam was distinguished not only by its 
special relations to Hinduism (at all levels) but by its own emotional tone” (Hodgson, 
1993:194-196). As already mentioned, the Ottoman millet system was based upon the 
dhimmi concept of the Islamic law. Dhimmis were also defined as ‘the people of book’, 
thus as a concept it didn’t include Hindus. However, in practice since the establishment 
of first Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent by Mohammad Qasim, a young Arab 
general at the early eighth century, the Hindus were treated as dhimmis and were 
incorporated to state apparatuses (Malik, 1963:4-5).78 
It is also true that after Akbar’s (reigned between 1556-1605) failed attempts to 
create a complete incorporation of Hinduism and Islam through his din-i ilahi, 
subsequent Mughal emperors paid more homage to Islam and with the rule of 
Aurangzeb (reigned between 1658-1707), Islam and Islamic law became entrenched in 
                                                          
78 In fact the extension of dhimmi status to the followers of religions other than Christianity and Judaism 
dates back even to an earlier time, to the reign of the second Caliph Omar and the invasion of Iran by the 
armies of Islam. After the conquest of Iran, Zoroastrian population of Iran was accepted as dhimmi, based 
upon the similarity of their belief system to the monotheist ideals of the “religions of book.” But it is with 
the acceptance of Hindus, a religious group that clearly defies any conception of monotheism, as dhimmis 
that the word dhimmi practically became the equivalent of non-Muslim. Prof Malik claims that the 
distinction between non-Muslims that were people of book and other non-Muslim was effectively 
abandoned at the early dates of Islam and bases his argument to a fatwa given by Abu-Hanife (Malik, 
1963:301).    
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the Mughal system. Thus, it is possible to consider the religious policy of Mughal 
emperors as two competing attempts represented by Akbar; an increased 
accommodation between Hindus and Muslims and a greater orthodoxy represented by 
Aurangzeb. Series of struggles and succession wars in which the succession struggle 
between Dara Shukoh and Aurangzeb was decisive were in part a contest between 
Akbar’s conciliation and Shah Jahan’s (Akbar’s son and heir) iconoclasm (Robb, 2002: 
94-95).  
Historians so far have not reached a consensus on the real role of Islam in the 
policy preferences of Aurangzeb. While the dominant tradition has always contrasted 
Aurangzeb with Akbar, and portrayed him as a religious bigot whose religious zeal had 
prevented him from preserving the delicate balance the Mughal system had established 
with regard to its relations with Hinduism and Hindu chiefs. According to this narrative, 
by the end of Aurangzeb’s rule, the religious compartmentalization of India was 
complete both by through implementation of Islamic law and the supremacy of Islam 
against Hindus and Sikhs and also through social grievances. This narrative doesn’t only 
portray Aurangzeb’s religious policy as the main explanatory factor behind the Mughal 
decline, but also mistakenly portrays him as the founder of Muslim nationalism in the 
subcontinent.79 In contrast, Akbar is portrayed as the representative of the cosmopolitan 
and secular conceptualization of an all-inclusive Indian identity, which transcends over 
communal divisions. According to this narrative the evolution of Mughal system from 
Akbar to Aurangzeb represents the failure of cosmopolitanism and the hegemony of 
                                                          
79 And of course his Hindu rivals like the Maratha leaders Shivaji and Shambaji are depicted as the 
founder of Hindutva, Hindu nationalism, which in fact didn’t emerge any before then 1920’s. 
 107 
 
communalism. Recently historians have challenged such a portrayal of Aurangzeb. 
Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf (2006: 20-24) point to the facts that most of 
Aurangzeb’s military campaigns had targeted the Muslim dynasties,80 and more 
importantly, he continued to incorporate the Hindu elites into his system.81 Aside from 
his many Hindu generals, during his reign, more than one fourth of the mansabdars (tax 
collecting governing officials, with high administrative powers and military duties; 
roughly equivalent of Ottoman timariot elites) were Hindus. Thus, although encouraging 
a more austere Islamic style in the courtly culture, Aurangzeb “shifted but didn’t 
fundamentally alter the religious policy of the empire.”82  
Considered in this light, there is a more familiar reason for the Mughal decline of 
power, “imperial overstretch” (Kennedy, 1989) rather than religious intolerance. 
                                                          
80 It is surprising to learn from Stanley Wolpert (1991: 43) that Aurangzeb’s military campaigns stirred up 
hatred among the Hindus in Deccan. Yet, one wonders why the Hindus in Deccan would be stirred up 
with hatred when the Muslim dynasty already ruling Deccan is defeated by another Muslim dynasty from 
the north. Moreover Ayesha Jalal points to the negative reactions of Muslims in Deccan to Aurangzeb’s 
conquests: “The Bijapuri poet Ansari compared the situation (Aurangzeb’s overrunning of the city-states 
of Bijapur and Golconda) in his conquered homeland to the advent of kufar (infidelity) and found little 
pleasing about the new circumstances. A Muslim conqueror being billed a kafir in a poetic lament about 
the destruction of a style of life is a warning against any facile equation of an individual’s religiously 
informed identity with an undifferentiated community of Islam” (2000: 12). 
81 As the elite are not necessarily united by religion as in many other imperial cases, it was Persian which 
provided the unifying common culture of elites. As a non-Indian language, Persian also helped to 
distinguish the ruling elite from the rest of society, just like the Ottoman Turkish did in the Ottoman 
Empire (for more detail, see Alam, 1998). 
82 Another important point is that Akbar’s policy of forcefully creating harmony between Islam and 
Hinduism seems to have created a backlash in the long run. The struggle against accomodationist and 
syncretic policies of Akbar had opened a way of religious reformation and increased consciousness among 
the Muslims of the subcontinent. The religious revival of Muslims starting with Ahmed Faruk Sirhindi 
also known as Imam Rabbani reached a new climate by Shah Waliullah Dahlavi. The sunni reformist 
movements of Sirhindi and Dahlavi and later followed by the disciples of Dahlavi had influenced the 
community feeling among the Muslims of India. But more importantly, the zeal of these movements 
convinced the British to the compact, homogenous and distinctly separate from Hindus nature of Islam 
and Muslims in India.  
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Aurangzeb conquered more territories than any other Mughal ruler, but already by the 
end of his reign, central control over this enormous territory was becoming more and 
more impossible to maintain. Moreover, Aurangzeb was not willing to share his power 
and wealth with the intermediaries, or intermediaries of his empire were too greedy to 
accept the offered shares. In the few decades following Aurangzeb’s death in 1707, local 
power holders such as zamindars, princes of tributary states and defiant government 
officials started to challenge the central rule. The most important of such defiant 
officials was Nizam-ul Mulk, who as an imperial prime minister withdrew to Hyderabad 
and asserted his autonomy there, and even defeated Mughal armies. Soon he was 
dignified as the Mughal viceroy for the Southern parts of the empire. Other local 
officials in important provinces like Bengal and Awadh also asserted their local 
autonomy. All these peripheral power holders remained loyal to Mughal sovereignty 
only in name and became de facto rulers of their territories. As it will be seen in the next 
chapter, the sweeping away of the power from center to the periphery during the 
eighteenth century pretty much resembles the same process that occurred in the Ottoman 
Empire roughly during the same time. Nizam of Hyderabad is pretty much like the 
Mohammad Ali of Egypt who exactly one century later became de facto ruler of Egypt 
and defeated his imperial master in 1826. The qualified success of the Ottomans in re-
asserting the central authority through the nineteenth century was managed in the Indian 
subcontinent by the British power.  
Despite the extreme doctrinal opposition, Muslims and Hindus lived in the 
subcontinent together for more than a thousand years (Wolpert, 1991: 99). The nature of 
their relation with each other during this period is still a matter of academic controversy. 
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It is natural that on such a large time span and a large geographical-demographic-
cultural variation one can find instances of harmony, co-optation and even syncretism as 
well as rivalry, enmity and violence. However, in general it would be safe to say that 
what characterized the communal relations usually was the lack of violence. Moreover, 
historians also question the level of communal awareness in pre-modern periods (for an 
important example, see Bayly, 1985) and given the highly syncretic character of Indian 
Islam and Sufism many scholars point to the lack of clear differentiation and markers of 
identity among the communities. For further analysis, it seems necessary to make a 
distinction between the rural, where religious orthodoxies and learning were largely 
absent and the urban where both the arm of state and the influence of a high culture 
were evident. Religious syncretism and harmony seem to prevail in the rural. This is not 
to say that urban centers lacked such harmony, however, communal awareness was 
much more visible and higher in the urban centers. As Sudhir Kakar’s (1996: 10) 
analysis of the urban center of Hyderabad points, “it was a multicultural coexistance 
rather than any merger into a single, composite culture; Hindus and Muslims lived 
together separately.” He defines their relationship as (and Masters (2001: 38) finds it 
equally appropriate for the Muslim-Christian relations at the Ottoman –Arab-urban 
centers) “they were more than strangers, not often enemies, but less than friends.”  
The literature influenced by the post-colonial studies has tended to associate the 
increasing importance of communalism to the policies of the British. Thus, Pandey’s 
(1990) seminal study bears the name, “Construction of Communalism in the Colonial 
North India.” The title gives us the gist of the book; communalism is constructed by 
colonial masters. Pandey’s book puts forward many strong cases and convincingly 
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demonstrates the role of the British in the politicization of religious identities. However, 
British did not invent or even construct communal identities ab initio.83 Failure of 
Akbar’s syncretism, and subsequent revival of religious thought and religion’s increased 
dominance in the rule of empire had certainly contributed to the communal awareness. 
Yet, as Bayly (1985: 203) reminds us, communal awareness is not communalism and 
“analyses of consciousness seem to lead nowhere if taken out of context. 
Religious differences were more likely to become communal conflicts 
when they coincided with shifts in political and economic power. 
Conflicts between Hindu and Sikh peasantry and Muslim gentry, or 
between Muslim peasantry and Hindu gentry did not inevitably lead to 
polarization on communal lines. Preconditions are not the same as 
causes.”  
In this light, what Findley (2010: 65) said for the Ottoman Empire stands also true for 
the Indian subcontinent: religious difference had always existed, but the politicization of 
these differences was as modern as the politicization of ethnicity. 
Thus, important as it may be for the historians of Mughal empire, the discussion 
over the exact level of the role of Islamic orthodoxy and religious syncretism in the 
policy of Mughal emperors is little relevant for the formation of religious nationalisms 
in the subcontinent. In either case, it is anachronistic to define such policies as 
nationalist (secular-all inclusive or religious-communalist) at a time period where no all-
Indian conceptualization of either Islamdom or Hinduism was present. In fact all the 
processes of nation-buildings in India, be it the larger Indian nationalism or more 
communal oriented Hindu or Muslim nationalisms, started during the late stages of 
British Raj. The Mughal rule is relevant only to understand the society that British 
                                                          
83 As they didn’t invent caste ab initio (Robb, 2002: 19) but definitely gave it a new, more common and 
rigid meaning (Dirks, 2001). 
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inherited; a fragmented multi religious society with high levels of tolerance and 
syncretism. But it was also a society, despite the lack of communal administrative 
organizations and legal systems (as was the case in the Ottoman Empire), which had 
eventually reached a certain level of communal consciousness.  
Moreover, whatever might be the increasing use of religion is true for Mughal 
history, the distinguishing aspect of Mughal history is not its incorporation of Islam to 
the official discourse of the empire (which would be the expected norm) that 
differentiates Mughals in the Islamic history, but it is the level of syncretism and 
integration of Hindu elites to the system that differentiates Mughals. Despite the 
apparent supremacy of Islam, unlike the Ottomans, the Mughals had not 
institutionalized a religious policy similar to the millet system, which would be separate 
and hierarchical.84 Indeed, it was the British who institutionalized the organization of 
society on religious grounds. If we apply James Scott’s legibility concept to the Indian 
history, the way Barkey applied on the Ottoman history, we can safely claim that many 
of the British policies, which can be defined as part of “colonial governmentality,” 
(Scott, 1995) had led to the introduction of categories such as caste and religion for the 
administrative and organizational needs of the colonial state. Thus, it was more the 
vision of the British rather than Muslim’s own conceptualization that led them to 
conceive themselves as part of an all-Indian Muslim community. However, in 1947, the 
Muslims of the subcontinent shared the same vision with the British. How this 
transformation happened and the role of administrative policies of the colonial state 
                                                          
84 Moreover, contrary to other historians who underline the policies of Aurangzeb as the reason of Mughal 
collapse, Hodgson (1974: 59) claims that this difference led to the early collapse of the Mughals 
compared to Ottomans.  
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constitutes the next chapter. In the second half of the nineteenth century, both the 
Ottomans and Indian subcontinent experienced a religious revival, albeit on different 
terms. Yet the subsequent result had been the politicization of religious identity, and the 
emergence of Muslim nationalism.  
As a result, we can say that both the Ottomans and Indians entered into 
modernity with a fragmented society categorized and compartmentalized mostly through 
religion. The religious differences, stressed and exaggerated in so many ways, however, 
did not separate the communities into segregated social worlds of their own (Marcus, 
1989: 43). In the next two chapters, we will look at the story of how these religious 
compartments of the society gained political significance and transformed themselves 
into religious nationalisms. In a way, it is the story of the transformation of religious 
consciousness to religious nationalism and the ascendancy of religious nationalism over 
alternative political identities.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND OTOTMAN EMPIRE 
 
 
Why could not religious diversity, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Indian 
subcontinent, be endured? Moreover, what is the relation between the erosion of 
religious diversity and nation-building? How and why did religious communities evolve 
into religious nationalism? This chapter seeks to answer these questions in the case of 
the Ottoman Empire and will be followed by another chapter addressing the Indian 
context. In both cases, as everywhere else in the world, the emergence of nationalism is 
linked to the formation of the modern state. These chapters will also examine the 
politicization of religious communities and the emergence of religious nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire and Indian subcontinent in the context of modern state formation. It 
will be argued that due to the difficulty in sustaining plurality within a modern state, 
neither the Ottomans nor the Raj could reconcile religious plurality with a centralizing 
modern state. Rather, modern state formation led to the politicization of religious 
identities and the codification of religious nationalism. In the process, religion became 
an exclusionary ideology that enabled the formation of national boundaries. Thus, the 
exclusion of non-Muslims was crucial to nation-building and national homogenization. 
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This attempt to explain the emergence and dominance of religious nationalism 
builds on the previous chapter concentrating on empire as a pre-modern form of political 
organization. It further seeks to explain nationalism as a transition from empire to 
nation-state while pointing out that modernization reforms, such as the centralization of 
administration, the promotion of uniformity and equality through political reforms, and 
direct rule through the extension of state power are inter-related. Taken as a whole, these 
reforms transformed various aspects of empire in ways that helped precipitate 
nationalism. 
The nineteenth century marked the beginning of a new era, both in the Ottoman 
Empire and in the Indian subcontinent, as well as the emergence of the modern state. 
The emergence of the modern state also resulted in the transformation of the imperial 
social structure, which was based on a diverse, hierarchical and composite society ruled 
through multiple forms of administrative plurality. The new social structure was instead 
characterized by increased uniformity in all realms of life, administration, identity and 
citizenship. This process disrupts the social balance and is always resisted by both 
traditional centers of power and by those for whom increased state activity entails 
increased burdens, such as taxation and conscription. In contrast, pre-modern states, 
with less involvement in the daily lives of their subjects, offered limited services, yet 
demanded much less in return. The increase in the state’s capacity to deliver services 
also comes with the burden of increased obligations to the state. As Jurgen Habermas 
writes, “the expansion of state activity produces the side effect of a disproportionate 
increase in the need for legitimation (1975: 71).” Since this process entailed the 
transformation of imperial forms, structures of legitimation were also radically altered, 
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particularly religion and language, to some extent, acquired new meanings and social 
functions. 
The problems arising from such a rapid transformation in the nineteenth century 
were further exacerbated in the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire for 
disparate reasons. Whereas the British were suffering from a colonial legitimacy crisis 
in the Subcontinent, the Ottomans were managing the creation of a modern state in the 
face of nationalist challenges. Though nationalism poses a dangerous threat to every 
empire, the crisis in the Ottoman territories was even more severe due to the Ottoman 
center’s incapacity to counter the force of nationalist powers. Both states aimed at 
overcoming these problems by creating formulas subservient to their political order. 
While Ottoman attempts at centralization and modernization led to the creation of what 
Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) and Benedict Anderson (1991: 83-112) called “official 
nationalism,” the British resorted to imperial methods of collaboration, alliance-building 
and divide-and-rule tactics. In addition, though Ottoman weakness was a major obstacle 
in the face of the success of official nationalism, the colonial, racist character of the Raj 
prevented even the introduction of an official nationalism. However, the modernizing 
nature of the Raj resulted in the evolution of an anti-colonial nationalism and, at a later 
stage, led to the formation of what John Breulliy (1982: 199-217) called “sub-
nationalism in a colonial state.” 
This chapter and the following chapter analyze the introduction of the modern 
state along with the transformation of the old order in both cases. It also attempts to 
illuminate the emergence of nationalist projects within each of these processes. 
Thereafter, it investigates the success of Muslim nationalism both in the Ottoman 
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Empire and the Indian subcontinent among alternative nationalist projects. A century of 
reforms aimed at instilling loyalty among non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire 
ultimately led to their exclusion from the nationalist project and the dominance of 
Muslim nationalism. On the other hand, Indian Islam, the most hybrid and syncretic of 
all Islamic traditions, formed the basis of a state exclusively established for Muslims in 
the Indian subcontinent. 
 
4.1 Evolution of the Ottoman Empire During the Nineteenth Century 
The entire nineteenth century, defined by İlber Ortaylı (1999) as “the longest century of 
the empire” reflects the continuing attempts of the state to reform itself as well as the 
state-society relations.  In this “Century of Ottoman Transformation” (Karpat, 1972) the 
magnitude of the challenges posed both by the external enemies and also by the internal 
turn-overs compelled the state elite not only to reform the state but in a sense to “re-
invent” it (Hanioğlu, 2008: 41); a process that eventually paved the “road out of empire” 
(Barkey, 2008: 264-296). 
Through these reforms, the three basic features of empires outlined in the 
previous chapter in order to help contrast empires with nation-states went through a 
radical transformation;  
1) center-periphery distinction was undermined as attempts to centralize the 
entire empire was underway (with regard to the real and actual control 
imposed directly by the state without intermediaries).  
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2) uniformity was imposed in the administration of the empire as autonomous 
and distinctly treated communities (like millets, but also autonomous 
regions in the periphery) gave way to an understanding of universal and 
uniform citizenry.  
3) diverse identities were melted (or grouped) if not necessarily undermined 
along the way by an over-arching common identity; a process of creating a 
nation with varying levels of common denominators; Ottoman, Muslim and 
Turk.   
In this chapter, we will look at these transformations from the perspective of 
changes in state organization and state-society relations and how these changes initiated 
a process of transition from an empire towards a nation-state. This process included 
administrative homogenization, increase of direct control and elimination of 
intermediary power holders inevitably resulting in the need of a more egalitarian social 
system. This increased integration of state and society and the undermining of 
traditional power balances resulted with the search for a new structure and a political 
culture structure corresponding it (Karpat, 1972). The overall restructuring of the state-
society relations necessitated a new social contract fundamentally different from the 
centuries old social system of the empire. Thus, these administrative reforms also 
brought the question of what Lewis has defined as the search for a “corporate political 
identity.” This search also brought drastic changes to the legitimation system of the state 
and the function of religious and ethno-linguistic identities. 
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What we witness throughout the nineteenth century is a transformation from an 
empire toward nation-ness. While empire as the political body that enables the separate 
coexistence of different communities was evolving toward disintegration, nation-ness 
emerged as a solution to thwart the dissolution of the state. Emergence of the question of 
political identity that would link the state with its subjects was both the symptom and 
the result of this transformation. As nation is a discursive construct, the nineteenth 
century also witnessed the rivalry between alternative forms of nationalisms. On the one 
hand, the rivalry was between an all-encompassing imperial nationalism (Ottomanism) 
and its more particular adversaries of ethnic and religious nationalisms (For the earliest 
analysis of this rivalry, see Akçura, 1904 [1977]). On the other hand, increasingly from 
the second half of the century, the content and meaning of the official imperial 
nationalism itself became an area of contestation. All alternative national projects 
coexisted and interacted with each other and fed each other as the success or advent of 
any national project provoked rival national projects. As these national projects evolved 
and competed with each other through the age of reform until the formation of a new 
state in 1923, it was the religious nationalism that appeared as the eventual victor. Thus, 
the story of this chapter is more about the creation, evolution and the ultimate victory of 
religious nationalism(s) in the empire. This, however, does not mean the victory of 
tradition (religion) over the modern forces (nation). As Findley (2010: 65) has pointed 
out, “religious differences had always existed, but the politicization of these differences 
was as modern as the politicization of ethnicity.” 
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4.1.1 The Empire at the Turn of Century85 
Traditional reading of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Ottoman Empire in 
particular and the Islamic world in general as a continuous history of decline has been 
severely criticized by the more recent scholarship (see, Kireççi, 2007; Salzmann, 1993; 
Barkey, 1994). It is argued that rather than being passive bystanders of the European-
World history, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire were active, though very much 
weakened, participants of the world history in the making. The Islamic societies were 
also far from being stagnant, fatalist and passive.86 Thus, despite the previous portrayal 
of a decaying society, current scholarship underlines the vitality of the state and society 
and their desire and ability to confront the challenges they have faced. Thereby, contrary 
to the previous reading of the reforms as western imposed, the indigenous urge for the 
reforms has been underlined.  
Aside from acknowledging the reforming capacity of the state and society, 
another contention is on the nature and destiny of the reforms. Reading of the Ottoman 
century of reforms shaped by the ideological appeal of modernization in general and 
secularism in particular (Berkes, 1964) and then as a constant move toward modern 
Turkey is long abandoned. Similarly, the recent scholarship also questions the teleology 
of considering the reforms of late Ottoman history as a conscious prelude to the 
“emergence of modern Turkey” (a la Lewis). These evolutionary, modernist histories 
                                                          
85 Quite justifiably, the nineteenth century is the most studied period of the six century long Ottoman 
history and probably constitutes the strongest field of Ottoman historiography. There are plenty of 
excellent books that provide a detailed historical account of the century. In this brief historical sketch, I 
am mostly relying on the authoritative works of Hanioğlu, 2008; Karpat, 1972 and Ortaylı, 1999. Other 
works are also cited when necessary. 
 
86 For a detailed analysis of a Middle Eastern city, on the eve of modernity, Abraham Marcus’s (1989) 
detailed study of Aleppo in the eighteenth century is illuminating and challenges the stagnant portrait of 
the Middle East.  
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suffer from an overdose of ideological teleology and an assumption of the superiority of 
modernist ideology. In contrast, the history of the nineteenth century is too complex to 
allow a linear story either from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey or from religious order to 
secularism. Even the supposedly most obvious of the evolutions, the one from an empire 
to a nation-state is not that straightforward as the imperial social and administrative 
structures often coexisted with the newly emerging national ideas and institutions. 
Therefore societal change should be understood as the response of state and society to 
multiple challenges brought by modernity and the advent of Western powers rather than 
been driven by an ideology of modernization (Hanioğlu, 2008: 3). This would enable us 
to contextualize the change and also to explain the seemingly contradictory aspects of 
the change. 
Another fallacy of the previous scholarship on the Ottoman reforms is the 
excessive emphasis put on the European impact (see particularly, Davison, 1963 and 
Davison, 1990). Obviously an important factor in the reform movement, the European 
impact served more as a catalyzer rather than a cause for reforms. It is true that the 
imminent European threat to the empire’s survival stimulated the desire for reforms; 
however, the main urge for reforms comes from the internal dynamics (Karpat, 1972: 
243). Moreover, the benevolent reading of European influence as guiding the Ottomans 
through the reforms (a la Davison) has been criticized as European intervention and 
meddling appears to be one of the fundamental problems the reformers have faced and 
eventually the main reason for the qualified failure of the reforms (Anscombe, 2014). 
Thus, “while the influence of Western ideas cannot be ignored, it has also been shown 
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clearly that these steps originated from within the empire and as such reflected the 
interests, demands and contradictions of indigenous groups” (Kasaba, 2008:4). 
Ottoman urge for reform dates back to the seventeenth century, when Koci Bey 
in 1630 urged the Sultan to take measures in order to get the empire back to the golden 
days of Suleiman the Magnificent. However, the urge for reform became more apparent 
and urgent as the empire first lost its military superiority then subsequently became 
unable to cope with the rising military power of European empires; particularly the 
Russians and Austrians. Different dates have been provided as the turning point for the 
apprehension of the necessity of far reaching reforms. While most Middle Eastern 
experts mark 1798, the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon as the beginning of an era of 
modernization (Cleveland, 1994), the Ottomanists in general and the experts on Balkan 
and East European takes the date back, more plausibly, to the severe defeat of the 
Ottomans at the hand of Russians in 1774 (Hale, 2002; Anderson, 1966; Davison, 1990). 
It was after this defeat that state’s weakness and its vulnerability vis-à-vis its enemies 
became apparent.87 1789 is also considered as a turning point, not as the year of French 
Revolution, but as the year of the enthronement of the first self-consciously reformist 
sultan of the empire; Selim III (see Karpat, 1972; Findley, 1980; Findley, 2010). 88 
                                                          
87 This date is also significant as the inculcation of the Ottoman Sultan for the first time as the protector 
of a Muslim group outside its domain, the Crimean Muslims, as a part of the peace agreement that ended 
the 1774 Ottoman Russian War. Similarly the Russians continuously used an over-stretched interpretation 
of this agreement in order to meddle in to the affairs of Ottoman Orthodox population (see Davison, 
1976), thus severely contributing to the politicization of religious differences. At least one historian also 
dates the Treaty as the beginning of political Islam, or pan-Islam (see Landau, 1990), though this 
interpretation seems a little over stretched and anachronistic.  
 
88 Shaw and Shaw (1977) and Ortaylı (1999) takes 1808, the enthronement of Mahmud II as the 
beginning of a new era. All these are justifiable preferences and choosing one event and date over the 
others inevitably has an arbitrary aspect. I preferred 1789 and the enthronement of Selim III as the 
beginning of first attempts of state centralization, though resulted in a failure. Despite their shortcomings, 
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As Selim was enthroned, the empire was engaged in another losing war with 
Austria and Russia. War ended in 1792 and only Western intervention saved the empire 
from a more humiliating peace settlement with Russia. The need for reform was 
apparent and, as always, the initial locus of the reforms was addressing the military 
weakness of the empire. However, in order to improve the military power, the empire 
needed better finances and thus a military reform necessitated far reaching 
administrative transformations. “The twenty-odd papers on the question of reforms 
submitted to the Sultan at his own request stressed the need for civil reform, for 
economic recovery and for a comprehensive plan for reform to be reached by 
deliberation and universal consent” (Karpat, 1972: 252). Thus, it is apparent that the 
Ottoman state elite at the time was aware that the extent of military reform necessitated 
far reaching changes and the military reform could only be achieved if it was supplanted 
by an administrative restructuring of the system. Indeed this awareness resulted in the 
first attempt, though not very successful, of administrative reorganization program in 
1795. As part of the military reform a new military unit was formed and this new army 
was labeled Nizam-ı Cedid (the New Order), hinting the anticipated extent of reforms. 89 
What at the time was unanticipated by the reformers was the political and social 
consequences of these reforms. Despite the awareness that reforms had to exceed the 
military realm into the administrative realm, there was no awareness that these reforms 
would lead to an entirely new social order. Instead, the Selim’s reforms, despite not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and unlike the previous reformers whose emphasis was on the revival of the old golden days rather than 
creating an entirely new system, these reforms set the precedents for the subsequent reforms in enhancing 
state centralization and emerging of a modern state apparatus and bureaucracy, which in due time was 
accompanied by a novel ideology.  
 
89 This is significant, because all the previous reform movements of the eighteenth century, however 
important they may be, were addressing solely the military realm. This awareness that an entirely new 
system might be needed is what differentiates the Selim reforms from his predecessors. 
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being limited to military, were formulated within the mindset of the old order, thus 
Selim represented “between old and new” (Shaw, 1971). However, his failure also made 
it clear for the next generation of reformers that what needed was not only strengthening 
the Ottoman system but to transform it (Cleveland, 1994: 61). 
Military reform needed better finances; however the state lacked the 
administrative capability to extract the necessary resources from its subjects. Through 
the past two centuries the Ottoman system was effectively and excessively 
decentralized. Particularly the long and exhaustive wars with the Russians and Austrians 
during the eighteenth century put the Ottoman finances in dire positions. The urgent 
solution to the financial necessities was the privatization of the land system and 
introduction of the life term tax farming. Although initially successful in increasing the 
revenues that were urgently needed in the course of the long eighteenth century wars, 
introduction of life term tax farming ruined the Ottoman finances in the long run. 
Moreover, it resulted in the emergence of a wealthy and powerful provincial group of 
notables, who were called derebeys or ayans, even in the central areas of the empire. As 
these local derebeys increased their power, the central control of the state over these 
territories declined (Barkey, 2008: 226-263). It was particularly the strength of these 
ayans that prevented the success of the 1795 administrative reform program of Selim III. 
While state’s authority was curbed by ayans in its central lands, in the far flung 
territories local dynasties increased their power to the level of being practically 
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autonomous. Indeed at the turn of the nineteenth century, the control of the Ottoman 
center was almost non-existing beyond the core provinces of Rumelia and Anatolia.90 
Thus at the turn of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the sultan was 
challenged on two grounds; territorially his control did not extend beyond the core, and 
within the core he was sharing the power with the local leaders. 1808 Sened-i Ittifak 
represents the bottom level of the strength of the sultan and the center with regard to the 
local power holders. Although saved the day for the new incumbent sultan, the deal was 
a proof of his powerlessness and his lack of control over his subjects. “As such, it 
accurately reflected the balance of power at the time. Mahmud II signed the document 
half-heartedly after his advisers admitted that it ‘violated his sovereignty, but could not 
be resisted’ under the circumstances” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 58).91 
 
4.1.2 Transformation of the Empire 
From that point on a century long attempts of administrative reforms targeting 
centralization and the extension of state control both territorially-horizontally (by 
starting to assert state’s authority on the periphery as well) and vertically (by increasing 
state’s grip over the subject people). Throughout the time what constitutes the center has 
showed variance and the century witnessed a competition between the sultan (and court) 
and the sublime-port (bureaucracy) as the main center of power. Throughout the reign of 
                                                          
90 Large parts of the empire such as North Africa, Syria, Egypt and Iraq all acquired a de facto, though 
temporary, autonomy while Arabia went under the control of the Wahhabis. Even in Rumelia, which is 
the core of the empire, the upheavals among the Kirjalis, and ayans like Pasvanoğlu and Tepedelenli Ali 
Pasa in Janina, weakened further the government's authority by forcing the army to fight these rather than 
the Christian rebels (Karpat, 1972: 249).  
91 The original document does not exist. Once reasserted his power, Mahmud destroyed this “pernicious 
document” (menhus belge) (Ortaylı, 1999:36). 
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Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) the court managed 
to establish itself as the center of power. The modern bureaucracy which was formed by 
Mahmud II managed to exert its influence over the sultan during the interim Tanzimat 
period (1839-1876). Although the patterns of power sharing at the center have showed 
variance and the competition between the court and the Sublime Porte has never ceased 
(and indeed deeply affected the outcome of many political developments), the consistent 
pattern of the century was the increase of the power of the center at the expense of the 
periphery. In that regard, “there were important continuities across the major periods of 
the Tanzimat, Abdülhamid II’s reign, the Second Constitutional Period and the War for 
Liberation” (Kasaba, 2008:4). 
However, this was no typical process of centralization that aims to increase the 
power of center vis-a-vis the periphery. Centralization in a classical imperial form meant 
the reorganization of power sharing between the center, periphery and intermediaries of 
power holders in favor of the central power. Thus centralization means providing a more 
efficient flow of resources from periphery toward the center and guaranteeing the flow 
of orders from center to the periphery. In a typical centralization, multiple deals are 
struck in order to maintain the vertical integration of power from the periphery toward 
the center through intermediary power holders (Barkey, 2008:264). However, the 
nineteenth century Ottoman centralization aimed to eliminate these intermediaries. “To 
the far-sighted contemporaries it was clear that… a loosely bound association of 
disparate, semi-independent territories could not expect to survive long in the 
Napoleonic era.” In order to survive the empire needed to establish a new balance 
between center and periphery. However, building such a new balance was “so closely 
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bound up with the structural characteristics of the state that traditional measures of 
reform were no longer sufficient. To survive, the empire’s leaders had to do more than 
change the state; they had to reinvent it.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 40-41). 
It was also untypical because it was a process of reform which led to the creation 
of modern forms of power that enabled unprecedented level of control over the subject 
people. The nineteenth century reforms also correspond to the transformation of 
sovereignty from a personal-judicial level to a deeper, more widespread and more 
penetrating level, defined as “govermentality” by Michel Foucault.  Thus nineteenth 
century centralization attempts mean the introduction of modern government. This led to 
far reaching changes in the formation of state and the nature of state-society relations 
such as the formation of a bureaucratic arm, introduction of state sponsored education 
institutions, increased communication between the state and its subjects as well as 
increased interaction within the society. Such measures that enabled states 
unprecedented levels of power to control and penetrate into the society also transformed 
the societal relations in general and inter communal relations in particular. Evolution of 
the modern forms of power also means the disruption of the delicate balance of empires 
which rested on the passivity of most of the society and active involvement and support 
of the limited segments of the society (intermediaries of power), in favor of an increased 
identification between the ruler (which impersonalized and took the shape of modern 
state) and its subjects (which transformed to a citizen), and the active participation of the 
entire society in support of the sovereign (state). As this delicate balance of empires was 
broken, new forms of engagement between the ruler and the society were developed, 
which have changed the traditional roles of the ruler and the subject and have brought 
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new responsibilities and expectations on both sides. This also means that the tacit 
contract between the ruler and the subjects in the traditional polities based on the 
compliance of the former and the limited involvement of the latter has changed. Such a 
change also meant a total transformation of the state organization and its relation with 
the society. Indeed a new form of state qualitatively different from the traditional empire 
was being formed. Key features of traditional empire discussed in the previous chapter, 
such as indirect rule through intermediaries of power holders and plurality of political 
and administrative arrangements were unacceptable in this new form of state. 
Elimination of intermediaries and uniformization of administration also targeted the 
hierarchical and compartmentalized nature of society. All these transformations resulted 
with the necessity of a new social contract which involves a new arrangement (or a 
contract) of the roles; duties and obligations of the ruler and the subject. Declaration of 
the Tanzimat Edict at the end of Mahmud II’s reign in 1839 points to the first attempt of 
these searches for a new contract; a search which continued throughout the century and 
found its most typical form among the constitutionalist movements. Thus, this long 
century of centralization (read also as the formation of modern state) is accompanied 
with new arrangements of state-society relations. Evolution of empire toward nation-
ness and the emergence of nationalism and national questions should be understood in 
this context of transformation. What follows is an account of major reform policies 
which transformed the empire toward a modern state, and on the way of this 
transformation we will also witness different attempts of defining a new social order. 
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4.1.3 Policies of Centralization 
The centralization policy had administrative, economic and military dimensions. It was 
targeting the autonomous power holders in order to bolster the authority and control of 
the center. Logically, the centralization policy started in the Ottoman heartlands in 
which the state followed a combined approach of punishment and reward toward the 
notables. The ones who accepted and yielded to the power of a more assertive center 
managed to protect their economic power, while those unable or unwilling to adapt to 
the new realities disappeared. By 1820, the center had asserted its control over all 
Anatolia and Eastern Rumelia. Finally in 1822, the major remaining power holder at the 
Balkans, Ali Pasha of Yania, was eliminated. Having achieved certain control of his 
heartland, Mahmud finally moved on to deal with the military dimension of the reforms. 
The major moment of the Ottoman reforms was the abolishment of Janissary 
units in 1826. With the elimination of an important power center and the creation of a 
new army loyal to himself, the sultan was finally capable of asserting his power.92 The 
same year the sipahi units were also abolished and a new salaried cavalry was formed. 
As a related development, timar system was abolished in 1831. The abolishment of 
timars was partly related to the center’s increasing control of land, but it also led to the 
elimination of the provincial armies that had threatened the center in the past. As a result 
of these changes, “the Ottoman state now possessed a single military organization under 
unified command. This was a major accomplishment in centralization” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 
59).  With these military reforms, for the first time in its history, the Ottomans met the 
                                                          
92 It also destroyed the entire balance of power within the Ottoman political system. Ulama who were the 
traditional allies of the janissaries also lost power and were effectively removed from the power struggles 
(Hanioğlu, 2008: 59).  
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famous Weberian criterion of a modern state: an institution which claims legitimate 
monopoly of violence in a given territory. 
As the central authority established in the heartlands of the empire, the military 
re-organization enabled the state to take far more steps to extend its control over the 
periphery. Administrative reorganization and the creation of a modern bureaucracy were 
the next steps of centralization. While a modern government was formed in the center, a 
bureaucratic army was gradually established in order to take the periphery under the 
direct control of the central government. At the center, the ministerial system was 
transformed as the office of The Grand Vizierate evolved and divided into different 
ministries, such as Ministries of Civil Affairs (later became the Ministry of Interior in 
1837), and Foreign Affairs, that undertook different functions of state administration. In 
1833, Tercüme Odası, was founded as a result of increased relations with Europe and 
the replacement of Greek Dragomans with Muslims. This chamber would serve as the 
training ground for a new generation of Ottoman diplomats as well as a new 
intelligentsia. As part of ministerial reforms, certain functions were assigned to new 
councils, - some of which later became ministries. For instance, the courts, which had 
been under the Kadıasker now fell under the jurisdiction of the Şeyhülislam. The 
establishment of a Ministers' Council (Meclis-i Vükela), along with the creation of a 
Military Council and a Judiciary Council, was followed by the establishment of 
committees for public works (nafia), agriculture, trade and industry (Karpat, 1972: 255).  
While central government was being re-organized, a professional bureaucracy 
was gradually created in order to keep the provinces under tight control of the center. 
Tax farmers were removed by centrally appointed officials. Thus local officials were 
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brought under increased control of the center. Finally “in 1838 the state allocated cash 
salaries to all officials; henceforth, all other sources of income, including the collection 
of transaction fees, were shut down. This was not only a major step toward creating a 
centralized, monetary economy; but it also bolstered the status and image of officialdom 
under direct control of the center” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 69-70). The Sublime Porte with 
barely seventy three people in the sixteenth century first evolved into a reformist 
bureaucratic elite, and ultimately into an army of civil bureaucrats.  Through the process 
the number of personnel employed by Ottoman bureaucracy increased from a 
mediocre1000-1500 at the end of the eighteenth century to numbering fifty thousand to 
one hundred thousand people from 1876 to 1909 (Findley, 1980). 
It was this bureaucratic army that tried to bring the periphery under the direct 
control of the center, as the loyal bureaucrats representing the center replaced the 
autonomous intermediaries of power. Tanzimat bureaucrats, who were the results of 
Mahmud’s administrative reforms, continued his reforms, and the drive for further 
centralization remained the major theme for the rest of the century. “Having achieved a 
reasonable degree of centralization in the heart lands of the empire, the Tanzimat 
statesmen set their sights on reforming provincial government. Their major project was 
to make local administration uniform throughout the empire.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 86).  For 
that end, Law of Vilayets (1864) modeled on the French administrative system was 
introduced and all provinces were placed under the new regime (Karpat, 1972: 259).  
As the main dimension of the creation of a bureaucratic arm for the center was to 
increase control over the periphery, the initial step for this control was “to amass 
accurate information about the population of the empire.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 61). The 
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first empire wide census was done in 1831 with the aim of “securing information on 
various forms of property and on the number of people in the empire in order to levy 
taxes and draft men into the army. This was in fact a prelude to general conscription.” 
(Karpat, 1972: 257).93 Another direction of the flow of information was from the center 
to the periphery, and in the same year the publication of the first official Ottoman 
newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events) was started. As an instrument to keep 
the provincial administrators informed of the reform programs, it became required 
reading for all civil servants (Cleveland, 1994: 77)94 
Increased communication constituted an important aspect of the efforts to bind 
the empire more tightly together. This started with an extensive reform of the Ottoman 
postal service as of 1825. Building of new roads also appeared high on the agenda of 
public development. These attempts of increased communication and transportation 
continued throughout the century with the introduction of telegraph (1855-64), and 
railways (1866), chiefly as the result of the government's efforts to communicate with its 
field representatives and rapidly transport its troops. Particularly the introduction of 
telegraph radically changed the nature of the relation between the center and provincial 
administrators as the central administration acquired the means of instant 
communication with its representatives in the provinces. In 1871, the government issued 
                                                          
93 The frequency and reliability of the censuses continued to increase throughout the century. Abdülhamid 
II, the main centralizing figure of the century, was particularly keen on sustaining the flow of information 
from the periphery towards the center through repeated censuses. As it will be seen in the next chapter, 
British administration in India also gave high importance to repeated and extensive censuses as a way of 
increasing their control over the territory and the people of India. 
 
94 With the establishment of a modern press, especially of Ceride-i Havadis and of Terciiman-ı Ahval 
(1860), the full impact of modern communications began to be felt. (Karpat, 1972: 261) While Takvim-i 
vekayi was an official gazette aiming to disseminate the government’s views, these two journals prepared 
the ground of the emergence of a new intelligentsia and created venues for public debates on political and 
economic problems. Moreover, these journals also contributed to the simplification of written language, 
thus bridged the gap between the elite and ordinary people (Sadoğlu, 2010: 81-86). 
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a new set of provincial regulations which enhanced the powers of the governor, as 
representative of the central government, and applied equally to all the provinces of the 
empire. The formation of a uniform provincial bureaucracy under direct control of 
central administration through novel means of communication created an entirely 
different type of provincial ruler. Sir Charles Eliot, one of the contemporaries of this 
transformation, perceptively explains the change: Traditional (pre-modern) Vali “had a 
proprietor’s interest in his estate and was anxious to promote local interests and send as 
little money to Constantinople as possible. He was a centrifugal force and in his way 
promoted independence, whereas modern Vali entirely centripetal” (Poulton, 1997: 60). 
As a result of these reforms, modern government became not only more 
systematized and standardized but also its grasp over the society increased. “The 
apparatus of government acquired more information on its subjects, became more 
visible, and penetrated more deeply into the fabric of daily life throughout the empire.” 
But the strengthening of the state rested on increased burdens on people which led to 
social discontent (Hanioğlu, 2010: 70).95 Moreover the extension and standardization of 
administration made the preservation of local traditions undesirable, which in the 
classical period had not only been tolerated but encouraged. This contributed to 
increased unrest in the periphery (Hanioğlu, 2008: 88). As the increase of government 
                                                          
95 The most typical of increased burden is more taxation and conscription. But there are other ways in 
which people were forced to pay the burden of this modernization. For instance, the extension of road 
system was an important part of the reforms. Men from each region where new roads were built had a 
compulsory service of twenty days in every five year working for the road construction. (Hakkı, 1309: 89-
91, quoted in Ortaylı, 1999:151).  
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control extended spatially towards the periphery and vertically into the daily lives of 
people, an inevitable resistance ensued.96 
In order to balance such discontent and mobilize people in favor of the reforms, 
the state introduced two main policies; broadening the participation of people in 
governance, and the introduction and spread of modern education. Mahmud II formed a 
consultative council very much similar to those consultative organs formed in other 
modernizing empires. The more enduring and important form of participation however 
took in local administration as in 1845 a special council of local notables were formed in 
order to promote reforms, but also to provide some sort of representation for this 
powerful group at the time of extensive state centralization (Karpat, 1972: 260). Non-
Muslims were also included in these local councils, and as such this can also be seen as 
another attempt to further incorporate them into state structure. However it was 
preconditioned that non-Muslims would not constitute the majority even if they were the 
majority of the population of the respective region. Moreover, they were present in these 
councils as representatives of their millets-communities, thus their existence in these 
local councils buttressed communalism rather than undermining it. As such, these 
councils reflect the traditional notion of religiously compartmentalized society. 
Formation of such councils points both to the increased legitimacy problems and the 
need of support for the reforms as well as to the changing nature of state-society 
relations. 
In order to increase the support of people in favor of reforms, another instrument 
the state resorted was education. But in order to achieve this end, a standardized and 
                                                          
96 For a very detailed analysis of how formation of modern forms of government initiated a backlash 
from the society see Khaled Fahmy’s (1997) seminal work on Ottoman Egypt under the rapid 
modernization of Mehmed Ali.   
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centralized schooling system was necessary. As in all pre-modern polities, in the 
Ottoman Empire schooling was primarily a communal concern. Moreover, as already 
pointed in the previous chapter, due to increased autonomy and high levels of communal 
organization, each millet had their own autonomous schooling system. In order to 
centralize and standardize the education system, a Council of Education was founded in 
1845 followed by a Ministry of Education in 1867. However, the extent of education 
reforms and their success in instilling loyalty to the state was quite limited. The initial 
scope of education reforms in the Mahmud II era targeted the training of new personnel 
for the ever expanding bureaucracy, while the Tanzimat rulers’ aim of spreading 
education in order to promulgate the Tanzimat ideology found very limited grounds for 
implementation. As will be discussed later, the major success in making use of modern 
and standardized education in order to bolster state ideology was achieved during the 
reign of Abdülhamid.  
 
4.2 National Question in the Context of Modern State Formation 
Local resistances, defiant intermediary power holders unwilling to submit to the central 
authority, incompetent officials, and a traditional society who want to preserve its 
traditional organization were all centrifugal forces that resisted to the centralization 
attempts of the state. Increased use of education and local participation were only 
partially successful in overcoming these challenges. However, the most dangerous of all 
the centrifugal forces for the empire was the newly emerging ideology of nationalism. 
This was an entirely new challenge for the state. 
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Centralization policies also required a new meaning in the age of nationalism. As 
it had been argued, the extent of centralization policies also posed a fundamental 
challenge to the nature of the empire. It is hard to sustain the mosaic character of 
empires at the time of administrative unification. Empire as the political body that 
enabled the separate coexistence of different communities was evolving toward 
disintegration, yet the centralization and administrative unification which were 
employed as the remedies to stop disintegration of the empire also started to transform 
the empire toward nation-ness. Thus one can say that nationalism in the context of 
modernization becomes a double-edged sword. As a modern political ideology it is used 
both by the centralizing state administration and by the peripheral opposition toward this 
modernizing state. 97 
There is a widely shared agreement among the scholars that nationalism as an 
ideology emerged in relation to the formation of modern centralized state. Yet, there is a 
point of disagreement on which of these two rival forms of nationalism emerged first. 
Different scholars discussing different cases provide contradictory narratives. The 
problem is partly related to the fact that nationalism emerges and develops within 
phases. As Hroch’s (2000) seminal study on nationalism in East Europe point, the 
emergence of the national idea and its dissemination, and the mobilization of large 
                                                          
97 In his memoirs Rıza Nur clearly reveals the double-edged nature of nationalism in an imperial poltical 
setting:  “We saw that a Circassian club had opened in our neighborhood. Then an Albanian association 
was formed. Soon after, an Arab philanthropic society appeared! ... Circassians wanted their freedom, as 
did the Albanians. The members of all these clubs were graduates of our own schools.... Hence the 
Bulgarian...Albanian... Arab independence movements were all manned by those reared and educated in 
our country, our schools ... I am dying for the Turkish cause, but I am carrying this cause like a secret 
bowl in me. I do not tell about it to anyone. For I know that if we do that, our action will legitimate the 
explication of the inner thoughts of the others. And that would mean the fragmentation, the extinction of 
the empire.” (quoted in Göçek, 2002:15. Thanks to Yavuz Tüyloğlu for bringing this quotation to my 
attention). 
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segments of the society for this ideal take place in at least three distinguishable phases. 
Thus as it is impossible to point out a clear date for the emergence of any national idea 
and nationalist movement, it is almost impossible for most cases to clarify whether the 
national idea first emerged from the ranks of centralizing state (as Hobsbawm, Giddens 
and Mann argued) or, on the contrary emerged as a form of resistance against the ever 
more centralizing and intrusive state (as Gellner, Breuilly and Anderson argued). (see, 
Day and Thompson: 2004: 54-59). Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, it should 
suffice to mention that these two rival forms of nationalisms have emerged and evolved 
in reaction to each other.  
 
4.2.1 Nationalism and Empires (Official Nationalism and Its Rivals) 
Nationality problem in the empires in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular 
should also be considered from two different angles; one from the state’s desire to 
promote its own version of nationalism (official nationalism) and the other from the 
rival forms of nationalisms emanating from the peripheries and often resulting in 
secessionist movements. It needs to be re-emphasized that neither other empires nor the 
Ottoman Empire in its classical form were multi-national states. Defining an empire as 
multi-national is anachronistic. Correct label would be “non-national” or “a-national” as 
the classical empire belongs to an age before nationalism. The nineteenth century 
witnessed the emergence of nationalism in two different and often rival forms; one 
coming from the state and aiming to transform its subjects into co-nationals and the 
other coming from people (and in any case this is a very limited segment of the people) 
aiming to create a state for the particular people conceived as a nation. Thus throughout 
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the nineteenth century subjects of the empires started increasingly to imagine 
themselves as members of a particular nation, while at the same time imperial 
institutions promoted an alternative national identity that would cover the entire empire. 
This second form of nationalism which aims to transform the dynastic realm into one 
concept of nationhood is defined as “official nationalism” (Anderson, 1991: 83-112; 
Seton-Watson, 1977). In the context of modern state formation, official nationalism 
aims to fully mobilize the energies of society in the service of the modern state without 
undermining the dynastic and patrimonial principles that formed the basis of their 
political legitimacy (Roshwald, 2001: 8). 
Thus, formation of official nationalism within the empires should be understood 
in the context of modern state formation and the age of nationalism. All empires of the 
nineteenth century, and indeed the eighteenth century in the case of Russian and 
Habsburgs, were going through a process of administrative centralization. This process 
transformed the traditional organization of imperial societies that were based on 
conglomeration of territories. Elimination of intermediaries and direct control of state 
over its subjects brought certain administrative homogenization that inevitably brought a 
cultural homogenization. However, Anderson rightly warns us that policies of 
centralization should not be confused with the policies of promoting an official 
nationalism. At least until the mid-nineteenth century, none of these centralization 
processes were based on an intention of nationalization. The clearest case is Habsburgs 
who turned to the uniform use of German instead of Latin during the late eighteenth 
century. As Anderson quotes from Jazsi, “the Habsburgs were not consciously and 
consequentially Germanizing power…There were Habsburgs who didn’t even speak 
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German. Their measures were dictated by the intent of unification and universalism of 
their empire.” (Anderson, 1991: 84). However as nationalism found an audience among 
the minorities of these empires (Ruritanians) the empires themselves (Megalomanians)98 
undertook a conscious project of nation-building. This attempt of transforming all the 
subjects of the empire into an all-inclusive imperial national identity is called official 
nationalism. The aim is to compete with the nation-building processes of Western 
Europe and combine the nationalization with retention of dynastic power. Thus, 
according to Anderson (1991: 86), it developed after and in reaction to the popular 
national movements proliferating in Europe since 1820s. 
Although making the important distinction between the centralization policies 
which were not consciously nationalizing and the later conscious policy of building an 
official nationalism, Anderson however overlooks the central role of this prior 
centralization for the emergence of official nationalism. Even if one accepts that official 
nationalism is not a direct outcome of centralization policies, it should also be added 
that official nationalism would have never come to the table without prior centralization. 
As it was argued above, the centralization policies that empires in continental Europe 
followed at least since the mid-eighteenth century were qualitatively different from the 
traditional centralization of imperial systems. In many ways these policies followed the 
French and English centralization attempts that preceded them by two centuries. The 
previous centralization of France and England was crucial for the emergence of a 
national identity through a more organic and slow process.99 However as Jazsi (1961: 
                                                          
98 For the parable of Ruritanians and Megalomanians, see Gellner (1983).  
99 Though not necessarily more benign. For the brutality of nation-building in the Western Europe, see 
Weber (1976).  
 139 
 
32) points, this two centuries time lapse changed the nature and outcome of 
centralization policies followed by the empires as unlike their West European 
counterparts, the imperial monarchies in the East of Europe undertook these 
centralization policies at an age of nationalism. Thus centralization in these empires 
took place in a multi-nationalizing100 (the term is no more anachronistic!) social setting. 
Although the resistances of the peripheral power centers to the centralization policies in 
European empires are similar to the ones in Western Europe, in the case of empires 
these resistances quickly acquired a nationalist cloak. 
Thus, centralization of empires and nationalism are linked to each other in two 
different ways. First through administrative uniformity, centralization creates a threat for 
the peripheral power centers and for the communal autonomies and accelerates their 
adaption of nationalism. Second, centralization creates a more intrusive state which 
needs additional means of legitimation founded in the creation of official nationalism. 
Thus official nationalism becomes a requirement both to counter the centrifugal forces 
of peripheral nationalism and to mobilize the people in favor of the intrusive modern 
state. Here the contrast with the imperial model based on the participation of limited 
segments of the society is too evident and puts a clear distinction between traditional 
empire and modern imperial nationalism.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
  
100 I preferred multi-nationalizing rather than multi-national in order to highlight the processual aspect of 
the period. Although empires were not multi-national, they were becoming so with the rising tide of 
nationalisms. 
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4.2.2 Nationalism and the Ottomans 
Throughout the nineteenth century nationalism was a destabilizing power for the entire 
Europe. As Napoleon’s armies marched through Europe singing Marseillaise, they also 
spread this new ideology to the territories ruled by the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, local 
uprisings, traditionally a result of maladministration or excessive taxation, now took a 
nationalist color. With the 1848 revolts, nationalism became the primary threat for the 
multi-ethnic empires of Habsburgs and Romanovs. Yet the problem was even graver in 
the Ottoman context “because of the weakness of central control, the severity of 
socioeconomic problems, and the structural reality of an empire dominated by Muslims 
but well-nigh encircled by Christian powers” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 115). 
Since nationalism was an ideology spreading from Europe, it is not surprising 
that the peoples who had the most connection with the European neighbors of the 
Empire, the Serbs and Greeks, were the first to be influenced from this new ideology. As 
certain Serbs and Greeks fell into the appeal of nationalism, religion played a pivotal 
role in both cases, albeit in completely different manners. The relation between the 
religious identities and the emergence of nationalism is discussed at the end of this 
chapter. However, the level of nationalist consciousness in these revolts should not be 
exaggerated. Partly due to European intervention, these “local uprisings, ostensibly 
indistinguishable from their numerous historical antecedents, took on a deeper 
significance at the age of nationalism” (Hanioğlu, 2008:51). However, partly due to the 
slow but steady spread of nationalist consciousness and more importantly partly due to 
the European desire to provoke potential conflicts and use them as a pretext for 
intervention, nationalism became the dominant threat for the integrity of the empire 
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throughout the nineteenth century. Yet, this is only one side of the emergence of 
nationalism; the one coming from the periphery. The center also played its due share in 
the evolution of empire toward nation-ness. 
The unprecedented transformation of the social and political system of the 
empire described above coupled with the centrifugal challenge of nationalism made it 
mandatory for the reformers (center) to re-establish the system. Thus, the Ottoman 
social fabric which was classically divided on two axis; a horizontal axe dividing the 
society into two social classes of a ruling-elite and reaya, and a vertical axe dividing the 
society into separate and hierarchical existences of monotheistic religions had to be re-
invented on more egalitarian and uniform manners. In fact the classical social 
organization was already obsolete: On the one hand Christian supremacy in commerce 
and education challenged the established hierarchies (Issawi, 1982), on the other hand 
due to difficulties of sustaining mosaic nature of society at a time of administrative 
unification, separate coexistence started to disintegrate. When Mahmud II declared that; 
“From now on I do not wish to recognize Muslims outside the mosque, Christians 
outside the church, or Jews outside the synagogue” (quoted in Hanioğlu, 2008: 74), he 
was hinting for the need of a new social organization. This search for a new social 
contract materialized for the first time in the declaration of Tanzimat in 1839.101 
This new social contract is based on the prioritization of state and direct 
allegiance to the state instead of intermediaries; religious or otherwise. Thus it can be 
                                                          
101 Tanzimat Degree of 1839, was in reality instrumental chiefly in accelerating the centralization and 
bureaucratization of the Ottoman empire… the edict merely expanded upon and crystallized ideas and 
policies developed and implemented in the past (Karpat, 1972: 258). But it also corresponds to the new 
ideological foundation of the reformed state-society relations. The reformers of the state, who by now 
were aware that these reforms also meant a complete transformation of the state structure and thus 
necessitated a new social contract between the state and society, formulated the decree as a first attempt of 
providing an ideological base for the new state-society relations. 
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considered as the first significant attempt in the formulation of an Ottoman nationhood 
that would include all subjects of the empire. As such it can be understood as the 
extension of Peter Sugar’s (1977: 34-43) category of “professional Ottomans” to include 
the rest of the society as well. In that sense Tanzimat is the first step of a series of 
attempts to remove both the horizontal and the vertical axes that divided the society and 
to submerge these categories under the banner of the newly forming Ottoman nation.102 
“As such the edict was a significant first step toward the transformation of hitherto 
Muslim, Christian, and Jewish subjects into Ottomans” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 74). 
Formation of the Ottoman nation is well reflected in the change of legal 
categories. A new legal category of ecnebi (foreigner) was introduced in order to refer to 
all foreign nationals regardless of religious affiliation. As Anderson (1991: 6) mentions 
unlike the universalist aspirations of empires and world religious systems, a significant 
aspect of nations (both as legal and discursive categories) is their “limited” ness.103 
Thus, defining the foreign is essential for the construction of national and ecnebi defines 
the limits (and the “other”) of Ottoman nationality. This was complemented with the 
introduction of Ottoman as a legal term “to replace the old distinction between Muslims 
and dhimmis. Finally, the important designation of dhimmi was replaced by “non-
Muslim Ottoman.” The Ottoman Law of Nationality of 1869 formalized these 
concepts.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 74). 
                                                          
102 Contrary to the common assumption, Tanzimat Edict does not clearly refer to equality, but it promises 
the universal and equal application of the new laws. Thus it reveals a desire for establishing a single legal 
system which was already hinted by Mahmud’s above statement (Hanioğlu, 2008: 73-74). The equality of 
non-Muslims and Muslims that was implied in the Tanzimat Edict was the main theme of Islahat Edict 
declared in 1856. The process towards the emergence of a single legal system also means that 
administrative homogenization is coupled with legal homogenization.  
 
103 It is this universalisms of the empires that enables-pushes them to tolerate diversity. In contrast the 
limited nature of nations and nation-states provides the necessary condition for homogenization.   
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Throughout the century, efforts to create a modern state have continued and 
evolved hand in hand with related attempts of creating a new social contract and finding 
a new social balance. Thus administrative, economic and military developments and a 
search for a corporate political identity suitable for the new realities on ground have 
continued in a dialectic relation to each other. Put in different words, as the modern 
Ottoman state was being formed, qualitatively different from the pre-modern imperial 
structure of loosely connected territories and conglomeration of peoples, the inevitable 
result of the process was the evolution of a modern political ideology: Ottomanism. 
“The development of a distinct Ottoman identity was actively supported and cultivated 
by the Ottoman state both as a part of these reforms and as a way of strengthening 
them.” (Kasaba, 2006: 200). 
Thus, the promotion of this national identity in the Ottoman Empire, like in other 
empires, has two dimensions; first a reaction toward peripheral nationalism and second a 
consequence of centralization and modern state formation. Based on Anderson’s above 
argument, it is possible to claim that the project of building an Ottoman nationality was 
partly a reaction to the nationalist uprisings of Greeks and Serbians. Particularly in their 
attempt to deal with the Greek Revolution which continued for nine years, the Ottomans 
themselves were influenced by the language and vocabulary used by the rebels (see 
Erdem, 2005). Through the experience of Greek Revolt, Ottoman administrators 
realized that nationalism was a potent force to fight against, usually by adoption of the 
same tools used by their opponents (Erdem, 2005: 81).104 Yet, official nationalism in 
                                                          
104 Erdem (2005: 82) also quotes Mustafa Reshid Pasha defining Ottoman Empire as Turkistan right after 
the Greek independence. Yet this singular example should not be exaggerated since multiple examples 
prove that Ottoman administrators particularly when confronted with a nationalist uprising avoided the 
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general and Ottomanism in particular, was not only a reaction to the secessionist 
nationalisms but it was also deemed a necessary consequence of social and political 
reformations. However, as we will see below, these attempts for the evolution of an all-
inclusive Ottoman identity creates a hitherto nonexistent problem of the relationship 
between this larger identity and sub categories of identities, as well as the relationship 
between sub categories. 
 
4.2.3 Diversity: From Being an Asset to Being a Problem  
With the idea of Ottomanism we can start talking about a nation project. As the 
evolution towards nationalization was primarily a result of the transformation of the 
definitive aspects of an empire toward the definitive aspects of a nation-state, the 
process is equally reflected in the changing nature of state-society relations and more 
particularly on state’s approach toward diversity. 
In this process of nationalization, the state was transforming itself from the 
previous imperial structure, which was based on a conglomeration of territories 
connected to the center in varying levels and ruled through intermediaries, toward a 
more centralized system in which the center eliminated intermediary levels of power 
holders. As such the previous imperial model which enabled various kinds of rules and 
regulations evolved toward more uniform rules and regulations. As the loosely held 
territories and subjects were tightened up under the direct control of the modern state, 
the imperial society which was based on a hierarchical and cosmopolitan nature started 
to evolve toward a more egalitarian and uniform social relations. As it was discussed in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
usage of national vocabulary either due to the existence of traditional mindset or due to the practical 
considerations. See Davison (1977). 
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the previous chapter, as the state manages to penetrate deeper into the society, the 
sustaining of the acceptance of diversity becomes more and more difficult (Lieven, 
2007; Laitin, 2009). Establishment of direct state control over the subjects leads to 
administrative homogenization which is also coupled with a certain degree of legal 
homogenization. Maintenance of social and cultural plurality in the face of increasing 
state interference and administrative homogenization is a challenge that all modern 
states are facing (see Young, 1976 and chp.3 of this dissertation). Ottoman state was no 
exception to this. 
As the Ottoman Empire evolves toward nation-ness, the most explicit 
manifestation of this transformation can best be observed with regard to the attitude 
toward diversity. As Barkey (2008) and Rodrigue (1995) points, diversity was not only 
tolerated but also praised in the classical period which represents an imperial society. 
Most typical example of this attitude is the invitation of Jews from Spain to the 
Ottomans in 1492 with the hope that these Sephardic Jews would help to advance the 
trade of the Empire. It was believed that the existence of diverse communities did not 
detract from the empire, but contributed to its human resource. Compare this with 
Cevdet Pasha’s, a leading Ottoman statesman and scholar of the Tanzimat era, 
complaint on the diversity of empire:   
The lands of exalted state (of the Ottomans) do not resemble the lands of 
any other state. In its every corner, you can find unique conditions. No 
province resembles another province; nor does any given part of a 
province resemble another part of the same province. Therefore it is 
impossible for a method of administration that might be conceived by the 
state to be applied equally and uniformly everywhere (Quoted in Kasaba, 
2006: 203). 
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However, this was not regarded as a source of weakness in the classical period. 
Indeed, the strength of the Ottoman Empire depended not on the consistency of its 
practices and the uniform allegiance of its subjects, but on the fluidity, flexibility, and 
ambiguity that were hallmarks of many of its central practices (Kasaba, 2003). Classical 
empire lacked any sense of a uniform identity, or a uniform system of rule, or even a 
uniform system of education. Introduction of all these homogenizing tendencies clashed 
with the previous social and political categories, and in the nineteenth century these 
clashes had the potential to fire up to nationalist secessionism. 
In the previous chapter we have also seen that the Ottoman Empire was 
exceptionally successful in managing its religious diversity through millet system. 
However, in their desire to build an Ottoman nation, the Tanzimat statesmen were 
locked in the paradox of millets. The creation of an all-encompassing Ottoman 
nationality could only be built if the millet barriers were broken down. Thus following 
the Islahat Edict of 1856, they urged on a reform of the millet system that eventually 
undermined the power of clergy as the leaders of different millets. “With the Islahat 
Edict millets had become more of a purely religious organizations rather than dealing 
with all the aspects of the relation between the individual and the state.” (Poulton, 1997: 
52). In doing so however the Ottomans weakened their traditional allies. The patriarches 
were allies of the Ottoman Empire but they were not and could not be the allies of 
Ottomanism. They were targets of this transformation just like other intermediary power 
holders; such as ayans. “Even giving fixed salaries to Christian clergy was proposed 
which would transform them to state officials rather than community representatives.” 
(Poulton, 1997: 52). This is similar to the bureaucratization of provincial administration 
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through administrative homogenization. Thus while elimination of administrative 
intermediaries and their replacement by the central bureaucracy was successful,105 the 
same process was unfeasible and destructive when extended to religious intermediaries. 
Diversity which marked the empire and which was seen as an asset turned into a 
liability in the context of nineteenth century reformation. As such the introduction of 
some sort of uniformity throughout the empire meant the evolution of empire toward a 
more national social organization. The process of nationalization was meant to 
overcome this diversity in time as the society would become more homogenous. 
Homogenization of this troublesome diversity was, inter alia, the story of transition 
from an empire to a nation-state. 
The “transition toward a modern imperial model infused with national imagery 
and identity” was a common feature of all modernizing empires (Barkey, 2008: 292) and 
historical and political trajectory of Ottomanism would be better understood if it is 
contextualized on the nationalism problem of the nineteenth nineteenth century empires. 
It is important to evaluate the official nationalisms of these empires together as the 
nationalist movements, both the separatist ones and the official ones, were influenced 
deeply by the movements across the borders (Roshwald, 2001).  
 
 
 
                                                          
105 We have already mentioned that centralization and bureaucratization of the state administration were 
particularly important in that aspect. Transformation of Vali from a provincial intermediary toward a state 
official reflects the way state dealt with administrative intermediaries.  
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4.2.4 Official Nationalism and Diversity: Ottomanism in Between Habsburg and 
Romanov Options 
Anderson argues that official nationalism was a universal phenomenon common to all 
empires of the nineteenth century. Thus he argues that this attempt to unite the dynastic 
realms into some sort of a nation-state was in no way unique to the land based universal 
empires and can be traced among the British and French colonial empires. This assertion 
should be taken with a grain of salt. As it was previously discussed in this dissertation, 
the British colonial state’s policies in India do not entirely prove Anderson’s assertion 
(see chapter 5). As Anderson himself also concedes, there are certain differences 
between universal land based empires and the sea based colonial empires in the 
implementation and possible results of official nationalism (1991: 83-112) . As it was 
discussed in the previous chapter the difference comes from their diverse ways of 
managing plurality and different patterns of tolerance, inclusion and accommodation. 
The logic of official nationalism, to the extent that it was applied, in the colonial cases 
was self-contradictory and often a lip service was paid to the idea of official 
nationalism, while the colonial policies of subjugation and discrimination remained in 
practice. 
Moreover, even if we limit our focus to land based universal empires, it would 
be misleading to assume, as Anderson seems to do, a uniform pattern since there are 
important variations among the universal land empires with regard to the ways official 
nationalisms are formed. The two most important land based empires of the nineteenth 
century that of the Habsburgs and that of the Romanovs followed different strategies 
with regard to forming an official nationalism and can be considered to form two 
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different ideal types. While the Habsburg model is based on a more federalist 
understanding, the Romanov model is based on excessive centralization. The difference 
between these two models is not trivial as the Habsburg model in its extreme form 
would mean a confederation of modern nation-states, while the Romanov model in its 
extreme would cease to have any attribute of an empire and would take the form of a 
nation-state. The Habsburgs attempted to maintain the plural identities of their empire 
and offered Habsburg identity as an umbrella concept. This necessitated a more 
federalist organization of state structure and conceding more autonomy to local groups 
in return for their subjugation to the imperial identity. Thus they did not attempt to erase 
sub identities but tried to offer the Habsburg identity (framework) as the over-arching 
ideology of a multi-national state. The extreme result of these policies was the Ausgleich 
(compromise) in 1867 which transformed the empire into a dual monarchy.106 This 
being unable to solve the problems, toward the end of the empire, proposals for a triple 
monarchy also came into table which would consider Germans, Magyar and Slavs as the 
three constituting nations of the imperial identity. On the other hand, the Russians 
followed a vigorous policy of centralization and assimilation. They used Orthodoxy and 
Russification as the means of creating an official nationalism. Their turn toward nation-
ness is more complete and radical compared with the Habsburg model which aimed to 
                                                          
106 Yet as late as 1907, Otto Bauer, Austrian social democrat, would warn that this dual monarchy was an 
extreme compromise that threatened the survival of the empire intact and the empire should be once again 
transformed into one realm (Reich). He warned the Habsburgs not to follow the fate of House of 
Bernadottes, who until 1905 was ruling over Sweden and Norway in a similar fashion of dual monarchy. 
That year, Bernadottes had to yield to Norwegian nationalist demands for holding a referendum in 
Norway for independence in which only 184 people voted for the continuation of dual monarchy. Fearing 
that Ausgleich would result in an independent Hungary, Bauer searched for a formula that would allow the 
nationalities to survive under the imperial umbrella. His proposition is forming a federative yet united 
state, in the line of the United States of America. It is certainly not a coincidence that around the same 
time Ziya Gökalp would also propose the Ottoman Empire to re-organize itself imitating the United States 
of America.   
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preserve imperial plurality in a federal-national system. Anderson’s (1991: 86) famous 
assertion of “stretching the tight body of the nation to empire” fits more perfectly to the 
Romanov case.107 
The Ottomans followed neither way consistently and vacillated between the 
Habsburg model of federal plurality and the Romanov model of centralization and 
assimilation. This vacillation is most evident in their approach to millet system which 
simultaneously followed the contradictory policies of undermining millet boundaries in 
order to promote a sense of unity across the multi-faith society and policies of 
promoting and safeguarding the privileges and group specific rights of non-Muslim 
communities. Understandably, the peripheral powers opted for a more plural form of 
Ottomanism a la Habsburg while the central bureaucracy and particularly the Turkish 
element within the army inclined toward a more centralized system. The Bulgarian 
demands that the Ottoman sultan should be declared the Bulgarian Czar certainly 
imitates the Ausgleich model. A similar proposal would be raised later on to transform 
the Ottoman state to a dual monarchy of Turkish and Arab kingdoms. The 
assimilationist strand within the CUP, which considered Turks as the millet-i hakime 
and argued for the Turkification of Muslim elements, was the most extreme form of 
                                                          
107 It still should be noted that these empires weren’t as consistent as it is implied. Habsburgs turned to 
more centralizing policies during 1850’s following the 1848 revolts, while Russian policies of 
centralization and assimilation which was formulated by Kont Uvarov in 1830’s as Autocracy, Orthodoxy 
and Nationalism, took real pace only after 1880’s, under the reign of Tsar Nicholas III.  However, apart 
from certain fluctuations and to a certain extent, both empires followed these two different paths 
mentioned. Thus Romanovs and Habsburgs can be considered as ideal type models in the promotion of 
official nationalism.  
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Romanov-style Ottomanism.108 The contribution of Russian immigrants in this strand of 
Ottomanism is also worth mentioning. 
In certain ways the trajectory of Ottomanism can be read within this dilemma 
and vacillation between the federative-pluralist Habsburg model and the centralist-
assimilationist Romanov model. 109 Thus the desire to construct a nation from the 
peoples of the empire inevitably brings the problem of the relation between this new 
national imagery and the existing socio-political categories of the empire. Particularly, 
“the reconciliation of this new, nondenominational ideological basis of the state with 
Islam’s traditional centrality in the legitimizing framework of the empire remained the 
most delicate and challenging issue.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 74). 
 
4.2.5 Ottomanism and Religious Diversity 
The appeal and the strength of the Ottomanist project often go unrecognized through the 
retrospective reality of the imperial collapse. However, Ottomanism made certain 
inroads among the imperial elite, though unsatisfactory it may have been. Future leaders 
of many post-imperial nationalist projects were true Ottomans in their personal and 
political lives. The most striking example, Sati’al-Husri who is often credited as the 
intellectual father of Arab nationalism was and remained a die-hard Ottomanist until the 
very end and remained loyal to the empire as long as there was an empire (see 
                                                          
108 With all due respect, it is impossible to agree with Karpat (2009:18) who argues that the Ottoman 
nationalization process differs from Habsburgs and Romanovs (emphasis added), as Romanov version of 
official nationalism is the more complete and extreme form of Ottoman-CUP ways. 
 
109 Here I am not implying that Ottomans consciously or subconsciously tried to follow or imitate 
Habsburgs or Romanovs, but that the two alternative approaches to official nationalisms available to 
Ottomans are best represented by these two empires. Thus Romanovs and Habsburgs can be considered as 
ideal type models in the promotion of official nationalism. The Ottoman case however lacked any such 
consistency.  
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Cleveland, 1971). In the final analysis, the failure of the Ottomanist project testifies to 
nothing but the contingent nature of nations and national projects in contrast to the 
essential quality attributed to the nation by most nationalists.  Yet, the appeal of this new 
ideology as it was propagated by the Tanzimat leaders was limited only to certain 
segments of the society. Despite all the attempts of creating a universal education 
system- a sine quo non for any nationalization project- the state lacked the capabilities to 
do so. In the end the aim of educational institutions remained limited to staff the 
growing bureaucracy. The spread of Christian schools and their numerical and 
qualitative superiority to state schools prevented the formation of national consciousness 
through education.110 Despite growing means of communication and the publication of 
new journals which became the venues for political discussion and the spread of new 
ideas, the high rates of illiteracy limited the dissemination of these ideas. 
One of the important dimensions of the Tanzimat period is that it is a period of 
transition; a transition from a decentralized empire to a centralized state which would 
eventually define itself more on national terms. As it was a period of transition, 
Tanzimat reforms created dualism in almost every field.111 It preserved many of the old 
institutions while creating numerous new ones. As such the imperial model and imperial 
institutions coexisted with the newly nationalizing state model and institutions. The 
concept of one Ottoman society (or one nation) coexisted with the traditional 
understanding of conglomeration of societies as Ottoman citizenship coexisted with the 
communally organized millet system. Attempts for legal uniformity which would 
                                                          
110 There were four different types of schools. This plurality in itself was an impediment to 
nationalization (Zurcher, 2004: 63). 
 
111 Davison (1963: 408) claims that “this is not a fatal dualism as the critics have said, but may on the 
contrary be viewed as a part of the normal process of growth.” 
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provide the basis for a secular Ottoman idea coexisted side by side with the communal-
religious courts and legal plurality of the traditional system. Mindset of the traditional 
society lived on side by side with a great transformation of values and attitudes. The 
idea of an egalitarian society was introduced but this did not mean that the entire 
mindset changed radically. Despite the desire to create an Ottoman subject irrespective 
of religious differences, the Sublime Porte continued to deal with millet organizations 
through the Foreign Ministry well into the end of the Tanzimat. 
The main obstacle in front of Ottomanism was the religiously divided nature of 
the society. Nationalism was still absent among the Muslim communities, so separatist 
nationalism was uniquely a Christian problem. Thus transformation of members of 
various millets to non-Muslim Ottomans was the “acid test of Ottomanism” (Findley, 
1982). Ottoman statesmen took brave steps for this purpose and, despite European 
criticisms; progress achieved by the Ottoman state was far beyond what European 
Empires achieved in their own realms.112 Yet in the final analysis, the Tanzimat was 
unsuccessful in creating an Ottoman nation and failed in the task of incorporating non-
Muslims to this national identity. The primary reason for this failure was the 
unwillingness of non-Muslims which was no doubt provoked by external intervention 
and compounded by the extent of European protection provided for the non-Muslims.113 
                                                          
112 For a comparison, even in Britain, the most liberal of European powers legal obstacles set for the 
Catholics and the Jews were abolished only in 1829 and 1846 respectively (Kymlicka, 1992: 37 ). Of 
course this was the case in the metropole. In colonies like India, such discrimination continued until the 
very last moment of British rule. 
 
113 Through the eighteenth and increasingly the nineteenth centuries, it became a very common practice 
among the local Christians of the Empire to attain the citizenship of a Western power in order to attain the 
protection of that power. Particularly in trade, benefiting from the capitulations of that country, these non-
Muslims had a comparative edge over Muslim Ottomans (Issawi, 1982: 272-277; Zurcher, 2004: 11). 
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Moreover, the Tanzimat era created a reaction among the Muslims of the empire and 
paved the way for the future emergence of Muslim nationalism. 
Thus Tanzimat reforms resulted in the deepening of the very divisions that they 
wanted to erase. Three transformations throughout the Tanzimat era feed this result. 
1) The creation of a two distinct elite over determined by religious divisions. 
As the works of Keyder (1997), Göçek (1996) and Issawi (1982) 
demonstrate, nineteenth century witnessed the ascendancy of Christians in 
the commercial sector and almost complete elimination of Muslim 
bourgeoisie. While commerce was concentrating at the hands of non-
Muslims, another avenue opened up for the future generations of Muslim 
elite: the bureaucracy. As already mentioned, throughout the century 
Ottoman bureaucracy grew more than fifty times. And this bureaucracy was 
and remained essentially a Muslim dominated institution. Despite the efforts 
of Tanzimat statesmen in including non-Muslims into the bureaucratic arm 
of the state, and despite the limited progress they have made, even in the 
foreign ministry, the institution in which non-Muslims have considerable 
advantages due to their language skills, non-Muslims remained a minority. 
Widening the gap (or deepening the division) further was the almost 
complete non-existence of non-Muslims in the military.114 This was due to 
the reluctance of the non-Muslims rather than state sanctions. The necessary 
reforms that would enable the employment of Christians in the military and 
                                                          
114 There were some Christians in the army during the early Ottoman period, this was quickly 
abandoned. There was limited conscription after 1908, but it was very small. Navy however was a 
different matter and relied on Greeks for a long time. Attempts to replace them by Muslims resulted with 
the dearth of skilled crew. (Poulton, 1997: 46) 
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their rise to the rank of colonel were done fairly early in the Tanzimat 
period. However, non-Muslims preferred to use their rights to buy off the 
military service. Soon the process was institutionalized, thus the abolished 
jizya made a return in the form of purchased military service.115 
Surprisingly, military ceased to be a decisive institution in state affairs from 
1826 until 1909. Despite this unequivocal unimportance of military in state 
affairs in this period, absence of non-Muslims from the military is still very 
important for the fate of nation-building process. Regarded as schools where 
national identity is inculcated, militaries in every nation-building project is 
decisively important thus the exclusion of non-Muslims from military had 
long lasting effects. Most of the future leaders of CUP and modern Turkey 
grew up in this entirely Muslim institution. The roots of the CUP were to be 
found in the resentment felt by young Muslim bureaucrats and officers 
towards the changing balance of power in favor of the Christian bourgeoisie 
and their European patrons (Zurcher, 2010: 276). While the Christian 
bourgeoisie under the protection of European powers tended toward 
separation, the Muslim intellectuals (Young Ottomans), a result of growing 
bureaucracy, seized upon Ottomanism as a nationalist ideology of their own 
and defined its content (Karpat, 1972: 261). 
2) Millet reforms: Not only the elite, but the society itself was also religiously 
divided. We have already mentioned that Tanzimat statesmen were locked in 
                                                          
115 To be sure the problem was twofold. Although not very common there were instances of non-Muslims 
in the military as well. Yet in these cases, putting Muslims under non-Muslim command always created a 
problem. Non-Muslims were not willing to do military service, but military was not very willing to 
incorporate them either. 
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the paradox of millets. On the one hand millets provided an efficient way to 
manage this religious plurality, but on the other hand the separate 
coexistences of millets had the potential to get politicized and become 
means of European intervention. Since non-Muslims were the main targets 
of the Ottomanism project, the state, through the Tanzimat reforms, aimed to 
ameliorate their social disadvantages and thus hoped to impede the 
nationalist inclinations on behalf of them. Betterment of the non- Muslims’ 
position was also essential in order to thwart the European intervention. For 
these purposes, following the declaration of Islahat Edict (1856), the 
government considered dealing with the ancient millet privileges. As it had 
been mentioned in the previous chapters, millet system was created as an ad 
hoc arrangement and despite its social existence since the reign of Mehmed 
II, it was never formalized. As part of the efforts to increase the rights of 
non-Muslims in the Ottoman social system, the state had institutionalized 
and formalized the millet system and gave it a formal base through the 
declaration of millet constitutions. Another hope was to save the non-
Muslim subjects from the yoke of their clergy whom the Ottomans thought 
were becoming increasingly corrupt and oppressive. Thus the millet reforms 
which followed the Islahat Edict had paradoxically institutionalized and 
deepened the very cleavages that the Ottomans hoped to erode. The dualist 
character of the Tanzimat reforms is once again evident. On the one hand the 
state was espousing or at least propagating an egalitarian idea of nationhood, 
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while on the other hand simultaneously maintained the divisions through 
extending group specific rights and privileges.   
3) The resentment among the large Muslim masses who considered the 
outcome of the reforms as a loss of position vis-a-vis the non-Muslims. This 
feeling of resentment got more heated as the Muslim refugees had to flee 
towards the shrinking core of the Empire. This migration was important as it 
transformed the demographics of the empire, and also important in the sense 
that it contributed to the Muslims’ feeling of resentment. Particularly the 
Muslim intelligentsia and the Muslim middle class mentioned above, who 
were in certain ways a by-product of Tanzimat reforms, turned against the 
Tanzimat statesmen in the process. Young Ottomans were the first 
generation who voiced the Muslim resentment in the Empire.116  
 
4.2.6 Young Ottomans  
Young Ottomans was a group of intellectuals and low level bureaucrats who reacted 
against the bureaucratic absolutism of the Tanzimat pashas. In that regard they were 
typical representatives of religious-cum political opposition toward the authoritarian-
modernizing state that emerged during the fifteenth century England and France (see, 
Breuilly, 1994: 76-81). However, unlike their counterparts few centuries back in 
Western Europe, they were opposing an administration that already formulated its own 
official nationalism, and their opposition targeted a modification and supplementation of 
                                                          
116 As such they are often considered as the precursors of political Islam (see Turkone, 2003). 
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the official nationalism. They wanted to create some sort of constitutional system which 
would introduce elections and some sort of a representative system. This way they 
aimed to overcome the legitimacy crisis which the intrusive state organization led to. 
They were also simultaneously committed to the idea of Ottomanism and argued that 
this could be better defended in a constitutional system. 
We have already seen that local representation and limited participation were 
offered, as early as 1845, by the Tanzimat administration as antidotes to the unrest and 
the legitimacy crisis caused by the intrusive state. However, “the leaders of the 
Tanzimat feared, with good reason, that their polyethnic, multi-faith empire would not 
survive the introduction of a truly representative system of government.” (Hanioğlu, 
2008: 76). On the other hand they were aiming to instill a sense of Ottomanness as a 
supranational identity that would encompass all religious differences. For this ideal they 
refrained from making use of explicit Islamic references for the newly emerging 
identity. The reasons for this failure are already discussed above, yet the Young 
Ottoman policy can be understood in contrast to those policies of the Tanzimat period. 
On the one hand, they demanded a constitutional order and a full representative system. 
They argued that an Ottoman identity could be instilled only through a constitutional 
system in which all elements would be defined primarily as equal Ottoman citizens, 
thereby ending community specific privileges.117 On the other hand, they developed “a 
theoretical justification and an ideology for the emerging centralized modern institutions 
in terms of Islamic political tradition and Ottoman principles of government.” (Karpat, 
                                                          
117 This would also remove the logical base for European intervention. 
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1972: 262). Yet their dual aim of promoting an Islamic ideology and a constitutional 
system based on equal citizenship was self-contradictory. 
As it will be discussed in the next chapter, Young Ottomans encountered the 
same problem that Gandhi and other Congress leaders would face two generations later 
in India. They were defining Ottomanism as an all-inclusive shared ideology. However, 
the emotional aspects of this national identity were increasingly defined on Islamic 
motives and values. Similarly Gandhi’s definition of India, as an all-inclusive national 
identity, lacked the emotional support from the Muslim masses as the nation was 
increasingly defined through Hindu culture, rituals, motives and history. 
Moreover, as recent works on democratizations have demonstrated, elections and 
democratic transition may not be the most conducive environment for nation-building 
(particularly see Snyder, 2000 and Mann, 2005). As Linz and Stepan (1996: 16-37 and 
401-433) point, democracy building and nation-building may have contradictory 
outcomes and in the case of Young Ottomans, the 1877 elections “instead of 
overcoming sectarian divisions through the institution of universal representation, 
reinforced the communitarian basis of society by allotting quotas to the various religious 
communities based on projections of population figures derived from the census of 
1844” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 119. See also Kayalı, 1995). 
Thus, the Young Ottoman attempt to solve the Tanzimat’s contradiction of “the 
ideal of an overarching Ottoman identity clashing with the increasing autonomy of 
religious communities within the empire and bureaucratic centralization conflicting with 
political fragmentation” ended up producing new ones (Hanioğlu, 2008: 104). In the 
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final analysis, attempts to create an Ottoman nationality failed in the face of religious 
divisions. Not only did the reforms deepen and formalize these divisions, through the 
transfer of leadership from pro-state clergy towards independence oriented intelligentsia 
and bourgeoisie, they actually contributed to the politicization of these divisions. Thus, 
“the attempts toward integration failed as far as most of the Christian subjects were 
concerned, for the idea lacked the emotional appeal held by their own brand of 
nationalism.” (Karpat, 1972: 261). It is this Christian nature of secessionism that 
eventually gave Ottomanism its Islamic color. Young Ottomans’ reaction to this 
Christian supremacy and the voice of Muslim resentment soon found a rallying point in 
the persona of Caliph-Sultan Abdülhamid II. This also marked a crucial shift from an 
all-inclusive and supra religious imperial ideology toward a more Islamic oriented 
imperial ideology. It can be called the start of Muslim nationalism within the imperial 
context. It can also be considered as the end of Ottoman paradox of maintaining 
plurality in a centralizing state, and reformulation of Ottomanism on a more centralist-
assimilationist Romanov model.  
 
4.3 Abdülhamid and the CUP: Islamization of Ottomanism and the Emergence of 
Muslim Nationalism 
After decades of demonization in Ottoman historiography, in the contemporary 
scholarship Abdülhamid is re-evaluated as a key figure who continued and extended the 
Tanzimat reform program. As Tanzimat represents the emergence of the modern state, 
Abdülhamid took this modernization attempts to unprecedented levels. As the 
modernization program of Tanzimat necessitated a fundamental change in state-society 
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relations and the introduction of Ottomanism as a panacea to the multiple problems 
emanating from the modernization, Abdülhamid’s extended modernization program 
resulted in a similar need for modern means of legitimation. In that regard Abdülhamid 
era can be said to constitute both a continuation of and a rupture from Tanzimat and its 
ideology of Ottomanism. On the one hand, Abdülhamid continued the implementation 
of this official nationalism (and was more successful in its spread through education 
compared to failures of Tanzimat period), on the other hand this official ideology of 
Ottomanism acquired a definite Islamic mark in this period. More significantly, this 
switch to the Islamization of the official ideology was not a result of Abdülhamid’s 
personal religiosity and thus was not limited to his reign. Indeed this Islamization of the 
official national ideology accelerated during the CUP regime – particularly after 1913 
and reached its peak during the period of 1920-1924. Therefore a structural analysis of 
this transformation is necessary. Once again alternative politics followed by 
contemporary empires are also consulted in order to better grasp and contextualize the 
evolution and the fate of Ottomanism and its increasing Islamization.  
  
4.3.1 Accelaration of Modernization 
In many ways the period of Abdülhamid shows strong resemblances with the preceding 
Tanzimat period. Here one is tempted to accept Stanford Shaw’s (1989) characterization 
of Abdülhamid as “the last man of the Tanzimat.” He embarked on the reform program 
that was initiated by his grandfather Mahmud II and continued throughout the Tanzimat 
era. A consistent feature of his reign was the process of centralization which was under 
way for the last seven decades, but now carried even more rigorously. Technological 
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advancements strengthened the central power’s hand even more than ever in the state’s 
attempt to increase its control over the subjects. We have already mentioned the crucial 
role of telegraph in enhancing the power of central administration. However, 
Abdülhamid’s attempts of increasing centralization extended also to the more visible 
realm of roads and railways. During the latter part of Abdülhamid’s reign the railroad 
system reached 5883 kilometers, while the highway system was lengthened from a mere 
6500 kilometers in 1850 to 23,675 kilometers in 1904 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 227-228). 
Thus, in many ways, Abdülhamid, the Ottoman Petro, was loyal to the spirit of 
Tanzimat and his reign represents the “culmination of Tanzimat.” (Shaw and Shaw, 
1977: 172-271). Since Abdülhamid era was the time when formation of a modern 
centralized state took pace, this modernizing state also faced the same challenges 
Tanzimat leaders had faced -increased state intervention was creating backlashes among 
the peripheral forces. This increased legitimacy deficit, necessitated the introduction of 
novel means of legitimation (for a very detailed analysis of the legitimacy structures of 
Abdülhamid era, see Deringil, 1998) 
The new legitimacy structures that Abdülhamid introduced in order to meet the 
challenges of an increasingly modernizing state can roughly be classified around three 
items; creating a personality cult around himself, glorification of the Ottoman dynasty 
and increasing use of religion. This policy is by no means unique, and the parallels with 
Uvarov’s triology of autocracy-orthodoxy-nationality are evident. 
Development of a personality cult around the ruler was a common measure that 
most modernizing empires had followed. Thus from Meiji restoration in Japan to the 
consolidation of British colonialism in India during the post-mutiny period, creation of a 
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personality cult was a common feature of the era. In all these cases, creation and 
historicization of such a cult necessitated a process of inventing a tradition. Abdülhamid 
also took an extensive project of inventing traditions around his dynasty in which the 
Caliphate was the central pillar. Similarly, the British in India followed the same policy 
when Queen Victoria was enthroned as the Empress of India (Kaiser-i Hind) in 1874. 
Her coronation ceremony which was supposed to be based on Mughal traditions was in 
fact a prime case of an invention of traditions. Imperial symbols, particularly coat of 
arms, were quite important in this invention process. (see Deringil, 1993 for the 
Abdülhamid era and Cohn, 1983 for the British Raj. The parallels in the strategies used 
for inventing traditions are evident). 
Another characteristic of the Abdülhamid era which was shared by his 
contemporaries was the increasing use of religion as a mean of legitimation. Similar to 
Russian Tzar’s emphasis on Orthodoxy and Habsburg Emperor’s pretension of being the 
protector of the true Catholic faith, Abdülhamid started to emphasize his role as the 
caliph and underlined Islam as the central pillar of state. Late nineteenth century 
modernization resulted with increasing importance attached to religion in state affairs. 
Thus even in Britain, the most liberal of all empires, religion acquired a more central 
role during the Victorian age than her predecessors (Van der Veer, 1999). However, in 
the Ottoman case this regeneration of Islam’s central role conflicted with the previous 
Tanzimat policy of creating a secularized concept of Ottoman nationhood. The reasons 
and consequences of this shift are discussed in detail below. 
However, the most important dimension of Abdülhamid’s attempts of increasing 
the legitimacy of the empire and creating adherence of the subjects was the attention he 
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paid to education. We have already mentioned that educational reforms in the previous 
Tanzimat era were too limited to impose any feeling of Ottoman-ness to the society. 
This was partly so, since the educational reforms’ main target, at least for the initial 
stages of the Tanzimat period, was to train personnel for the growing state 
administration rather than educating and transforming the population. This urgent need 
for educated staff diverted the path the reformers should follow. In most cases the 
reforms were mainly starting from the wrong end -such as establishing a university 
without any widespread primary or secondary education institutions (Ortaylı, 1999: 
194). It was only in 1869 that Tanzimat bureaucrats finally devised a regulation which 
would follow a French styled three layer education system. Like in all other 
modernizing states, the Ottoman statesmen believed in the transformative power of 
education. It is during the Abdülhamid period that an extensive reform of mid-level 
schools (rüşdiye and idadiye) was undertaken.118 In 1895, an impressive number of 
1.358.508 pupils, out of a population of about six and a half million people between the 
age of five and twenty five, attended school (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 112-113). 
Schools are one of the most important “ideological apparatuses of the state” 
(Althusser, 2003). Almost all the nineteenth century states had considered education as 
an important apparatus for nationalizing their populations. Indeed mass education is one 
of the distinctive features of modern states and societies as opposed to traditional 
societies in which education was limited only to the privileged classes. The crucial role 
of mass education in the nation-building process is one of the few themes that almost all 
                                                          
118 Despite previous emphasis on education, “the development of an empire wide system of government 
schools occurred only under Abdülhamid. The 1880s became a major period for the development of 
public education around the world, the Ottoman Empire included.” (Findley, 2010: 153). 
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theoreticians of nationalism (Smith, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson) agree on.119 
Modernization of state and society came with the formation of modern ideologies that 
linked the state with its subjects. It was through these schools that states promoted these 
novel ideologies. Importance of education in spreading novel ideologies and loyalty to 
the state was already recognized by the Tanzimat administration. Thus with his 
successful attempts of spreading mass education, Abdülhamid was achieving an 
unfulfilled Tanzimat dream. However, the ideology-Ottomanism propagated by 
Abdülhamid was radically different from the Ottomanism of the previous Tanzimat era. 
 
4.3.2 Islamization of Ottomanism 
Nationalization of the Ottoman Empire was both a response and a result of the 
modernization reforms undertaken since Tanzimat. As the main modernizer of the 
Empire, the process of nationalization continued under Abdülhamid’s reign with greater 
success. However as already mentioned, Abdülhamid pursued a different and more 
Islamic strand of official nationalism. There are basically two reasons for such a shift: 1) 
increased inter-communal tensions and increasing Muslim resentment 2) changing 
demographics. 
                                                          
119 An important aim of the education policies of these modernizing states is the mission civilisatrice. 
However, mission civilisatrice plays a paradoxical role in colonial states. While the aim of producing an 
Ottoman man, if successful, might indeed create loyalty towards the Ottoman state and help to strengthen 
it, in British India, Macaulay’s aim of creating brown colored Englishmen would help to increase loyalty 
only in so far as these Brown Englishmen would not be discriminated against themselves. As, this is 
impossible in a colonial empire, the educational reforms undertaken in the Raj were self-destructive. 
Contrast this with the increasingly important roles taken by the sons of traditional Arab and Kurdish elites 
in the Ottoman Empire. As these peripheral notables were not blocked in the manner they were in colonial 
empires (or in Anderson’s phrasing were not denied from the pilgrimage to the capital), these educational 
reforms helped to instill a sense of solidarity and loyalty towards the state and the throne. For the relation 
of the sultan with the peripheral notables and the integration of Arab and Kurdish notables to the central 
Ottoman administration, see Rogan, 1996 and Deringil, 2003. 
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Peaceful coexistence of different religious communities was the dominant 
feature of the Ottoman history. However, this stability was based on a certain worldview 
where each community had its legitimate place and rank and nobody attempted to go 
beyond its legitimate realms. This stability was already undermined with the emergence 
of a Christian bourgeoisie as the intermediaries between European capitalism and the 
Ottoman markets. As this group increasingly dominated commerce throughout the 
empire, it destabilized the previous social order. Yet the real destabilization of the 
previous balance came as a result of Tanzimat reforms, and particularly with the 1856 
Edict of Islahat. Feeling a loss of superiority in the social and political realm coupled 
with the increasing superiority of non-Muslims in the economical realm cultivated a 
strong sense of resentment to the ongoing changes among the Muslim masses. European 
intervention exacerbated the situation. Clear European intervention and pressure in the 
declaration of 1856 Edict was a source of resentment. Extensive protection and 
citizenship rights granted to non-Muslims by the European states were other sources of 
resentment. With all these reasons it is not surprising that early inter-communal tensions 
started in regions where trade was a major source of income and where European 
presence was stronger. Thus in the mid-nineteenth nineteenth century Lebanon turned 
into an area of communal conflict between the Druzes, Muslims and Christians (Akarlı, 
1993) These tensions occasionally spread to nearby urban centers such as Damascus and 
Aleppo (Masters, 2001). European powers and particularly France was very eager to 
intervene in these conflicts as they fashioned themselves the protectors of the Christians 
in the empire. While European intervention, always in favor of non-Muslims, increased 
the feeling of discontempt toward Europe, it provided the means for independence for 
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the nationalist movements. Considering a European intervention as the only feasible 
scenario of independence, Armenian and Bulgarian nationalists started large scale 
agitations and terror attacks against the Muslims of the empire hoping inter-communal 
conflict to lead to European intervention and eventually to independence. Bulgarians 
succeeded in this scenario as the Ottoman state suppressed Bulgarian atrocities 
ruthlessly, the Christian public in Europe had encouraged intervention and in 1878 this 
resulted in Bulgarian independence. The tensions with the Armenians and the Muslims 
as well as the Armenians and the Ottoman state continued until the whole scale 
expulsion of Armenians from Anatolia in 1915. 
Moreover, the nineteenth nineteenth century witnessed the spread of European 
colonialism throughout the world as most of the Muslim communities outside Ottoman 
realms were occupied by European powers. Thus the resentment against Europeans was 
a global phenomenon and as interaction between Muslims all around the world 
increased, this feeling of resentment also spread and multiplied.120 Thus as Nikki Keddie 
(1969:20) pointed, when Abdülhamid came to power he responded to a Muslim reaction 
toward greater Islamic identification as much as he created it. Abdülhamid capitulated 
on an already existing feeling of resentment (voiced by Young Ottomans already) and 
promoted Islam as “a last line of defense against the corrosive effects of nationalism” 
(Hanioğlu, 2008: 142). By the 1870’s, nationalism started to gain ground among a 
limited segment of Muslim population as well, evident in certain cases such as the 
formation of Prizren League by the Albanians and the start of Nahda, a literary 
                                                          
120 For example the first contact between the Indian Muslims and the Ottomans started at late nineteenth 
century as the famous Indian Muslim scholar-poet Maulana Shibli, visited Ottomans and tried to create 
awareness among the Ottoman Muslim public on the plight of Indian Muslims. His visit attracted 
widespread attention and created enthusiasm among the Muslims in Istanbul. Upon his return such visitis 
and contacts have increasingly continued. 
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awakening among the Levanten Arabs. By promoting Muslim nationalism instead of a 
secularized notion of Ottomanism, Abdülhamid aimed to curb down the potential threat 
of separatist nationalism among the Muslims of the empire. 
A more important reason for the shift in Ottomanism can be found in the 
changing demographic make-up of the Empire. Tanzimat leaders often complained 
about the diversity of the society as an obstacle in the modernization and nationalization 
of the state and society. For the reasons discussed above, this limited their success in 
creating and spreading the official ideology of Ottomanism. However, when 
encountering the same challenge, Abdülhamid had to deal with a different society. The 
demographic nature of the Ottoman state had drastically changed in the last century. 
While the extremely diverse nature of Ottoman society limited the success of nation-
building project of the Tanzimat regime, Abdülhamid inherited a much more 
homogenous society than Tanzimat leaders. Tanzimat leaders were trying to develop a 
collective identity out of a formidable degree of diversity. Even in 1876, the 
composition of the first Ottoman parliament was impressive in its diversity, perhaps 
unique in the history of multi-ethnic empires: Out of 125 deputies 77 were Muslim, 44 
Christian, and four Jewish. The religious diversity that the Tanzimat leaders tried so 
hard to manage through various reforms and attempts of egalitarianism was much 
diminished by 1878. During the 1877-1878 war with Russia, the empire lost most of its 
remaining territory in Europe. This brought a radical demographic shift. On the one 
hand, the Christian populations had diminished as a result of the loss of territories 
mainly populated by Christians. On the other hand, faced with ethnic cleansing, large 
flocks of Muslims from the lost territories had migrated to the Ottoman territories. 
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By the time of 1878 war, Muslim immigration to the empire was already an 
ongoing process and this flow of population continued on to the very end of the empire. 
If one source of Muslim immigrants were coming from the Ottoman losses at the 
Balkans another equally important source was coming from the Russian conquests in the 
Muslim populated areas at the north and east of Black Sea. Thus both at the Balkans and 
the Caucasus, Muslims facing ethnic cleansing were migrating to the Ottoman Empire in 
large flocks. From 1856 to 1865 and thereafter two to three million Caucasians were 
forced to immigrate to the Ottoman lands. By 1879 about 13 percent of Bulgaria’s 
Muslim population were killed and 34 percent were made refugees. In the Balkan wars 
812,771 Muslims from the lost European territories were made refugees aside from the 
632,408 death. (McCarthy, 1995: 167). 
With this demographic transformation, the remaining land became essentially a 
Muslim majority Empire, as the Muslims constituted nearly 80 percent of the 
population. Thus, the very demographic nature of the Ottomans that made them develop 
the tolerant millet system; having substantial numbers of Christian populations and 
ruling over territories where the majority was not Muslim, has changed. What is more 
striking is that in this new situation the Christians were not majority on any large 
territory. Thus the most important danger of nationalist secession of Christian territories 
was largely removed. It is this demographic shift that accounts for the difference 
between Tanzimat policies and Abdülhamid policies. Nationalism theorists point to the 
crucial role played by a staatsvolk to be the base of nation-building project (O’Leary, 
2001). Now, Abdülhamid had a solid majority on which he could build a nation. As 
such the threats that faced the state were changing. While secession of Christian 
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majority areas was no longer a possibility, nationalism was starting to find ground 
among the Muslim populations of the empire. As centralization reached new grounds, 
the reaction of Muslim periphery to these centralizations gained increased importance 
and emergency. 
As a result of these social and demographic changes Abdülhamid developed a 
corporate identity based more on Islam. In fact he did not repudiate Ottomanism but 
gave it a more Islamic coloring which was now more possible given the majority 
position of Muslims. The Ottoman state of the twentieth century was not an "empire," 
but a new type of Muslim state with its own unique cultural, religious, ethnic, and social 
characteristics derived from the life of the people it ruled (Karpat, 1991: 547). 
Construction of Ottoman nationalism, like all other nationalization attempts, faced the 
dilemma of creating an all-inclusive national identity and defining that national identity 
among the highest common denominator possible. However, the problem that Ottomans 
could not solve was the relationship between this supra identity of Ottomanism and 
other sub identities. In the end they ended up narrowing the definition of Ottomanism. 
As Muslims were now a clear majority everywhere, the new demographic situation 
enabled to put Islam as the common denominator of the nation. 
Like in any nationalism project, the boundaries of the nation are subject to 
constant shift and social-political bargaining. The fate of Ottoman official nationalism 
was also subjected to similar boundary shifts. Its boundary has shifted in the due process 
to represent a more homogenous society. The idea which was initially created as a 
measure to include all members of the society and considerably the Christians who had 
secessionist ambitions had narrowed itself as the inclusion of Christians became both 
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impossible and perhaps to a degree secondary in importance. The exclusion of 
Christians from the official ideology, however, did not mean the reassertion of tradition 
over society. Underlying the importance of the inclusion of Muslims and exclusion of 
non-Muslims was a result of the search of a creation of a bond between the state and 
society. Thus in its nature it was a modernizing attempt. It was modern in both senses. 
On the one hand, it was the strength of central state and modern institutions attached to 
it that make such a project feasible. On the other hand, it was this modernity of the state 
that created the need for a common bond between state and society. The narrowing of 
the original Ottomanist idea through exclusion of non-Muslims in fact continued until 
the collapse of the empire. Abdülhamid’s major rival, the Young Turk movement who 
in the end succeeded in overthrowing him also formed its political orientation on a 
Muslim nationalist Ottomanism that was based on the exclusion of non-Muslims.   
 
4.3.3 Ottomanism Contextualized: From Tanzimat to Abdülhamid and Afterwards 
Despite the inconsistency of Ottoman administration in its application of official 
nationalism a la Habsburg or Romanov, one broad generalization can be made; through 
the historical process Romanov model gained ascendancy over the Habsburg model. It is 
possible to claim that despite apparent inconsistency, Habsburg model dominated the 
Tanzimat era, while with the absolutist reign of Abdülhamid a shift toward a more 
Romanov version of Ottomanism emerged in which Islam became the central pillar of 
official nationalism. The struggle between the different strands of official nationalism 
also dominated the opposition politics. The ideological split of CUP in 1902 in two 
different groups led by Prince Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza can better be understood as 
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a split between two alternative forms of official nationalism (For the detailed analysis of 
the 1902 Paris Congress of Young Turks and events leading to the split, see Ramsaur, 
2004: 81-133). Within this split among the Young Turks, it is no surprise that non-
Muslim elements sided with the decentralizing version of Sabahaddin while the Muslim 
and Turkish elements opted for a more centralizing version of official nationalism. 
However, the evolution of Ottomanism toward a more assimilationist-centralizing 
version continued well through the CUP administration with never ending 
inconsistencies. Yet after 1913, the extent of centralizing and homogenizing tendencies 
of Ottomanism a la Romanov reached to the extent that Ottomanism irrevocably 
transformed into Muslim nationalism. In order to understand options available for 
Ottomanism and how and why Ottoman statesmen pursued a particular brand of it in 
contrast to other options, a quick look over the Habsburg and Romanov versions and 
transformation of the Ottoman realm might be helpful. 
The difference in terms of the formulation of official nationalism among 
different empires is more a result of different conditions and different composition of 
the empires rather than being merely ideological. In the Habsburg Empire, Germans 
constituted only 23 percent of the empire’s overall population. Moreover, Germans of 
Habsburgs were a minority among the Germans of Europe as the majority of Germans 
were living in the newly formed bordering German nation-state. Thus Habsburgs did not 
and probably could not follow any policy of Germanization. In contrast, Russians 
constituted more than forty percent of the Romanov Empire and they formed an 
important majority throughout the core regions of the empire. Besides, unlike the 
Habsburgs, they were not threatened by any other state that would claim rivalry on the 
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allegiance of its Russian populations. This Russian population constituted a solid base to 
formulate policies of nationalization and assimilation. 
In terms of demographic diversity, Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era 
resembled the Habsburg Empire rather than the Romanovs. Moreover Tanzimat 
statesmen were contemporaries of Metternich and in him they found their role models 
and ideologue. Metternich was struggling to maintain centralization without 
undermining the imperial-plural nature of the state. Thus the problems facing the 
Habsburgs were more similar to the Ottomans and despite the common assumption of 
French influence on the Ottoman statesmen, at least for the Tanzimat statesmen, it is 
possible to say that Habsburgs in general and Metternich in particular was more 
influential as a model (Ortaylı, 1999: 240).  
However, we still can not say that Tanzimat statesmen entirely or consistently 
followed Habsburgs. The common problem facing all the empires was the difficulty to 
sustain the mosaic character of the empire at the time of an administrative unification. In 
order to overcome this, Habsburgs followed a more federalist attitude which aimed to 
preserve and coexist diverse identities and communities under the banner of an inclusive 
Habsburg identity, while the Russians opted for excessive centralization that aimed to 
transform the empire into a typical nation-state based on state-nation congruence. 
Tanzimat statesmen never considered federalism as a valid alternative. For them 
federalism was a pretext for separation and they resisted all such demands (Davison, 
1977). As it had been discussed already, the Ottoman state was excessively 
decentralized in the previous centuries and the common theme of all the nineteenth 
century reformers was the emphasis they have put on centralization. Indeed this 
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obsession with centralization created certain absurdities such as the creation of an 
agency for beggars (dilenciler kethüdası) in Istanbul that would function as a central 
body for all the beggars of the empire (Ortaylı, 1999: 148). Thus it is possible to say that 
while the diverse nature of Ottoman society was more suitable for a federalist-plural 
version of Ottomanism (Habsburg model), the evolution of state organization and state-
society relations were leaning towards a more centralizing-assimilationist (Romanov 
model). 
In their attempt to promote their form of official nationalism, Ottomans were 
doubly disadvantaged with regard to their contemporaries. Both the Habsburg and 
Russian centralization attempts started much earlier than the Ottoman Empire. They 
entered the nineteenth century, the age of nationalism, with stronger and more 
centralized political bodies. Moreover, these empires were more homogenous than the 
Ottomans at least in terms of religious diversity. The Habsburg dynasty had aligned 
itself with the Catholic Church since the reformation wars and the formation of the 
empire (Jazsi, 1961: 155-162). Catholic Church remained the major centripetal force for 
the empire at the age of nationalism. However, it is true that since the eighteenth century 
Russian expansionism had led the Russians to include a substantial number of Muslims 
to the Russian Empire. Yet it is imperative to consider that the Russian policy of 
centralization and assimilation did not extend beyond the Ural Mountains where the 
majority of the Muslim population lived. Thus the Czarist Empire had a double policy 
with regard to its subjects. The empire tried to create a nation-state from its Christian 
subjects through Russification policies. Yet the newly conquered Muslims lands were 
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treated pretty much as colonial possessions and thus the Muslims were excluded from 
the newly emerging nation.121 
The Ottomans could not follow either policy as the Christian populations were 
very wide spread and they were majority in the most important European possessions of 
the empire. Indeed as it was already pointed, nationalism was primarily a Christian 
problem in the empire until the end of nineteenth century. Under these circumstances the 
Ottomans vacillated between creating a common identity for all its subjects and 
preserving communal differences. However main features of the empire that pushed 
Tanzimat statesmen for a more plural version of official nationalism (demographics and 
the crucial importance of Christians for the Ottoman state) started to change throughout 
the century. Their inability to develop a definition of Ottomanism that would convince 
the non-Muslim subjects to remain in the Empire and the changing demographics of the 
Empire finally led the Ottomans to define Ottomanism more and more with a Muslim 
content and the imperial nationalism of the Tanzimat period started to evolve toward 
Muslim nationalism. As the empire evolved more toward a clearer national definition, it 
also lost its imperial character which enabled it to rule over and benefit from diversity. 
Thus we can safely say that starting with the reign of Abdülhamid, or more 
precisely following the 1878 War, Ottomanism started to gain a more Islamic character 
                                                          
121 Indeed it is possible to claim that this was more or less a universal model as the empires of Europe 
transformed the imperial core into a nation-state while keeping their overseas possessions as colonial 
possessions. However Romanovs was the first land based empire that followed this double policy. To a 
certain extent Ottomans also developed such a policy in their attitude toward the distant and peripheral 
Muslim elements at a later stage. Deringil's (2003) article provides insights on the Ottoman state elite's 
attitude toward the tribal populations of Libya considering them as primitive societies that needed to be 
elevated to the level of civilization through the civilizing mission of the Ottoman Empire. Erol Ülker's 
(2005) important study on contextualization of Turkification during the CUP regime also points to a 
similar “double policy” where certain elements within CUP made a distinction between the imperial core 
(Anatolia) that needed to be homogenized and nationalized while the peripheral regions (Arab and 
Kurdish lands) were to be centralized but not necessarily Turkified.    
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and the Ottoman nation increasingly meant Muslim Ottomans. This did not necessarily 
mean a whole scale exclusion of Christians from the state, but refered to a progress in 
which the nation was defined more and more through religious representation. Thus, the 
ideal Ottoman subject of Tanzimat era, who was deprived from religious denomination 
started to be defined through religious representation, and the initially secular concept of 
Ottomanism increasingly started to represent Muslim Ottomans. However, this alliance 
between Islam and the state was fundamentally different from the classical alliance 
existed in pre-Tanzimat period. It is wrong to conclude that the relation between state 
and religion, after four decades of attempts of detachment turned back to its original 
form. The situation of a non-Muslim reaya in classical era who belonged to one of the 
established millets and showed state his/her allegiance through the millet organization is 
fundamentally different from the non-Muslim citizens of the post Tanzimat era. 
The situation of a non-Muslim in the classical era during which the population 
remained largely passive, and state and individual relations were conducted through 
millet intermediaries is fundamentally different from the non-Muslims in the post 
Tanzimat era, during which the subjects were mobilized actively in favor of the state 
and an attachment (nonexistent in the classical era) between the state and individuals 
was created. “The state now demands not passive obedience but conformity to a 
unilaterally proclaimed normative order” (Deringil, 1998: 11). The Ottoman state in the 
late nineteenth century was transformed from being a Muslim dominated empire into a 
Muslim nation-state. Thus, as the classical reaya were transformed into citizens, non-
Muslims who were traditionally considered as members of certain millets increasingly 
became minorities in a nationalizing state and were increasingly considered as obstacles 
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in the formation of a homogenous nation. This fundamental difference resulted in their 
exclusion from the newly created congruence of community and state: a process 
culminated into a decade of promoting religious homogeneity by many means until 
1924. War, deportations, ethnic conflicts-cleansings and population exchanges were all 
different means through which the religious homogenization was achieved. 
Paradoxically, the exclusion of non-Muslims accelerated and finalized under the 
secularist regime of CUP.122 
 
4.3.4 CUP  
It is customary to consider CUP’s rise to power as a breakthrough in the Ottoman and 
Turkish history and there is great truth to that. The discrepancy between the personal 
piety of Abdülhamid and the lack of religiosity of many leading CUP members further 
substantiaes an impression of a rupture by the CUP regime. Indeed most of the Young 
Turks, even more than being non-religious, had a negative attitude toward religions in 
general and Islam in particular, that is so well demonstrated by Hanioğlu’s article 
“Garpcılar” (1997). Yet they “adopted a Muslim variant of Ottomanism quite similar to 
the ideology promoted by Abdülhamid II.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 145). As an organization 
CUP was composed mainly of Muslim civil servants and army officers and in its early 
days it was not even open to non-Muslims. It was a political movement of the Ottoman 
Muslims for Ottoman Muslims (Zurcher, 2010: 277). During the early days of their 
revolution and in the hype of constitutional order, they officially declared their loyalty to 
                                                          
122 Recent debates on religious minorities and secularism in Europe and elsewhere challenges the 
conventional expectations that religious minorities are the ones benefiting from secularism. Indeed the 
recent literature on secularism points that suppression of religious minorities in secularizing socities is not 
necessarily paradoxical (see, Bader, 2007; Chatterjee, 1998; Nandy, 1995) 
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the all-inclusive concept of Ottomanism formulated as ittihad-ı anasır,123 yet in a similar 
fashion to the failure of the original Ottomanist project and shift to Ottoman Muslim 
nationalism, they also based their practical policies, and in time even their discourses, on 
Muslim nationalism. Once again Muslim nationalism of CUP was partly shaped by the 
overwhelmingly Christian nature of separatist nationalism. Particularly following the 
Balkan War, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the national identity gained pace and a 
wholesale exclusion of Christian from the national identity started. In its climax, this 
exclusion is unprecedented as the capacities available to CUP leaders after a century of 
modern state formation was unprecedented as well.  
Muslim nationalism of CUP had two dimensions; economic and demographic. 
Economic dimension aimed for a transfer of wealth from Christians toward Muslims. 
For that end, the programme of National Economy (Milli İktisat) was launched in 1914. 
The main target of the programme was to build a strong bourgeoisie among the ranks of 
Muslim entrepreneurs. Conditions of wartime enabled these entrepreneurs to make 
excessive profits under government protection. (Zurcher, 2010: 219-220).  
The second aspect of the CUP nationalism was demographic engineering in 
order to create a homogenously Muslim population in Anatolia (For a detailed analysis 
of demographic engineering of CUP, see Dündar, 2001; 2008). Demographic change in 
Anatolia was shaped by two forces; immigration of large flocks of Muslims from the 
territories lost in the Balkan War and the forceful expulsion of non-Muslims from 
Anatolia. Muslim migrants were settled in a way to ensure the transformation of Muslim 
                                                          
123 Unlike the 1877 elections, the 1908 elections “eliminated the quota system in the hope for forging an 
Ottoman unity unless shackled by primordial attachments.”  It was hoped that enforced centralization 
would maintain unity (Kayalı, 1995: 281). 
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minority places to Muslim majority. The more decisive aspect of religious 
homogenization was the expulsion of non-Muslims which started right after the Balkan 
Wars. The Greeks living in the West Coast of Anatolia were forced to migrate to 
Greece. Ayhan Aktar (2010: 26-32) rightly defines this deportation of Greeks as the 
precursor of the population exchange took place after Lauzanne Agreement. In the 
Eastern Anatolia, Armenians were deported en masse to the Syrian Desserts after the 
introduction of the Law of Displacement (Tehcir Kanunu) in 27 May 1915. While many 
died without ever reaching to Syria, Tehcir resulted the complete cleansing of the 
Armenians from Anatolia. The religious cleansing of non-Muslims from Anatolia was 
completed after the promulgation of forced population exchanges by the Lauzanne 
Agreement (see, Bayar, 2014; Yıldız, 2001: 26-32). In a way the population exchange in 
the Lauzanne Agreement completed a process that was already underway for a decade. 
As a result of this agreement, 1.200.000 Greek Orthodox, some of whom spoke Turkish 
as mother tongue, from Anatolia migrated to Greece. And in response approximately 
500.000 Muslims, from various ethnic backgrounds, had migrated to Turkey. After this 
final step Turkey was almost completely homogenous in the religious terms.  
Despite their personal secularism and their desire to diminish the role of Islam 
both in the public life and in state affairs, it was the CUP cadres who firmly and 
irrevocably established Muslim nationalism. This is crucial to understand the nature of 
Muslim nationalism. Religion in Muslim nationalism serves a social force of cohesion 
and unity. Thus it has a function of homogenization. Particularly in the Ottoman case, 
religion had been functional in excluding certain sectors of society. As recent studies in 
nationalism underline, what constitutes the nation is partly defined through what the 
 180 
 
nation excludes. Thus, exclusion is constitutive of both nation and modernization 
(Wimmer, 2002). In the same line, it would be safe to say that Young Turks’ 
differentiation from the Christians was a constitutive aspect of their mindset. This is not 
only evident from the fact that all founders of the movement were Muslims, but the 
founding charter of the crucial 1906 Society of Freedom explicitly forbids the 
membership of non-Muslims to the committee (Zurcher, 2010). This was particularly so 
since it was the struggle against the Christians in the Balkans that shaped the political 
trajectory and mindset of the CUP leaders. Thus, we can say that Christians was the 
constitutive other of the Ottomanism of Young Turks. So their Ottomanism was in fact 
an anti-non-Muslim Ottomanism that can safely be defined as Muslim Ottoman 
nationalism. 
It would be wrong to put too much emphasis on the world views of the CUP 
leaders with regard to their adoption of Muslim nationalism or Turkish nationalism. The 
entire concept of nation emerged in the Ottoman case as a centripetal force that would 
prevent the empire from disintegration. Thus it had a practical aim, to save the empire. 
This practical necessity dictated the emergence of nationalism in the first hand but it 
also dictated the definition of nation. Nationalism is constituted through the constant 
negotiation of its boundaries by including some groups, meanings, and practices and 
excluding others (Göçek, 2002: 1). Thus since the first introduction of the concept of an 
Ottoman nation in the Tanzimat period, the meaning and boundary of this nation 
continuously shifted. The initial desire of an Ottoman nation which would include all the 
members of the state remained as a constant hope for the state elites. However, as the 
political realities such as wars, European intervention and emergence of secessionist 
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nationalisms dictated otherwise, certain groups were excluded from the definition of 
nation. 
 
4.4 Religion and Nationalism Among Christians and Muslims  
The conventional wisdom sees a direct evolution from millet identities toward 
nationalism. Based on the central importance of religion in many post-Ottoman 
nationalities, this narrative sees in the millet organization the roots of nationalism as 
millet system enabled different communities to maintain organizational autonomy and 
cultural distinctiveness (Karpat, 1982, recently repeated by Aktürk, 2009). Although 
being partly true, “this interpretation is based on a backward projection of the conditions 
that emerged in the late nineteenth century rather than historical realities” (Kasaba, 
2006:205). The problem with this narrative is that it gives an over-generalized account 
and among many other things misses the deeply anti-clerical roots of Greek nationalism. 
Inevitably then, the Greek nationalist movement attracted the deep hostility of the 
Orthodox establishment and clergy. In 1802, a Greek monk was warning the youth for 
the degenerative effects of Europe, where “the most atheistical lackeys of the arch 
atheist Voltaire spew up from the foul smelling gorges the most irreligious insults and 
blasphemies against the Divine Majesty” (quoted in Kasaba, 2006:213). The millet 
system and Christian religious institutions were obstacles for the spread of non-
denominational Ottoman nationalism. 124However, with regard to evolution of their own 
secessionist nationalism, these institutions played paradoxical roles. Thus despite being 
limited to Christian subjects, these popular nationalisms had contradictory relations with 
                                                          
124 The Islamic institutions and the central role played by Islam in the imperial system provide a similar 
challenge to the spread of this non-denominational ideology. 
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religion. This is quite similar to the formation of Muslim nationalism during the 
Abdülhamid and CUP eras. 
As we have seen, the Greek Orthodox Church had preserved its privileges of the 
Byzantine era after the Ottoman conquests. In what is often called as Byzance après 
Byzance, the institutional autonomy and imperial-ecumenical character of the Church 
have remained untouched after the Ottoman conquests. Moreover the juridical authority 
of Patriarchate was extended to the rest of the empire, thus the authority of Patriarchate 
reached to unprecedented levels and territories compared with the Byzantium era. In that 
sense the church had a special position of “an empire within an empire,” and thus it was 
vulnerable to nationalism as much as the empire was. Greek nationalism was the first 
nationalist challenge that Greek Patriarchate had to face. Greek was the Church 
language, but it was also the language of commerce and intellect throughout the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Christians). The central role of Greek Patriarchate and Greek language 
had contributed to an early development of Greek nationalism in three different ways; 1) 
Greek language and its universal use provided the necessary “high culture.” 2) Existence 
of an elite; both religious and commercial. 3) Being open to European influence through 
commercial networks. 
Greeks also had the advantage of Philhellenes in Europe who under the influence 
of Classical Romanticism saw in the Greeks of the nineteenth century the intellectual 
forefathers of the European civilization. This was another tension between the Greek 
nationalism and the clergy for whom ancient Greeks represented nothing but paganism. 
However, despite the resistance of Patriarchate, with the political support they got from 
the European countries, and particularly from the British, the Greek nationalists 
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acquired their independence in 1829. This was the first region that broke of the 
Ottomans through revolt and clearly showed that internal unrest and nationalism was 
now as dangerous as the external enemies of the empire.125 However, the Patriarchate’s 
hostility to nationalism in general and Greek nationalism in particular continued well 
after the Greek Independence. Indeed the Patriarchate recognized the independent Greek 
State in 1856, almost thirty years after the Ottoman state itself recognized it. As an 
imperial institution, the high clergy considered nationalism as a potentially disruptive 
force that would undermine and limit its ecumenical authority - an apt prediction to be 
confirmed by the course of events throughout the century. 
The Serbian case was a somewhat different. With regard to European influences 
the Serbians were like the Greeks. They did not have the commercial networks of the 
Greek elites, but through their close contacts and geographical-linguistic affinity with 
the neighboring Habsburg territories they were open to ideological influences from 
Europe. However, it was not only geography that put the Serbs into a distinctive position 
among the Christians of the Empire. Unlike the claims of later nationalist mythologies, 
Serbs were the main collaborators of the Ottoman expansion throughout the fifteenth 
                                                          
125 Once again the dynamics between the religion and language in this newly established Greek state is 
entirely similar with the later evolution of the Turkish state. The nation was primarily defined through 
religion and adherence to Greek Orthodoxy. Thus, even Orthodox groups who were not members of the 
Greek Orthodox Church, like the Serbians were excluded from the national ambitions. The state was 
primarily targeting the Greek Orthodox who were not completely Greek speakers. However, as soon as 
the state was established, a new process of homogenization started which aimed to linguistically 
homogenize the nation. Primarily through the education system, but also with the support of the military 
and judicial institutions, the state aimed to linguistically assimilate the Albanian and Vlach speakers of 
Greek Orthodox faith. The Greek case particularly had an irredentist dimension, thus the target of 
linguistic assimilation was not limited to the citizens of the new Greek state, but was targeting the entire 
Greek East- all the members of the Greek Orthodox Church. The University of Athens, with its graduates 
spreading all over the Eastern Mediterranean, was particularly instrumental in the Hellenization of the 
Greek Orthodoxes and transforming them to members of the imagined community of Greek nation and 
potential members of the Greek irredentism. Thus religious differences were considered non assimilable 
and were excluded from the national group, while linguistic differences were considered assimilable and 
were included in the nation (Kitromilides, 1989). 
 184 
 
and sixteenth centuries. This enabled them to keep their own church organizations and 
unlike the other Orthodox people in the Ottoman Empire, they were not part of the 
ecumenical Greek Church. This enabled them to have their own high culture, their own 
elite open to politicization and nationalization (Hastings, 1997: 124-147). The rivalry 
between the ecumenical claims of the Greek Patriarchate and the autonomy of the 
Serbian Church transformed the Serbian clergy to the leaders of the demands for 
autonomy-secessionism. In a way Serbian clergy played the role of Greek bourgeoisie-
intelligentsia as the leaders and protagonists of nationalist movements. Thus church 
clergy and millet organization played opposite roles in the Greek and Serbian cases. 
While the universalist-imperial Greek clergy resisted nationalism, the particularism of 
Serbian clergy and their struggle with imperial religious institutions (Patriarchate) 
pushed them to hold a line with the nationalist forces against the empire. Thus the first 
two secessionist movements in the Empire had two contradictory relations with religion. 
However, despite this difference they were both targeting a special Christian population. 
Thus, to a certain extent, both can be considered as Christian nationalism. In their 
attempt to link the state with a particular Christian population, they excluded other 
religious denominations, particularly the Muslims from their respective national states. 
Thus the formation of the secular Greek nationalism and religious Serbian nationalism 
both resulted with the large scale expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Muslim populations, 
even when those Muslim communities were Greek or Serbian speakers. 
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Although the peculiar role of religious institutions can help us understand the 
very early development of nationalism among the Greeks and Serbs,126 similar 
contradictions with regard to religion-nationalism relation can be observed in the later 
nationalisms of Christian communities of the empire. In a sense, the struggle between 
the Greek nationalist bourgeoisie-intelligentsia and the Greek Patriarchate replicated 
itself decades later as the struggle between the secular-nationalism oriented Armenian 
amira class and the Armenian patriarchate, while the role played by the Bulgarian clergy 
in the evolution of Bulgarian nationalism, particularly after the formation of a separate 
Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 was parallel to the role played by the Serbian clergy almost 
a century ago. Thus one generalization can be made that religion is an impediment to the 
spread of nationalism as long as it is aligned with the imperial-universal institutions, 
while it would be a force for nationalism once it is associated with a particular people-
district or state. Another conclusion well in line with the thesis of this dissertation is that 
religion plays contradictory roles in the formation of nationalism and nation-states and it 
would serve nationalism as long as the state is associated with the homogenizing 
function of religion and this is irrespective of the personal religiosity of nationalist 
leaders. In that sense it is reminiscent of the relation between Islam and Ottoman-
Muslim nationalism of Abdülhamid and CUP periods. Thus, either under the reign of 
pious Caliph or the secularist officers it was a period of the re-alignment of the state 
with the Muslim population. Thus, like the Christian nationalisms preceding them, 
whether religious or secular, these Muslim nationalisms are also based on the exclusion 
of Christians. 
                                                          
126 This early development of nationalism among the Greeks and Serbs had always been a problem for the 
modernist account of nationalism as the emergences of nationalism in these two cases clearly predate the 
features of modernity such as industrialization, mass education or even print capitalism. 
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4.5 Muslim Nationalism 
The Ottoman state of the twentieth century was not an "empire," but a new type of 
Muslim state with its own unique cultural, religious, ethnic, and social characteristics 
derived from the life of the people it ruled (Karpat, 1991: 547). Like in any nationalism 
project the boundaries of the nation is subject to constant shift and social-political 
bargaining. The fate of Ottoman official nationalism was also subjected to similar 
boundary shifts. Its boundary has shifted in the due process to represent a more 
homogenous society. The idea which was initially created as a measure to include all 
members of the society and considerably the Christians who had secessionist ambitions 
had narrowed itself as the inclusion of Christians became both impossible and perhaps 
to a degree secondary in importance. The exclusion of Christians from the official 
ideology however doesn’t mean the reassertion of tradition over society. Underlying the 
importance of the inclusion of Muslims and exclusion of non-Muslims was a result of 
the search of a creation of a bond between the state and society. Thus in its nature it was 
a modernizing attempt. It was modern in both senses. On the one hand, it was the 
strength of central state and modern institutions attached to it that make such a project 
feasible. On the other hand, it was this modernity of the state that created the need for a 
common bond between state and society. The narrowing of the original Ottomanist idea 
through exclusion of non-Muslims in fact continued until the collapse of the empire. 
Abdülhamid’s major rival, the Young Turk movement who in the end succeeded in 
overthrowing him, also based its political orientation on a Muslim nationalist 
Ottomanism excluding the non-Muslims of the Empire. 
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How justified is to define the policies of Young Ottomans or Abdülhamid, let 
alone the CUP as Muslim nationalism? Both the Young Ottomans and Abdülhamid 
period had already been suggested as the periods of emergence of Islamism (Turkone, 
2003 and Karpat, 2001). The problem is partly related to the definitions. Nationalism is 
defined as the congruence of political and cultural units. Thus Muslim nationalism 
means that the nationality of that particular state is defined through religion. As 
Anderson underlines, nationalism is both “territorial and limited” thus it is 
fundamentally different from religions which are not bound by any territory in their 
claim to universality. The religious policies of Abdülhamid precisely aimed at 
strengthening a particular state. His emphasis on caliphate as a universal institution was 
more a result of his desire to strengthen the state rather than to establish a worldwide 
religious renewal. 
As it is mainly related with institutional arrangements and state power, either 
formation of a state or strengthening of the state, Muslim nationalism should not be 
confused with other religious revival movements of the time. Indeed, as John Voll 
points, movements of religious renewal and revival are a constant feature of Muslim 
history. One can even talk of a tradition of change. These revivalist movements became 
ever more frequent and widespread at times of crisis. Thus, whenever Muslim societies 
experienced the crisis of modernity, a religious renewal and revival movement have also 
flourished. Losing its political superiority much before than the Ottoman realms, the 
Indian subcontinent started to experience a wave of reform embodied in the important 
personality of Shah Waliullah in the eighteenth century. This religious reformism in the 
Indian subcontinent is well studied and well documented (see, Rizvi, 1980; Metcalf, 
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1982; Rahman, 1999). A less well known and less studied religious revival movement 
started in the Ottoman realms by Mevlana Halid (see Mardin, 1991 and recently 
Findley, 2010). Another well-known religious revival movement that touched upon both 
India and the Ottomans was the reformism of Cemaleddin Afghani. Being more political 
compared with the other two religious movements, Afghani cannot be considered as a 
Muslim nationalist either, since his emphasis was on the universal ummah rather than a 
particular and limited state. Moreover, his emphasis on anti-colonialism led him to 
ignore the religious differences in certain cases like India.127 
Thus despite the fact that Muslim nationalism and Islamic revivalism probably 
affected each other and contributed to the development of each other, they actually are 
two different phenomenon; one addressing mainly the newly emerging centralized state 
aiming at institutional adaptation and political socialization while the other addressing 
mainly the Muslim societies addressing for religious reform (Karpat, 1972: 262). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter we have contrasted the empires and nation-states with regard to 
their approaches to certain values such as equality, diversity and plurality. We have 
pointed that nation-states praise equality and uniformity while empires praise hierarchy 
and plurality. As a result nation-states pursue homogenization while empires are content 
with diversity of the society. We have also pointed that as imperial societies both Indian 
subcontinent and the Ottoman realms were home to very diverse societies which were 
                                                          
127 However, the reformist traditions of Afghani and Abduh have contributed to the emergence of 
nationalisms and can be considered as form of proto-nationalism (see Keddie, 1969). Moreover the 
intellectual heritage from Afghani to Abduh and then to Rashid Rida, provides an important linkage for 
the emergence of Arab nationalism (see Kedourie, 1962).  
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largely organized through hierarchical, autonomous and separate coexistence of 
religious communities. With the emergence of the modern state in the nineteenth 
century, decentralized and indirect rule of the empires gave way to a more centralized 
and direct rule. Through this process it became almost impossible to sustain the previous 
fragmented character of the society. Increased state intervention, particularly state’s 
attempt of establishing a uniform and centralized administration, created a backlash and 
led to the politicization of previous communal identities. As the previous communal 
organization was centered on religious affiliation, particularly in the Ottoman Empire 
and to an extent in the urban India, formation of the modern state led to a politicization 
of religious identities. In the age of nationalism, this soon led to rival religious 
nationalisms. 
The creation of a more intrusive state and disruption of the old social balance 
combined with the ever increasing threat of nationalism, led the state to formulate an 
official nationalism. The demographic realities of the Empire gave an Islamic coloring 
to this official identity. Given the demographic nature of the state, Abdülhamid allied 
the official nationalism with the majority population. Thus the Ottoman Empire tried to 
overcome its legitimacy deficit by the re-alignment of religion and state. The British 
being the colonial rulers in India lacked all of these instruments. The racist and 
exclusionary nature of the Raj prevented the introduction of any sort of official 
nationalism. As such the power sharing mechanisms and incorporation of local elites to 
the system maintained the logic of separate coexistence of distinct regions and 
communities. This limited inclusion of the people in the system however remained 
unsatisfactory as the mass politics increasingly dominated the Indian scene. While the 
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Ottomans aligned themselves with the majority community in such a situation, the logic 
of colonial rule forced the British to forge an alliance with the minority groups. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM IN THE 
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT 
 
 
The previous chapter examined the formation and eventual triumph of Muslim 
nationalism in the late Ottoman period and demonstrated how Muslim nationalism 
shaped the formation of the new Turkish Republic. More specifically, it aimed to 
contextualize the emergence of nationalisms in the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman 
Empire through the process of modern state formation and the modern state’s increased 
need for legitimacy and mobilization. It also sought to reveal the relation between the 
modern state’s difficulty in maintaining plurality along with the eventual hegemony of a 
religiously-based official nationalism. In effect, the previous chapter showed how 
religious exclusion was the most crucial part of national homogenization. This chapter 
similarly attempts to locate the relation between the founding of Pakistan and the 
evolution of Muslim nationalism in the context of modern state formation in the Indian 
subcontinent. The aim, then, is to contextualize the emergence of religiously-based 
nationalism through the specific conditions of the emergence of the modern state in the 
subcontinent, the colonial nature of the modern state, and its system of alliance. At the 
outset, the idea that a particular ideology of Islam created Pakistan appears obvious. 
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However, it is precisely because of this that we need to examine the phenomenon in 
more detail. The vital role of Muslim nationalism is far from straightforward, and 
Pakistan does not represent the final iteration of the centuries-long development of 
Muslim identity in the Subcontinent. 
In fact, a historical analysis would reveal that the eventual victory of Muslim 
nationalism in India is even more surprising than in the Ottoman Empire. As discussed 
in the third chapter, the Mughal Empire, unlike the Ottoman, never institutionalized a 
millet-like system to classify communal bodies. As such, there were no millets that 
could form the basis of future religious nationalisms. In contrast, the dominant form of 
religious life in the subcontinent was its syncretism. 
Thus, when Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy of India (1884-1888), described the 
Muslims of India in 1888 as “a nation of 50 million, with their monotheism, their 
iconoclastic fanaticism, their animal sacrifices, their social equality and their 
remembrance of the days when, enthroned at Delhi, they reigned supreme from the 
Himalayas to Cape Cormorin” (quoted in Hardy, 1972: 1,) he was certainly mistaken 
and projecting his own vision onto realities on the ground. However, as Peter Hardy 
pointed out, Dufferin’s vision was shared by the majority of the Muslims in 1947. The 
story of this transition is the subject of this chapter. 
Moreover the Muslims of the subcontinent showed remarkable variations in 
terms of their geographic, occupational, linguistic and cultural features. Muslims, 
constituting almost a quarter of the Indian population, were scattered unevenly 
throughout the subcontinent. The majority of the Muslims were concentrated in the 
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North West and the North East parts of the subcontinent. They were a slight majority in 
the Punjab and Bengal provinces. They were an absolute majority in Sindh and NWFP 
(North West Frontier Province). The remaining Muslim population was scattered around 
the entire subcontinent; having a more substantive population in UP and Bombay, while 
having few in the Deccan. Moreover, the Muslims were also divided occupationally as 
much as spatially. They were peasants and landlords in Punjab, while in Bengal they 
were mostly landless farmers. They were much better off in UP while in Sind and 
NWFP, they were such a majority that it is impossible to compare them with others. 
Even more importantly, the interests of Muslims in Muslim majority provinces and the 
ones in Muslim minority provinces were contradictory in issues relating to community 
representation, federation, centralization, autonomy and separate electorates. Thus the 
Muslim positions with regard to the politics of nation formation were polar opposite in 
the Muslim majority and minority provinces. In overall, the Muslims of India did not 
represent a unified and solid community of interest to justify their compartmentalization 
into a separate all-India communal category for purposes of political representation 
(Jalal, 1995: 13). 
Of course it is possible to argue that the eventual creation of Pakistan in the face 
of such oddities is a testimony to the power of religion as a source of national identity 
and political legitimacy. However the later history of Pakistan warns us not to make 
such quick conclusions. As Ayesha Jalal (2000:572) reminds us “the inefficacy of the 
Pakistani state’s Islamic card is a powerful indictment of the argument that the religious 
factor in ‘Muslim consciousness’ outweighs all other considerations.” Moreover, 
throughout the Islamic history and in the modern history of Indian subcontinent, Islam is 
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used to justify different political programmes and organizations. Thus politicization of 
religious identity and the emergence of Muslim nationalism leading to the creation of 
Pakistan is not a natural and inevitable phenomenon but the result of certain political 
developments. It is these developments that we will analyze in this chapter. This chapter 
is not a historical narrative of political developments until 1947 but an analysis of how 
religion became a homogenizing power through exclusion (of followers of other 
religions) and through its power of uniting (members of the same faith). 
Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, four different explanations had 
been proposed to understand the emergence of Muslim nationalism and the creation of 
Pakistan.128 One explanation is to understand Pakistan as a result of the divide and rule 
policies of British colonialism (see, Chandra, 1984; Sarkar, 1983; Page, 1982). 
According to this narrative, in an attempt to thwart the evolution of Indian nationalism, 
British purposefully emphasized the Muslim identity and supported the Muslim elite as 
a collaborator against Indian nationalism. Moreover, through institutional arrangements 
such as the introduction of separate electorates British maintained that Muslims will 
develop a separate identity different from the composite Indian nationality. This 
narrative is of course the official narrative of Indian nationalism (see Nehru, 1936). 
Second narrative considers Pakistan as a natural and inevitable result of Muslim history 
in the subcontinent. According to this narrative, Muslims had always maintained a 
                                                          
128Despite the vitality of South Asian scholarship and many contributions to the region’s historiography 
both by the indigenous and foreign scholars, these narratives remain by and large unchanged. In a 
significant book on the formation of Pakistan written more than fifty years ago, Khalid B. Sayeed (1963) 
identifies similar narratives and in a more recent article over-viewing the current state of historiography, 
Franscis Robinson (2000a: 211-212) would identify exactly the same narratives as dominant. 
Contemporary scholarship, Robinson argues, did not indeed produce any new explanation, but different 
works supporting one of these four narratives maintain that the origin of Pakistan cannot be easily 
explained through one narrative. The recent scholarship makes us aware of the subtlety of the question 
and ensures that different narratives should be taken into account for different aspects of the phenomenon. 
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separate and distinct identity and therefore it was more than natural that they would 
demand their own political institutions and eventually their own nation-state (see, 
Qureshi, 1969; Aziz, 1967; Robinson, 1974; Shaikh 1986). Taken to the extreme, this is 
the official Pakistani policy that is based on the “two-nation theory.” A third narrative 
understands the formation of Pakistan as a result of Muslim elite politics in India. 
According to this narrative it was not a historically formed Islamicate identity, but the 
instrumental choices of Muslim elites, who are defined by Hamza Alavi as salariat, that 
maintained the formation of Pakistan. Fearing to lose their privileges in a Hindu 
majority India, these professionals maintained that they would be a dominant force with-
in a small but Muslim dominated state (see Brass, 1974; Alavi, 1987). Like the first 
narrative that blamed colonialism, this narrative is also supported by the Indian 
nationalists and the Congress. A fourth narrative puts the blame not on the Muslim 
insistence of separation but on Hindu exclusiveness. According to this narrative Hindu 
leaders of the Congress were either unwilling or unable to accommodate the religious 
diversity of Indian society and Muslim demands that came as a result of this diversity. 
This is the narrative mostly used by the Muslims with in Congress like Azad and later 
Muslim academics of India such as Mushir-ul Hasan (see Azad, 1959; Hasan, 1979). 
All these narratives partly capture the reality and it is not easy to rule out any one 
of them. However, it should be clear that I am not proposing an approach that would 
combine these four meta-narratives, particularly because they are clearly incompatible 
and were developed against each other.129 Yet the real reason behind the abundance of 
                                                          
129The perennialist view that understands Pakistan as the culmination of the evolution of Muslim 
consciousness in India is in a clear collision with the instrumentalist view that puts emphasis on the 
strategy and material gains of Muslim elite, and particularly those of the UP. These counter explanations 
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narratives is the fact that they are looking at different aspects of nation-formation. In the 
case of the formation of Pakistan we are faced with at least two entirely separate 
phenomenon; 1) the formation of Muslim as a social and political category, and thus as a 
“community” 2) the transformation of this “community” into a nation with its own state. 
The second phase does not naturally follow the first and a political process, that needs to 
be analyzed, links these two separate historical phenomena. 
Neither of these phases took place in a vacuum and they need to be 
contextualized in the political processes of the emergence of Raj as a modern state, the 
formation of anti-colonial nationalism and religious conflict in the subcontinent. Just as 
the emergence of Ottoman Muslim nationalism can be understood in the context of 
triangular relationships between secular Ottomanism and Christian separatism, the 
emergence of Muslim nationalism in India can also be understood in its triadic 
relationship with secular Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism. 
However, there is a fundamental difference between the Muslim nationalism that 
emerged in the Ottoman Empire and India. While the Muslim nationalism of Ottomans 
was a “state centered nationalism,” the Muslim nationalism in India which resulted in 
the formation of Pakistan was a “state seeking nationalism” (Tilly, 1994: 133).130 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
were also known as the Robinson-Brass debate, but later exchanges between these two scholars made it 
clear that neither of them insists on a perennial or instrumentalist position and in the final analysis their 
difference is a matter of degree rather than being complete opposites. Robinson (2000: 13) argues that his 
position “was only to indicate that politicians were more constrained by personal histories and cultural 
forces than Brass would have one believe.” 
130“What was state-led nationalism? Rulers who spoke in a nation's name successfully demanded that 
citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state. What of 
state-seeking nationalism? Representatives of some population that currently did not have collective 
control of a state claimed an autonomous political status, or even a separate state, on the ground that the 
population had a distinct, coherent cultural identity” (Tilly 1994: 133). 
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while it was the state in the Ottoman case that carried the process of nation-building and 
homogenization, in the Pakistani case, it was a social group who claimed to be the 
leader/speaker of a community that led the initiative of nation-building and the 
formation of a state based on religiously homogenous notion of a Muslim nation. 
The Muslim nationalism in India emerged as a counter nationalism to the 
Congress nationalism which itself emerged as an attempt of power sharing and 
eventually capturing the colonial state. Thus, in order to understand the emergence and 
success of the Muslim nationalism in India, we also have to look at the emergence and 
organization of the modern state in India and the emergence and organization of the 
Congress movement as well. However, our main focus is on the Muslim nationalism, 
thus we will look at the Congress movement for its relevant aspects to the emergence of 
Muslim nationalism. 
Moreover, the three alternative forms of nationalisms; the Hindu Nationalism, 
the Muslim nationalism and the secular Indian nationalism are all related with the 
formation of modern colonial state. It is not that the colonial state created these 
divisions. India was always a multi-religious society with sporadic communal tensions, 
yet the politicization of this religious plurality and the emergence of religious 
nationalism was a modern phenomenon that took shape under the political framework of 
the colonial state. The Muslim nationalism also emerged in this colonial context as anti-
colonial sub nationalism. Anti-colonial nationalism that started to emerge towards the 
end of nineteenth century and represented by the Congress movement succeeded in 
terminating the British rule in India, yet it failed to prevent the evolution of an anti-
Congress Muslim nationalism represented by the Muslim League (Muslim separatism). 
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Thus the eventual success of the Pakistani movement means two interconnected 
phenomena; the failure of Congress nationalism to keep the Muslims in, and the success 
of the Muslim League to keep Muslims out. 
The aim of this chapter is not to provide a political history of the Pakistani 
movement per se, but to understand the processes and the reasons behind the emergence 
of a religiously homogenous state from an extremely diverse sub-continent. 
Homogenization is related with the emergence of nationalism which itself is related with 
the emergence of modern state and colonialism. Thus, in a chronological order we will 
first look at the emergence of the modern state and how the colonial nature of this state 
effected the formation of modern state and its relation with the society. Then we will 
look at the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism within this context of modern 
colonial state formation. Since anti-colonial nationalism basically aims to capture the 
colonial state, these three phenomenon, modern state formation, colonialism and the 
emergence of anti-colonial nationalism are related with each other. Then we will try to 
see how this anti-colonial nationalism was unable to keep the sub-continent united. This 
necessitates an analysis of the relations between the Congress Movement and the 
Aligarh Movement and their relations with the Raj. That takes us back to our starting 
point; the emergence of the modern state and its colonial nature. 
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5.1 Emergence of the Modern State 
Just like the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire also went through a steady process of 
decentralization throughout the eighteenth century.131 Nevertheless “in contrast to the 
Ottoman empire the decline of central power in India was not replaced by a stable 
decentralism” (Hodgson, 1974: 146).  The decline of the Mughal power in the center 
vis-a-vis the peripheral power was both much quicker and also more definite. The 
Mughal center never recovered from its decline and never managed to reassert its 
authority in the periphery. While the Ottoman Empire went through a continuous 
process of centralization and modern state formation starting from the turn of nineteenth 
century, roughly in the same time it was the British who started to establish a centralized 
modern state in the subcontinent. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that formation of modern state is related 
with nationalism on two separate grounds; nationalism in the context of modernization 
becomes a double edged sword-tool. As a modern political ideology it is used both by 
the centralizing state administration (official nationalism) and by the peripheral 
opposition (separatist nationalism) towards this modernizing state. 
                                                          
131Dominant narrative on eighteenth century is to depict it as a dark century of decline.  Although the 
century reflected a decline in terms of the political power of the Mughal dynasty it is not clear if the 
overall social and economic life experienced such a decline. Chris Bayly’s (1988) detailed study of 
eighteenth century India reflects a much more complicated and uneven picture. There were economic 
decline and anarchy in certain parts of the subcontinent but there were also instances of economic 
development and growth of intra-subcontinent trade. Bayly argues that the real problem was that there 
was no political structure that would correspond to this economic development and sub continental trade 
and this political framework was later maintained by the British rule. Thus the real story of the eighteenth 
century, according to Bose and Jalal is decentralization rather than decline (2004: 38-41). 
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Unlike the official nationalism which aims to strengthen the modern state by 
mobilizing subjects in favor of the state, or separatist nationalism which aims to build its 
own modern state, anti-colonial nationalism aims to capture the modern state. Thus, 
anticolonial nationalism is inevitably shaped and limited by the modern state that it aims 
to capture.132 The political organization and framework of this modern state has 
inevitable effects on the nature of the anti-colonial nationalism. These all hold true in the 
Indian case as well. Since the story of anti-colonial Indian nationalism is the story of 
Congress becoming Raj, the evolution formation and organization of the Raj has 
decisive influences in the nationalism of Congress. Roots of the successes and failures 
of the nationalist movement and its trajectory are all shaped by the nature of the colonial 
state. This is not to deny Indian agency but to point out the structure they operate in. 
Thus we need a brief overview of the formation and development of Raj.  
 
5.1.1 British in the Subcontinent- Company Raj133 
The British originally followed the Portuguese in their quest to benefit from trade with 
India. The English East India Company was formed initially at Bengal in 1610 and 
                                                          
132In most cases post-colonial state formed by the anti-colonial nationalism also sticks to the territorial 
arrangements of the colonial state and appropriates colonial boundaries as the boundary of the nation. For 
instance, when the Chinese authorities told the Indian government in 1959 that the two countries should 
have no difficulty in negotiating a boundary settlement, since the existing boundaries were the product of 
an imperialist power, India made it clear that the boundaries were integral to her conception of 
nationhood, and the people enclosed by it had always regarded themselves as Indians. Similarly Pakistan 
also appropriated the Durand Line drawn by the colonial state as definitive of the Pakistani territory 
(Embree, 1989: 67). 
133The historical narrative in this section relies on Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006; Bose and Jalal, 2004 and 
Brown, 1984. 
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remained as a trade organization until the mid-eighteenth century. As the Mughal 
imperial power was declining through this century, the European companies and various 
regional powers were getting powerful in the subcontinent. The British had to contest 
more with other European powers and the emerging regional powers than with the 
Mughals in order to gain control of the subcontinent. Initially confining their control to 
the strategically important seaports of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, the Company rule 
started to extend its control throughout the eighteenth century. The first British land 
conquest started in the resource rich province of Bengal following the Company victory 
at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. As a result of its conquests in the second half of the 
century, the company started to transform itself into a state organization and its nature 
had changed from “an organization originally created to accumulate profits from oceanic 
trade (to a state) now drew its basic sustenance from land revenues.” (Bose and Jalal, 
2004: 53).  As a result of Company’s increasing dominance of the subcontinent, the 
British government brought the Company under its direct control and through Lord 
North’s Regulating Act of 1773 and Pitt’s India Act of 1784 brought the Company under 
the parliamentary supervision. As a result of this state formation and supervision from 
London, the position of governor-general was created as the sole responsible head of the 
Company’s state and Warren Hastings was appointed as the first governor-general. 
Although the company started to take direct responsibility of the lands that it 
controlled and started to transform itself to a regional state within India in 1757, it was 
during the governor-generalship of Wellesley (1798-1805) that they consciously started 
to build an empire in India. C. A. Bayly (1988: 5) points to the influence of the 
Napoleonic Wars and the rise of imperial nationalism at home as the main driving force 
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behind this empire-building process. Lord Valentine’s defense of Wellesley is quite 
instructive to reflect the mood at home: “In short, I wish India to be ruled from a palace, 
not from a counting-house; with the ideas of a Prince, not with those of a retail-dealer in 
muslins and indigo” (quoted in Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 68).  Not denying the 
importance of the nationalist fervor in England, Bose and Jalal (2004: 48-49) also point 
to the political economy of the empire building. Under the pressure of British merchants 
the British government gradually abolished the Asian trade monopoly of the East India 
Company. Then it was the land revenues that made the Company compensate for its loss 
of trade monopoly.134 After twenty years of aggressive war campaign, by 1818 British 
transformed themselves from being a regional power to being the imperial master in 
India. Thus at a time when the Ottomans were going through an intensive transformation 
of their political and social system, the British rule was transforming from a colonial 
merchant type towards a land based empire. In order to extract the maximum level of 
agricultural revenue and land taxes, this land based empire needed, like the Ottomans 
did at the same time, an extensive level of centralization which resulted in the creation 
of a modern bureaucracy, an educational reform necessary to staff this newly emerging 
bureaucracy, an increase in the means of transportation and communication which 
resulted in the construction of modern railways but also introduction of telegraph, and as 
a combined result of educational and communicational developments the emergence of 
a new public sphere of journals, gazettes and a subsequent intelligentsia who introduced 
a whole set of ideas and debates through these newly emerging media. 
                                                          
134The ruler of provinces in the British system was called “collector” signifying the centrality of land 
revenues to the British rule (Brown, 1984:53). 
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5.1.2 Centralization/Modern State Formation 
The extent of the rupture that came with the British rule is still a topic of academic 
controversy (see Hesteerman, 1985; Robb, 2002: 148-153). Scholars often debate on the 
elements of continuity and change that the British rule brought, particularly in the initial 
phases of the Company rule. In fact, like all empire formations, the building of a British 
Empire in South Asia “has been a gradual process, embodying a complex interplay of 
forces of change and continuity, and of modernity and tradition” (Malik, 2008: 89). 
Even the state itself does not completely represent a break off from the past as the 
British, like their predecessors, built their empires through forming local allies and the 
alliance network of the British Empire is pretty much a continuation of the alliance 
system of the Mughals. However, by the middle of the nineteenth century this regime 
and its influence may be described as ‘modern’. The most familiar answer, downplaying 
any continuities, is a narrative of evolving state capabilities (Robb, 2002: 149). 
Thus the British Empire that was formed in the two decades between 1798 and 
1818 was qualitatively different from the Mughal Empire whose juridical authority 
under they remained until 1857. In fact the Mughal Empire was not a state in the 
modern sense of the word and did not possess “boundaries” but instead had varying 
amounts of authority with its “inner frontiers” (Breuilly, 1994: 219). The Mughal 
Empire ruled through a series of intermediary power holders. It was this layered nature 
of sovereignty that enabled them to keep de jure authority until 1857 despite the fact that 
their de facto power was limited to the Red Fort in Delhi. Thus particularly during the 
nineteenth century the Mughal Emperors were also named as shah-en-shah pointing to 
the layered nature of sovereignty. The regional kingdoms and power holders like the 
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Marathas, the Nizam of Hyderabad or the Nawab of Awadh (Oudh) all had de facto 
authority in their respective realms though they remained under de jure rule of the 
Emperor. These regional power holders themselves also ruled thorough intermediaries 
called zamindars. 
In contrast to the loosely woven web of suzerainty claimed by pre-colonial 
empires, the British established an essentially unitary state structure in India (Jalal, 
1995: 12).135 This is the first introduction of the modern state and its power in the sub-
continental history. The development of the modern state meant tighter control of the 
society by the state. This modern administration was three layered. At the top was a 
central government appointed by the crown. Below this central government were 
provincial governments which were in turn divided into districts. At each level there was 
a governor with an executive and legislative council. There were few slots for the 
representatives of the Indian society in these councils and the formation of these 
councils and the number of Indians to be included was a matter of bargain between the 
colonial administration and the various indigenous power brokers including the 
nationalist movements. 
                                                          
135The princely states constitute an exception to this administrative centralization and unitary state 
structure. These states remained under the nominal administration of their hereditary princes and had 
certain autonomy and flexibility in the administration of their internal affairs. These states were those 
British preferred not to annex mostly for economic reasons. Constituting one third of the entire Indian 
territory, the princely states only possessed one fifth of the population and were not economically or 
strategically crucial to the British dominance. Thus indirect rule co-existed with the establishment of 
direct rule of British colonial state. The princely states however, never played a significant political role 
and always remained loyal to the colonial state. At certain times, particularly in 1932, the British tried to 
play the princely card in order to thwart the development and success of the Congress movement. For the 
purposes of our discussion, we need not to pay attention to the princely states, as nationalist movement 
was always very weak there and even that was mostly imported from the regions under the direct rule of 
British Raj. 
 205 
 
Through various administrative re-organizations British did not only ensure the 
complete control of London over India, but the administration in India also became 
strictly centralized. “The Charter Act of I833, which brought the Supreme Government 
in to being, had also granted the Governor-General in Council control over the entire 
revenues of all the territories in British India.” (Seal, 1973: 331) The fiscal control over 
the provinces was later supplanted by the complete military control as the Bombay and 
Madras military commands were abolished in 1893. The central command in Calcutta 
also extended its influence in the conduct of the relations between provinces and the 
princely states. Thus for the first time in the history of subcontinent, the army was 
unified under direct and immediate control of the central authority. Lack of such control 
previously allowed the emergence of local power centers that could be used against the 
central authority (Embree, 1972: 9). As a result of these fiscal, political, diplomatic and 
military centralizations, Anil Seal (1973: 331) concludes that “during the nineteenth 
century the provinces had been degraded into mere agents of the centre.” 
The assertion of central authority on the vast subcontinent was of course helped 
by the developments in the transportation and communication technology. Throughout 
the nineteenth century the Raj made enormous investments for the spread of railways, 
telegraph lines and postal services. This horizontal pattern of the extension of central 
authority and vertical deepening of its control over the society was indeed a common 
phenomenon of all modernizing states of the nineteenth century. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, this pattern of modern state formation was also evident in the Ottoman 
Empire as well as in all other universal empires. Moreover, we have seen that such unity 
is essential for the emergence of nationalism in these modernizing states; either through 
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the form of official nationalism that comes from the modernizing state or through the 
form of separatist nationalism that develops as a reaction to the modernizing state. In 
India, the Raj was certainly a unifier and its unifying impulse was not limited to its 
being the “common enemy.” English educated elite who were the forbearers of Indian 
nationalism was the first all-Indian group and this was a product of British rule and 
political control at the all-India level, something never existed as consistently and 
strongly before. At this stage in order to understand the relation between the modern 
state and the emergence of nationalism in the Indian case, it might be appropriate to ask 
whether the Raj was a prototypical modernizing empire of nineteenth century or not. 
How does the colonial nature of the modern state relate to the formation of 
nationalism(s) in the subcontinent? Partha Chatterjee, a leading scholar of anti-colonial 
nationalism, starts his analysis of colonial state by asking a critical question on the 
relation of modernity and colonial; 
Does it serve any useful analytical purpose to make a distinction between 
the colonial state and the forms of the modern state? Or should we regard 
the colonial state as simply another specific form in which the modern 
state has generalized itself across the globe? If the latter is the case, then 
of course the specifically colonial form of the emergence of the 
institutions of the modern state would be of only incidental, or at best 
episodic, interest; it would not be a necessary part of the larger, and more 
important, historical narrative of modernity. (1993:14) 
The question is rhetorical and is intended to draw attention to the distinctive aspects of 
the colonial state. The colonial nature of the modern state formation has shaped the 
political process on two grounds that had distinctive effects on the formation of 
nationalisms in the subcontinent. One feature of the colonial regime, as pointed by 
Chatterjee himself and many others is its racist character. A second and equally 
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important one is the relation of the colonial state with political unity. As we have seen 
above, Raj as a modern state created an unprecedented degree of administrative unity 
through the subcontinent; something inconceivable before the advent of modernity and 
its technological tools. However, the relation between administrative unity and political 
unity works in opposite direction among modernizing universal empires and colonial 
empires. While the Ottomans and other modernizing empires of the nineteenth century 
would try to create a political unity where it did not exist, the colonial state would 
consider political unity anathema to itself. Political unity is the first stage of nation-
building and all empires who espoused to promote official nationalism would put a keen 
emphasis on the promotion of unity. However, colonial states can not pursue official 
nationalism. Thus they have to follow traditional imperial policies of alliance building, 
collaboration and divide and rule tactics. For this they have to insist on the 
heterogeneous and divided character of the society. Therefore it is not surprising that all 
the British officers insisted that there is no such thing as “Indian” and promoted a vision 
of India as a conglomeration of diverse peoples, religions, caste groups etc. Moreover 
the underlying logic of this vision was the assumption that interests of these diverse 
groups were irreconcilable, making a neutral outsider, i.e British, to remain as the arbiter 
among these irreconcilable interests. The logical conclusion would of course be the 
inability of the indigenous to rule themselves and the necessity of the British rule for the 
self-development and justice in the subcontinent.  As we will see below both of these 
aspects of the colonial state had decisive effects on the fate of nationalisms in the 
subcontinent. The British legacy on the emergence and development of nationalisms in 
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the subcontinent would be shaped through the contradictory features of unifying impulse 
of the modern state and divisive impulse of the colonial state. 
As in all modernizing states bureaucracy played a central role in this affair of 
centralization and maintaining administrative unity. “The actual work of administration, 
whether at the central, provincial or district level, was in the hands of Indian civil 
service (ICS)” (Embree, 1972: 10). In fact, from its beginning to the end the British Raj 
was a bureaucratic empire. In the initial phase of British control in the subcontinent, the 
ICS emerged as a lucrative career path as many of its members returned home with 
fortunes. The level of corruption and surreptitious wealth the members of ICS gained 
was one of the major reasons of arguments on “drain of wealth”136 and eventually 
became a scandal at home (Dirks, 2009). In an attempt to prevent corruption and to 
protect the efficiency of bureaucracy, by 1853, the entry to the ICS was done through 
competitive examinations rather than patronage. However “through the latter part of the 
century the ICS was increasingly unpopular as a profession, partly because of the 
widening opportunities at home, professional grievances in India, and the health 
                                                          
136Aside from the huge prestige it brought to British Empire, India’s vast resources contributed to the 
farewell of British Empire in two crucial realms; economy and military. In terms of economics India was 
perfectly fitting the example of a colony which would provide cheap raw material and a market for the 
end products of the metropole industry. As a market India was indeed huge which accounted for almost 
half of British exports. This pattern of trade between Britain and India also maintained that in terms of 
balance of payment India owed a huge deficit to Britain. This British surplus was used to finance the 
British trade deficit vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Indian military was equally important for the Britain’s 
leading role in global politics. The Indian army did not only guarantee British control of India but used for 
various excursions into the north (towards Afghanistan), to the East (in order to increase British influence 
at South East Asia) and to the West (to maintain British colonization of East Africa and later Middle 
East). Needless to say that all these huge military operations conducted for the favor of British Empire 
was financed through Indian revenues. Thus Anil Seal argues that (1973: 329) “about a third of the total 
expenditure of the Indian government in the four decades before World War I was on its army.” One can 
easily predict that these rates would skyrocket during the two World Wars in which the Indian 
contribution was crucial for the eventual British victory. 
 209 
 
hazards, uprooting, and family disruption which an Indian career demanded” leading to 
increased concerns that the number and quality of the recruits were declining (Brown, 
1984: 92). On the other hand, “in recognition of ICS’s position in the power structure, 
that the early nationalist leaders made admittance of Indians to the civil service as a 
central part of their demands” (Embree, 1972: 10). It is this conjunction that paved the 
ways of the collaboration between the Raj and Indian elites. Since raison d’etre of the 
Raj was a British state enterprise which used Indian resources to serve British economic 
and political interests (Stern, 1993: 134), the extension of state apparatus and its control 
over the society made Indian collaboration a necessity for two reasons; first, as the 
state’s grasp and control over the society deepened, in the lower echelons of the 
administration the British needed the local knowledge of the indigenous. Secondly, to 
staff the ever expending administration by the British was over expensive. Thus, the 
British were willing to let Indian elements to take their part in the administration. The 
point is important as it reflects an element of imperialism that is often overlooked by the 
nationalist historiography. The interaction between the colonial powers and the 
indigenous society can also be seen in terms of collaboration and westernization as 
much as it is of domination and resistance (Breuilly, 1994: 218).137 However, 
collaboration had its limits and at a certain stage had the risk of putting the previous 
collaborators in collusion with the Raj. We will later turn on the importance of 
collaboration between the Indians and the British for the development of both the 
Congress movement and the Muslim League. However, before explaining the 
indigenous reaction to the colonial state and the emergence of nationalism in the 
                                                          
137The issue of collaboration is also related with the above discussion on th elements of change and 
continuity, and the role of indigenous society on the making of history. 
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subcontinent, we need to pay attention to a significant event that not only shook the 
foundation of the colonial state but also shaped the British vision of India and shaped 
their relation with the indigenous society; the 1857 Revolt. The paradoxes of a colonial 
modernization would be best observed in the post 1857 policies and these policies 
would also shape the nature and evolution of nationalisms in India. 
 
5.1.3 The Mutiny and its Afterwards 
Even though modern state formation and centralization in India was the leitmotif of 
nineteenth century politics, this process faced a twist in the middle of century. The 
extension of British control in the subcontinent, both horizontally (territorially) and 
vertically (increasing control over society) was paused in 1857 by a military mutiny 
starting in the regiments of Bengali army which quickly spread to most of north India 
and shook the British sovereignty from its foundations. For a while the revolt was so 
powerful that British were on the edge of losing their entire control in India and the re-
establishment of British dominance was only completed in the spring of 1858. 
It is customary to mark the 1857 events as the breaking point for the 
subcontinent’s history and also a founding moment of the Pakistani movement.138 In fact 
1857 Mutiny does not constitute a fundamental rupture in terms of modern state 
formation in India which was already under way before the Mutiny. The process of 
centralization and extension of state power started earlier and continued throughout the 
                                                          
138Khalid B. Sayeed’s (1968) important study is a good example. The title of his book is Pakistan: The 
Formative Phase 1857-1947. Also works of Sumit Sarkar (1983), K. K. Aziz (1967) among others take 
1857 as the breaking point. 
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century. However, 1857 was particularly important for it made it clear to the British the 
problems that comes with the modern state formation and the lessons they gained from 
revolt shaped their later policies. Therefore we need to pay a particular attention to the 
events, how they developed, but more importantly how they were perceived by the 
British and how this perception shaped the colonial policies and the relationship with the 
society and the colonial administration. 
There is even disagreement over naming the event. The British state defined the 
events as The Mutiny. Those who focused on the "mutiny" theme projected it as the 
work of a set of discontented sipahis who were offended with the introduction, in 1857, 
of the new Enfield rifle. Use of these rifles required the bullet to be bitten before loading 
and rumours that the grease used on the bullets was either from the fat of cattle or pigs 
created strong animosities and was perceived as an attack on Hindu and Muslim 
religious beliefs (Pati, 2007: 1686). 
In its beginning 1857 was a military mutiny. If the immediate cause of mutiny 
were religious sensitivities, the underlying cause was the deteriorating conditions of the 
military class. As the British control expanded, the Bengali sepoys were sent to military 
campaigns far away from their hometowns, often including overseas campaigns. 
Moreover their economic conditions were deteriorating and their future prospects were 
getting increasingly low, as the style of successful career changed from one in the 
military to commerce under the Company Raj (Hardy, 1972: 31). 
In contrast to the British, the later Indian nationalists would define the rebellion 
as the “First War of Indian Independence.” V.D. Savarkar’s 1909 book with the same 
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title was the first work written on the events of 1857-58 by an Indian, and continues to 
inform the Indian nationalist historiography. The latter also underlined a factor of unity 
that cut across religious boundaries. Much before Savarkar and other Indian nationalists, 
Marx and Engels also defined the events of 1857 as “War of Independence” and hailed 
the unity displayed by the Hindus and Muslims who opposed British colonialism during 
the rebellion (Pati, 2007: 1686-1687). 
While labeling the Revolt as a mutiny is clearly a British centric reading, to 
define it as a nationalist war or rebellion is equally anachronistic and misleading. It is 
true that “factors of racial subjugation and common misery created a sense of oneness 
that was, however, untainted by ideas of national sovereignty” (Pati, 2010: 10). As Tara 
Chand (1972: 42), a well-known nationalist historian and statesman of India, has 
admitted “the war against the British was not inspired by any sentiment of nationalism, 
for in 1857 India was not yet politically a nation… (Insurgents) were moved by personal 
loyalties rather than loyalty to a common motherland.” “The fact of a common enemy 
did not paper over the cracks in Indian society” (Jalal, 2000: 35). 
In fact, as Chris Bayly (1988: 169-171) points out, the Revolt was not a “solitary 
unheralded thing, but only the climax of many decades of sporadic revolts, urban as well 
as rural.” These revolts were mostly due to economic hardships and mal-administration 
and over taxation. In that regard they resemble the Serbian and Greek Revolts the 
Ottomans faced in early nineteenth century. Just as Serbian and Greek Revolts were not 
nationalist uprisings (see Anscombe, 2014), so was not the 1857 Revolt.139 These 
                                                          
139Moreover, unlike the Greek and Serbian Revolts, in the 1857 Revolt there was not even a nationalist 
intelligentsia. Thus even if one accepts Hroch’s (2000) seminal contribution that nationalism develops 
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sporadic revolts “were too heterogeneous to coalesce, and even the Mutiny when it 
came, remained fragmented and uncoordinated: in every district the government could 
find supporters and as well as enemies” (Bayly, 1988: 178-188). 
The fragmented and heterogeneous nature of 1857 was deeply linked to the 
nature of British control in the subcontinent. As the British control was not uniform and 
British policies differed significantly from place to place, so were the Indian reactions to 
the revolt. There was as much collaboration as resistance. In the end the British would 
never be able to suppress the Revolt without significant support from the indigenous 
society. The Punjab remained loyal and provided large regiments of military power. This 
would later shape the nature of Indian army and the entire Indian army will be made of 
Punjabis.140 In general it is possible to claim that those who benefited from the British 
rule did not only remain passive but actively collaborated with the British while those 
that suffered most were the leaders of the Revolt (Brown, 1984: 85-89). 
The Revolt is an important turning point of the subcontinental history, since it 
created significant changes in the perceptions of the British. The immediate effect of the 
Revolt showed itself on the legal aspect of British sovereignty. The initial result of the 
Revolt was the abolishment of both the Mughal crown and the Company rule. The 
Company was ruling under the facade of a Mughal Empire, while being under the 
supervision of British parliament. With the suppression of the Revolt, these anomalies 
ended. Members of the Mughal dynasty, which was nothing more than a name, were 
                                                                                                                                                                          
through distinguishable phases from cultural awakening to the formation of nationalist intelligentsias and 
then to the mass mobilization, 1857 Revolt wouldn’t qualify as a nationalist uprising. 
140This was also the roots of the famous “Martial Races” theory. 
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either executed or exiled while the Company was transferred to the Crown and India 
nominally became the territory of the British Crown and direct governmental control 
was established. It became evident that India was too precious and too difficult for the 
Company to rule. “With the direct assumption of authority by the British crown in 1858, 
the British became, in a sense, “insiders” in India for the first time (Gilmartin, 1988: 
12). Hereafter the supreme executer of India, governor general, was also called Viceroy, 
pointing that he is now the representative of the crown as well as the parliament. In 
terms of the state organization and even of the personalities, little has changed. However 
the relation of this state with the indigenous society has radically transformed. This 
change will also give us a better apprehension of the difference between a modernizing 
universal empire and a colonial empire and how this difference influenced the 
nationalisms in the subcontinent. 
In certain ways British response to 1857 was in line with the policies of other 
modernizing empires. In the previous chapter we have seen that limited representation, 
education and creating a sense of loyalty towards the dynasty were the main policies of 
modernizing empires in order to appease the discontent in their society. Establishment of 
Crown rule should be considered as a first step of promoting loyalty around the persona 
of the sovereign. Inclusion of India to the British crown was later completed with the 
declaration of Queen Victoria as the Empress of India; Kaiser-i Hind in 1876. At a time 
when Abdülhamid II and other monarchs were relying on “invented traditions” in order 
to sacralize the dynasty, Victoria tried to do the same in India. As Bernard Cohn’s (1983) 
seminal study demonstrates, her coronation was full of symbols that were supposed to 
be belonging to the Mughal tradition. In reality they were all recently invented. 
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However, such glamorous coronations were later followed by the Viceroys as a way of 
spreading personal loyalty to the crown and its representatives in India. 
Aside from the creation of personal loyalty, limited representation and education 
were the main mechanisms all modernizing empires of the nineteenth century applied in 
order to overcome the legitimacy problems created by the formation of 
modern/interventionist state and British were already employing them before the Mutiny 
and continued to do so with increasing fervor. The British Raj, like all other 
contemporary empires, pursued a rigorous policy in spreading education. It was also one 
of the lessons of the Mutiny that the more educated classes remained more loyal. 
However, even education in the colonial context has its own contradictions as the 
western educated would later assume the leadership of the nationalist movement. 
However, the role of westernized elites and their ideological formations should not be 
overestimated in the development of anti-colonial nationalism.141 What mattered more 
was the problem of representation. 
Limited representation of local voices had already started in 1830’s when 
indigenous people were included in local bodies. Even though they had no executive 
power they were serving as consultative bodies. The locals in these bodies were 
nominated rather than elected. Throughout the century the level of Indian participation 
has extended beyond local bodies to more country wide bodies and also from 
consultative bodies to the legislative and executive councils. Soon after the Revolt, in 
                                                          
141Anil Seal whose 1968 book on the emergence of Indian nationalism was responsible for the orthodoxy 
of understanding Indian nationalism through the development of an English educated elite and their 
assimilation to the European notions of freedom and nationalism, would soon (1973) admit that he grossly 
exaggerated the role of western education in the emergence of Indian nationalism. 
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1861 the Indian Councils Act enabled the nomination of Indians to the highest council; 
the Viceroy’s Legislative Council. The process also took an important turn with the 
introduction of local elections in 1880s. Thus for the first time members of local bodies 
were elected rather than nominated. Thus there had been a steady extension of 
representative institutions on three grounds: (i) they spread from local to provincial and 
national bodies, (ii) the nature of these bodies shifted from consultative to legislative 
and executive, and (iii) the membership to these bodies shifted from being through 
nomination towards election. Extension of this election to national bodies and increasing 
Indian representation would later constitute an important subject of nationalist demand 
and a struggle among the Muslims and the Indian National Congress. 
In its moderate phase, the nationalist movement asked for equal opportunities 
and more representation. This was acceptable for the colonial state as well up to a 
certain point. However, as colonial rulers the British could not accept the idea that 
Indian population can rule itself. In order to substantiate this position they developed a 
number of ideological arguments and tried to justify the need for British rule over the 
subcontinent. As we shall see, the main objective of British rule starting from the last 
quarter of the century is to keep the real power at the hands of British, while yielding to 
increased demands for more Indian representation and participation. The administrative 
adjustments the British made to accommodate Indian representation without losing 
actual control had not only shaped the fate and development of anti-colonial nationalism 
but also remained an ongoing legacy for the post-colonial states. 
Under the direct control of British government the extension of modern state 
formation and the stricter control of society as its corollary continued after the Revolt. 
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The modern government continued to penetrate deeper into the society through its 
bureaucratic apparatus and used objective legal rules and institutions, and penetrated 
more directly through society with its taxes, records and information, and its larger 
agenda of interference and control (Cohn, 1996). However, despite the inevitable 
tendency of the modern state to intervene deeper, one of the main lessons British learned 
from the Mutiny was the danger of intervening in the social, cultural and religious 
realm. Thus refraining from social reform was one of the legacies of the Revolt. In 
general it is possible to say that a conservative attitude shaped the British policies in the 
post 1857 period.  
The conservatism of the British policies was also in line with the ideological 
changes at the metropole. As Thomas Metcalf points out the British liberalism was also 
going through a change and the British liberalism of 1860s was fundamentally different 
and certainly much more conservative than the liberalism of 30s “when a group of 
earnest young men, brash, self-confident, and aggressive, had set out to remodel 
England according to the principles of Ricardo and Bentham” (Metcalf, 1964: ix). The 
prosperous and complacent country lost most of its vigor for a reform and when 
combined with the lessons of Mutiny in India, conservatism became the hall-mark of 
post-mutiny British policies in India. 
This conservatism also shaped the alliance preferences of the Raj and thus had 
decisive effects on the political history of the subcontinent. Rulers of the Raj prior to 
1857 often considered themselves as agents of the interests of the middle and lower 
classes; while creating an alliance between the British and the traditional Indian gentry 
became the cornerstone of British policy in post-1857 period (Fontera, 1965: 714). This 
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was partly based of a very conservative vision of India which was considered to have 
“an unchanging social order comprised of a mosaic of separate communities, whose 
‘natural leaders’ spoke for them” (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 133). It was also based on 
a more pragmatic observation that those who have something to lose did not join the 
Revolt. Thus, the British concluded, the government should create vested interests as a 
safeguard against potential disruptions. What the British defined as the “natural leaders” 
of the society were those among something to lose and their alliance was an important 
aspect of the British control of the society. The natural leaders usually included the 
traditional gentry, urban magnates and the religious leaders. In general this was in line 
with the Orientalist depiction of India as hierarchical, authoritarian, divided and 
religious.  India was defined as a conglomeration of peoples with an inner hierarchy. 
Those at the top of the hierarchy were the ones the British should incorporate. 
Indeed, the landed gentry and the princes proved their importance and power 
throughout the Revolt either as allies or as adversaries.  In the words of a British official, 
princes were the “breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us 
in one great wave” (Metcalf, 1994: 191). Aside from the natural leaders, the British also 
considered the newly emerging western educated elite as another group of allies. The 
importance attached to the western education partly comes from the assumption that “an 
educated Indian was a loyal one”, thus spreading education was also related to the 
British desire of creating vested interests in the Indian society. But more importantly, the 
educated elite also had a distinct function that could not be provided by the “natural 
leaders”. Traditional gentry and religious hierarchy was useful in maintaining order in 
the society however, they were less than useful when it came to providing the necessary 
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skilled man-power British needed for an efficient administration. For a while the British 
tried to incorporate the sons of the ruling elite and the urban magnates to the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Canning College was established in order to produce English 
educated professionals the British needed for efficient administration from the heirs of 
traditional gentry. However, the traditional elite who secured their positions as the 
natural leaders had little incentive in pursuing such a career. Instead it was the middle 
class families who were ready and able to make the needed sacrifice to let their sons 
become English educated professionals. 
There was a mutual dependence. The western educated natives were essential for 
the effective administration, while government auspice was essential for the western 
educated as they lacked the financial comfort of landed gentry (Brown, 1984: 135). In a 
sense both the natural leaders and the English educated were the collaborators of British 
system and had different functions; the prior to maintain peace and order and the latter 
to create efficiency of the bureaucracy. This collaborator system would go into trouble 
when the interests of these two groups collided. Such a collision would often take place 
on the issue of admission to the very limited positions of representation. The British 
almost always favored the natural leaders over the western educated pushing western 
educated to form bodies and to act in coordination in order to protect their rights to 
representation. 
One of the most important conclusions of Metcalf’s seminal work on the post-
Mutiny India is that this alliance preference, which according to Metcalf was an 
inevitable result of the conservative turn in the policies, made the Empire “more stable 
and fragile at the same time.” (1964: viii). The empire became more stable as it 
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managed to incorporate the traditional elite in its collaborative system, however it 
became weaker as the British lost their sympathy to the western educated elite for a 
share of power and thus “were disabled from meeting the nationalist challenge in a 
friendly and responsive manner” (1964: viii). The missing part in Metcalf’s otherwise 
compelling narrative is the colonial nature of the British system. True to the spirit of 
Macaulay Anglicanism, here Metcalf seems to suggest that a possible power sharing 
mechanism could have been established if British remained true to the liberal principles. 
The problem is that these principles were self-destructive for British sovereignty, thus a 
colonial state would inevitably subvert them. 
Another aspect of the conservative shift in the policies of the Raj showed itself in 
the religious realm. As we have mentioned, religious sensibilities were the immediate 
cause of the Revolt. Thus not to interfere in the religious realm was the clearest lesson 
of the Revolt. Direct interference to the religious realm was never a significant aspect of 
the Company Raj. Aside from the governor generalship of William Bentinck (1828-
1835) and his abolition of sati, the British usually refrained from intervention in this 
realm. However, the lesson that hurting religious sensibilities might create a conducive 
environment for the discontented to rise up became a new apprehension. From this point 
on missionary activities received less and less support. Traditional religious orthodoxy, 
as it is understood by the British, were favored over religious reformists such as Ram 
Mohan Roy. However religion continued to be a significant venue of raising discontent 
against the British and in the early stages of nationalist opposition more radical elements 
among the nationalists would often refer to religion in order to mobilize the people. Half 
a century after the Revolt, Tilak would make use of the ‘age of consent’ as an issue to 
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raise anti-British feelings. However, as Breuilly insightfully mentions, even though he 
could cite ancient texts for his arguments, his was a nationalist objection, more 
concerned by the issue of right to self-rule rather than preserving religious orthodoxies 
(1994: 171). Yet the infusion and instrumental application of religion in the nationalist 
discourse was difficult to confine and needed to be delicately balanced in a clearly 
multi-religious society whose basic political principles were clearly segregated on 
religious principles. As the extremists within the Congress under the leadership of Tilak 
tried to provide a Hindu ideological underpinning to Indian nationalism or at least a 
Hindu idiom to its day to day political agitation, this had an adverse effect of feeding 
communalism (Chandra, 1984: 410). In the long run even the rhetoric of Gandhi who 
was clearly opposed to communalism would create unrest among the non-Hindu masses 
as his Indian nation was also a Hindu one. 
This British attitude with regard to religion was also in accord with the 
Orientalist view of India as a land essentially different from the West. India was 
portrayed as the other of West, and while it was assumed that Western societies were 
guided through secularized reason, the Orient was supposedly under the sway of 
religious bigotry. Moreover, India was not only depicted as a religious society but it was 
also defined as a religiously divided country. The unity displayed during the Revolt by 
different religious groups was a surprise to the British and to prevent it happening again 
was a central policy of the British.  In that regard, “the revolt cast a shadow of 
apprehension over succeeding generations of colonial rulers, but did not divert them 
from their course. In terms of religious diversity, belief in the impossibility of common 
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cause between Indians of different religions was shaken by events, but as we will soon 
see, reaffirmed as a mainstay of policy” (Robb, 2002: 147). 
In fact it is possible to conclude that policies of British Raj in post 1857 period 
became increasingly contradictory. These contradictions were not only shaped by the 
desire of modernizing a land based empire but they were exacerbated and appeared to be 
impossible to solve due to the colonial nature of this empire. On the one hand, the 
spread of education and the creation of vested interest were pursued. On the other, a 
heavy conservatism, for which social reform was "no longer compatible with the 
requirements of political security"(Metcalf, 1964: 133), shaped the perception of the 
British policy makers. In such an environment an uneasy combination of the modern 
state formation with increasing penetration of the society and a medieval state system, 
which relied on the support of intermediaries (the natural leaders), shaped the post 1857 
policies of the British Raj. These contradictions certainly shaped and influenced not 
only the colonial state but also the anti-colonial nationalism which targets to take over 
this colonial state. 
 
5.2 National Question in the Context of Colonial State 
John Breuilly (1994: 156-169) identifies four main political approaches142 to the study 
of anti-colonial nationalism. These are domination, westernization, collaboration and 
resistance approaches. The domination and resistance approaches are linked to each 
                                                          
142He also defines economic and culturalist interpretations of anti-colonail nationalism, but these 
interpretations “can do little more than indicate certain limits whithin which nationalism will operates.” 
(Breuilly, 1994: 167) 
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other as they both emphasize the domination of colonial state over the society. The 
colonial state was established through conquest and survived by the exploitation of the 
resources of the colony. The domination approach puts the strength of the imperial 
power to the center of its analysis and understands the success of anti-colonialism 
through the decline of this imperial power, while in an attempt to pinpoint the agency of 
the indigenous society, the resistance approach understands anti-colonialism as the 
resistance of society to the domination by the imperial power. Thus these two 
approaches provide available discourse to the nationalist historiography as well by 
understanding nationalism through the prism of domination and resistance. In our quest 
to understand Indian nationalism we can dismiss both approaches. Not because there 
was not domination, nor resistance to it, however, reducing nationalism to a history of 
resistance to the British rule presumes an Indian national identity that was clearly non-
existent through most of the colonial period. It cannot explain the factional divides with 
in the indigenous society and cannot differentiate nationalism from other sources of 
resistance, particularly the religious identity.143 
Thus even tough domination-resistance was a historical aspect of colonialism; 
we cannot understand anti-colonial nationalism in general and Indian nationalism in 
particular through this approach. For a better grasp of anti-colonial nationalism in 
general and Indian nationalism in particular, Breuilly rightly proposes to link the 
domination to the collaboration and westernization approaches. Westernization approach 
                                                          
143Of course nationalist historiography would insist on an essential and timeless existence of an Indian 
nation (which of course should have included Pakistan and Bangladesh, but doesn’t) and its struggle with 
the British. This narrative would also understand the 1857 Revolt as the First Indian War of Independence, 
which would be, as it is discussed above, anachronistic. 
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understands nationalism primarily as a political ideology and traces the evolution of 
anti-colonial nationalism through the expansion of Western ideas through education 
institutions set up by the colonial state. The collaboration approach focuses on the 
collaboration between the colonizer and the indigenous elites and understands anti-
colonial nationalism through the disruption of the collaborative system.  
 
5.2.1 Collaboration and the Congress  
The British were self-aware of their need for local allies not only in order to maintain 
order but also in order to rule efficiently. British military might was sufficient for rule 
and order but without indigenous collaboration, India was impossible to rule efficiently. 
“We rule India by British bayonets and native tahsildars” was a favorite British epigram 
mostly used after 1857 (Hardy, 1972: 108). In recognition of the need for collaboration, 
in 1858, soon after the establishment of Crown rule Queen Victoria declared that; 
 So far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, (shall) be freely 
and impartially admitted to offices in our services, the duties of which 
they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity duly to 
discharge (Roberts, 1958: 383-84, quoted in Stern, 1993: 140) 
The similarity with the Tanzimat declaration which argued for equality among the 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire is striking. Yet unlike the Ottoman Empire, the British 
did not try to follow up to their promises. Given the colonial nature of the British 
sovereignty in India they could have never followed it. 
Despite the legal changes in the state system, the colonial nature of British rule 
in India remained unchanged. It continued to be a colonial administration informed by 
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racial prejudices. It was governed in the name and for the benefit of the British. It 
continued to invest in the modernization of the administration and state apparatus in 
order to increase efficiency. There was room for indigenous participation to the system, 
yet the “systems of nomination, representation and election were all means of enlisting 
Indians to work for imperial ends” (Seal, 1973: 330). However, as the western educated 
natives demanded more impartial politics and better positions in the government system, 
they started to get into a collision with the Raj administration, since the Raj was and 
remained a discriminatory institution. The underlying ideology of the Raj’s 
discrimination was racism. In the nineteenth century this gave a “scientific” character to 
the discrimination employed by the Raj. The Raj tried to overcome the need for native 
collaboration at high posts through Anglo-Indians. Anglo Indians were the descendants 
of European settlers and they were considered to be a combination of the high qualities 
of European races with the necessary local knowledge. They were the “creoles” of the 
British Empire in India. 
Anderson famously defined the creoles as the pioneers of nationalism in Latin 
America. The discriminated creoles, whose pilgrimage to the capital was blocked, were 
soon to revolt. In India, creoles were the ones who were favored against the western 
educated Indians. Thus they were the allies of colonialism. This time it was the 
westernized educated who had the potential to turn nationalist, as they were 
discriminated against the Anglo Indians. The western educated were forced to stay in the 
subordinate positions as the higher positions were reserved for the Anglo Indians. This 
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discrimination became more visible and evident through the Ilbert Bill144 in 1883. “The 
Ilbert controversy forced the British for the first time to seriously consider how they 
should accommodate the demands of India’s educated for a share of political power” 
(Metcalf, 1994: 222). 
It also forced the English educated elite to consider the need for a better 
organized and concerted action for a share of power. Thus, there is direct link with the 
racism of the regime and the evolution of collaboration towards anti-colonial 
nationalism and it is no coincidence that Indian National Congress was formed in 1885, 
only two years after the infamous Ilbert Bill, as an institution to defend the rights of 
these western educated elite. However, considering that the primary focus of the 
Congress is to organize the newly emerged western educated elite for getting better 
positions in the government administration, we can say that Congress initially was 
another instrument of collaboration between the government and the native population. 
Thus in its early phase the Congress was an institution with a narrow focus. It didn’t 
challenge the Raj but it tried to find a better place for its members in the Raj. As a 
collaborationist institute it had to be a loyal organization and in its first meeting in 1885, 
W.C. Bonnarjee, the president of the meeting had to underline that “there were no more 
thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government than himself 
and his friends” (Zaidi, 1986: 16). Dadabhai Naoroji who presided over the second 
                                                          
144 The Ilbert Bill basically proposed that Europeans and Anglo-Indians could be tried by an Indian judge. 
This proposition was faced with hysteria and a campaign led by the Anglo-Indians asked for its 
annulment. Thus, it was a clear testimony to the prevalence of racism at the time. Government had to 
compromise and accepted that any European on trial will have right to have a jury at least half composed 
of Europeans (Brown, 1984: 130).   
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annual convention of Congress also declared, the organization was not against Raj but 
“another stone in the foundation of stability of that government” (Embree, 1972: 33). 
Naoroji was aware of the mission of the Congress as the representative of the western 
educated but also he was equally aware of the expectations of the government from the 
class of western educated when he frankly declared that “the educated classes have 
become true interpreters and mediators between the masses of our countrymen and our 
rulers” (Zaidi, 1986: 26). 
However, the collaboration between Congress elites and the Raj was not easily 
sustainable. One problem was that as it became more and more difficult to combine 
racism, discrimination and placating the demands of an increasing number of western 
educated elites, the collaboration between the Raj and the western educated represented 
by the Congress started to shake. Another problem was the extent of collaboration. The 
essence of collaboration was to ensure that the real power were to remain in the hands of 
the British.  While there was an ever increasing amount of potential collaborators, 
financial constraints and racial prejudices forced the government to make certain 
adjustments to placate an increasing number of collaborators. The dislocation, and 
discontent, of the First World War also forced the Raj for a reconsideration of the 
fundamental nature and objectives (Metcalf, 1994: 225). 
Following WWI, the British political arrangements in India i.e the 1919 and the 
1935 Constitutional Acts focused mostly on placating increasing demands on power 
sharing/self-government while keeping the real power in the hands of the British. This 
could have been done on two separate grounds. One was a keen attempt to keep politics 
confined to locality and province, while keeping the real executive power at the central 
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level. This was the gist of the 1919 and the 1935 political reforms. These reforms, 
particularly the 1919 reforms made a deep impact on the nature of Congress politics and 
the development of nationalism in India. The 1919 reforms basically did two things; on 
the one hand, it extended the electoral franchise and made the potential collaborators to 
fight for public support in order to benefit from the advantages of a representative 
position in the government administration. Thus the Indian politicians, usually residing 
in the provincial capitals, in post-1919 period had to seek popular support in the 
localities. Through this arrangement local politics was linked with provincial politics, 
meaning that local conflicts, be it religious sectarian or class based is now linked with 
provincial level politics. While indigenous politics was locked in the local-provincial 
level, the real executive power, particularly the power to control fiscal arrangements was 
shifted from province to the center, or in other words, upwards from provincial level to 
the all India (national) level, where they would be securely placed at the hands of 
British.145 Thus, while on the lower end the Indian politician is forced to create ties and 
power bases in the localities, in the upper end the emphasis of the politics shifted 
towards the all India (national) level. This linking of locality, province and national level 
is crucial for the emergence of Indian nationalism and shift of Congress from its 
moderate phase towards a mass movement (Seal, 1973). Studies on Indian nationalism 
and Indian National Congress often take 1920 as a turning point for the nationalist 
movement, since from 1920 onwards Congress became a mass movement. Up to this 
                                                          
145Thus Ayesha Jalal (1984:9) convincingly claims that “The 1919 reforms were not intended to be a first 
step towards the grant of responsible government at the centre. They merely tackled on some political 
concessions to divert Indian political attention to the provincial arenas. The principle of diarchy aimed to 
limit the Indian say in provincial self-government into the less important subjects… the reforms ensured 
that no single community would dominate the ministries; the balance of power was firmly kept in the 
government’s hands.”    
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point Congress politics was confined to a very small minority elite, “a microscopic 
minority” in the words of Curzon. With the extension of franchise, and with the linking 
of local politics to the national level, Congress finally started to acquire the 
characteristics of a mass nationalist movement. 
Finally the politics in India shifted from saloon rooms to the streets and this 
didn’t only change the style of politics but also the content also shifted. And once the 
politics is moved to the streets religion acquires a more central role in politics.146 The 
communal conflicts were dominant throughout 1920’s. As we will see below these 
communal conflicts came after a period of Hindu Muslim alliance symbolized through 
the the Khilafat Movement, thus the radical increase in the number of communal 
conflicts might be surprising. No doubt that this was so for the Congress elite which was 
unable to contextualize this sudden and radical increase in the communal conflicts. The 
initial Congress reaction was to blame the British for perpetuating the communal 
conflicts in order to divide the nationalist opposition. This is still the main argument in 
the classical work of Gyanendra Pandey (1990) and this line is repeated particularly by 
the scholars of the Subaltern School. As we will soon see the British did indeed relied on 
such communal divisions and even when they were not the perpetrators of these 
divisions they “accepted the fact of such divisions with the air of a man struggling 
joyfully in the grip of a benevolent fate.” (Hardy, 1972: 134) 
However, the pioneering works of Jack Snyder (1995; 2000) and others on the 
nature of early democratization would reveal that such conflicts in the early stage of 
                                                          
146Part of Gandhi’s mass mobilization was made possible through the Khilafat movement. 
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electoral politics is not unexpected at all. In the sudden need of acquiring mass 
mobilization the politicians in the early stages of electoral politics play on the local 
conflicts and ethnic and sectarian divisions as these have the power of mobilization. In 
cases where there are no sufficient institutional mechanisms, these divisions can easily 
turn violent. Thus the sudden eruption of violence in India in 1920’s is by no means 
unprecedented. While in the European cases that Snyder focuses the politicians played 
the ethnic card, the politicians in India played the religious card. This was so because, as 
we will see below, the nature and organization of politics in India made religion a more 
conducive card to play with. As David Gilmartin (1991: 107-111) mentions, the political 
structure of colonial state transformed religion to a form of “ethnic identity.” The very 
nature of separate electorates made it unnecessary for the politicians to reach out to 
other religious communities, since every politician would only need the support of his 
co-religionists in politics. This inevitably gives the upper hand to the more radical ones. 
Such communal conflicts and violence is of course an important element on the growth 
of religious nationalism, however, as we will see below, communal conflict is not 
necessarily the same with religious nationalisms. Thus through this decade which was 
characterized by mass religious mobilization, the Muslim politics in India was on the 
verge of collapse. As Ayesha Jalal (1994) rightly points, all India level Muslim politics 
was meaningful as a device of power sharing at the centre, and since the British political 
reforms was deliberately designed to keep Indian politics confined to the local and 
provincial level and inhibited any power sharing at the centre, the political fortunes of 
Muslim politicians like Jinnah hit the rock bottom. Muslim League as an organization 
was and remained ineffective throughout the decade and Jinnah wondered around 
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wilderness. The fortunes of ML would start to change only when a real power sharing at 
the center become a plausible expectation initially upon the 1935 Constitutional 
Reforms and more importantly with the British entry to the WWII.     
The second and more persistent aspect of British policies to deal with the 
nationalist demands for power sharing was the implementing the classical policies of 
divide and rule. This policy was pursued through the construction of a political realm 
based on exclusive and adversary communities, whose peaceful coexistance would 
necessitate an outsider, i.e British. Hence were the various political reforms in which the 
British envisaged the use of political power through separate communities or special 
interest groups. This was partly based on a sincere British vision of India as a land of a 
conglomeration of castes and religious communities. This vision was voiced by a Punjab 
official during the discussion in 1882 on Ripon's local self-government reforms; 
“representation in India should be of the real atoms of which Indian society was 
composed, namely religious communities, castes and classes, not of opinions and 
geographical areas” (Hardy, 1972: 135). But as the British knowledge on India 
deepened, the imperial strategy of divide and rule seems to be the main motivator for 
carefully calculated programmes of power devolution. The final aim of these policies 
was to ensure that an Indian majority (Congress being the most likely and even the only 
candidate for this) would come out of the election box and dominate the ministries. The 
culmination of these policies would be the 1932 Communal Award where almost every 
possible group, Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, Depressed Castes, Industrialists, Anglo 
Indians, Princes were accorded a reservation in order to ensure that a representative 
Indian majority would not emerge. Thus it was not only the Hindu- Muslim divide the 
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British capitulated on, but in the long run, this division remained as the only decisive 
one. 
 
5.2.2 Muslims and the Congress 
An important aspect of the Congress, particularly for understanding the evolution of 
Muslim nationalism, was that it was not only an organization of western educated, but 
also primarily a Hindu organization. Except a brief interval following the Lucknow Pact 
(1916) and the Khilafat movement (1919-1924), the Muslim participation in Congress 
remained significantly low. Francis Robinson (2000a: 213) points that if we take the 
attendance rates at the annual December gatherings of Congress as a criterion, Muslims 
although constituting more than twenty percent of Indian population, amounted to less 
than six and a half percent of the participants of the Congress gatherings between 1892 
and 1909. Why this was so might appear as an important question in order to understand 
the emergence of a separate Muslim nationalism. However one must resist the 
temptation to reach an easy conclusion of the pervasiveness of communalism among the 
Indian elite or to the exclusivist tendencies of Hindu-Congress elites. In fact the absence 
of Muslims during these years can better be understood through a deeper examination of 
the formation of the Congress and should better be understood as a contingency created 
by the expansion of British colonization and British institutions in the subcontinent. 
The Congress was primarily an organization for the Western educated and 
initially it was dominated by the three presidencies, where the British presence was the 
longest and thus the Western educated most populous. The dominance of delegates from 
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Bombay, Calcutta and Madras is equally recognizable if one looks at the participants of 
early Congress meetings (Brown, 1984: 177-181). These were regions where the 
Muslims were either insignificant in terms of population or were mostly members of 
subordinate classes. As Seal (1968: 308) points out “in none of the three most 
westernized provinces was there a large elite of educated Muslims who could be drawn 
into Congress.” Even the small groups of Muslim elites in Bombay were mostly 
members of commercial classes and they did not have any significant educated elite. 
Moreover the limited educated Muslim elite from Bombay did not hesitate in joining the 
Congress as was the case of young Jinnah in early twentieth century (Brass, 1974). The 
highest strata of Muslims in the subcontinent were from UP and Punjab and these 
provinces along with Bihar and CP were commonly considered “backward” in Congress 
politics (Brown, 1984: 177). The Punjabi Muslim elites belonged to the traditional 
landed elite and hence were absent from Congress but never absent from the 
collaboration links of Raj. The specific reasons for the absences of UP Muslims, where 
the highest strata of Indian Muslims and the best educated of them resided, however are 
important and had significant effect on the evolution of a separate Muslim nationalism. 
These are discussed below under the title of Muslim nationalism. 
 
5.3 Formation of Muslim Nationalism and Pakistan 
The Congress nationalism was unable to keep Muslims in, but how did the Muslim 
League managed to convince the diverse Muslim communities to follow a singular 
policy and rally behind the idea of Pakistan? This of course needs an analysis of the 
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relation of Muslims with the British and the Congress. This is no easy task, for 
throughout the entire period neither the Muslims, nor the Congress, nor the Hindu 
nationalists nor even the British followed a uniform and consistent policy at the entire 
region and at the entire time period. 
The Congress itself was a battle ground between the Hindu right which was out 
right anti-Muslim and the secular nationalists. Its relation with Muslims and other 
minorities changed through the phases of intra-party politics. Even after 1920 when 
Gandhi, a religious leader who did much to accommodate Muslims to the Congress, and 
gradually Nehru, an outright secularist who detested religious politics, dominated the 
Congress, they were never free from the pressures of Hindu Mahasabha. It is possible to 
claim that this pressure prevented them to take more accommodationist positions at 
certain junctures. Despite the pressures of Hindu right, at least at two significant 
moments the Congress had built an alliance with the Muslim leadership which included 
some of the so called Muslim communalists and separatists. 1916 Lucknow Pact which 
was masterminded by Jinnah himself was the first alliance built between the Congress 
and the Muslim League. Later during the early 1920’s alliance between Gandhi and 
Muslim Khilafat leadership was a significant turning point in the Indian history for this 
was the first time the political scene in India turned to base itself in mass politics. It was 
also this alliance and the mass support provided by the Muslims that secured the 
leadership of the Congress for Gandhi. The Khilafat movement also brought religion to 
the center of this mass politics, and therefore was condemned by Jinnah at the time. 
Therefore it would be simplistic to think that it was only British who manipulated and 
sacralized politics in order to play one religious group against another. There were 
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important strands of revivalism on both sides of the religious divide and the power of 
these revivalist movements also introduced religion to the center of public politics. 
The British policy vis-à-vis the Muslims also changed throughout the time. As 
we have discussed above, the British were convinced of a vision of India as a 
conglomeration of religious communities. Religious communities not individuals were 
the basic units of Indian society. Thus the British policies were not targeting individuals 
but religious communities as it was assumed that religious groups had corporate 
interests, thus they needed to be administered accordingly. This is not a millet system 
that each religious community would have a quasi-autonomous corporate structure, but 
the British vision of India was similar to the Ottoman system where the corporate 
religious groups lived not together but side by side. Religion was an important identity 
marker in the Indian society, but under the British rule it became more rigidified and 
gained political recognition. 
In the immediate aftermath of 1857, the British found Muslims as the real 
perpetrators of the Mutiny and thus they started a systematized bashing of Muslims. 
This process included the exclusion of Muslim gentry from Government offices and 
more importantly from the military and favoring of Hindus in every competitive prize. 
However, as we will see below this policy gradually started to change by 1880’s and 
eventually the Muslims were favored over Hindus. 
The attitudes of Muslims with regard to their relations with Hindu majority and 
with regard to British domination also show so much variation. Rebellion and armed 
struggle (as in the cases of Shah Abdul Aziz or al-Afghani) was an aspect of Muslim 
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response as much as looking for British auspices and collaboration (as in the case of 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan). Westernization and secularization can be detected as much as 
religious reform and revivalism.  Reform, rejection, and revivalism were some of the 
strategies that Indian Muslims adopted in their quest for self-definition (Malik, 2008: 
90). 
Yet it is striking to notice that the roots of Muslim nationalism go back to the 
more conciliationist responses rather than to resistance. Thus the entire idea of Muslim 
nationalism needs to be distanced from the notion of a religious revival. Despite the 
plurality of the Muslim responses to the British rule, they can still be classified under 
three groups; (i) radical revivalism and outright rejection of British, (ii) non-political 
revivalism of ulama and (iii) political revivalism of pro-British Muslim groups. 
The first group mostly refers to the armed resistance and jihad waged against the 
British. This tradition has its roots in the eighteenth century religious revivalism and it 
was Shah Abdul Aziz, the son of great Delhi scholar Shah Waliullah that declared India 
dar-ul harb. In the early nineteenth century armed resistance gained dominance in North 
India under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilly and through the Faraizi movement 
which gained dominance in Bengal. Thus this group in fact pre-dates the Mutiny. The 
second group refers to the revivalist attempts of ulama which is best represented by the 
formation of the madrasa of Deoband at 1864. The ulama of Deoband were less 
interested in resisting the British than creating religious awareness among the Muslim 
masses. Thus they were aiming to increase religious piety and practice in a political 
environment ruled by non-Muslims. They tried to remain aloof from politics and 
avoided any political clashes with the political authority and instead concentrated on 
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individual and social piety and the spread of religious education. Firangi Mahal 
seminary established in Lucknow can be cited as another famous example of such piety 
based non-political revivalist movements led by religious seminaries in colonial India. 
Loss of state power and the end of Islamic dynasty in the subcontinent is a stimulus for 
the emergence of such revivalist movements as the new political environment in which 
Muslims are no more the supreme rulers led to a panic to preserve self-identity and thus 
to increased self-consciousness. It is also possible to claim that their disinterest with the 
British rule was based on a conviction that British are too powerful to fight.147 When the 
political climate started to change in post-WWI period and once the British control of 
the sub-continent started to shatter, the majority of the Deobandi ulama sided with the 
anti-colonial nationalism. 
The response developed by the third group of Muslims was also based on a 
conviction that the British were in India for the foreseeable future and Muslims should 
adopt to this reality if they want to protect and improve their social and religious status. 
The social base of this group comes from the Urdu speaking ashraf families of the 
Gangetic Plain; the United Provinces in British India, and it found a representative in the 
towering personality of Sayyid Ahmad Khan.148 The United Provinces, corresponding to 
Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in contemporary India was the political center of the Mughal 
                                                          
147Formation of such religious seminaries in the second half of the nineteenth century can also be 
understood in the light of British policies after 1857. As it is recalled, one of the primary lessons British 
learned from the 1857 Revolt was not to interfere in cultural and religious realm. Thus it is possible to 
claim that just like the Muslim ulama understood the difficulty and the danger of waging a war against the 
British, the British officials also understood the risks of interfering in the religious realm. These 
seminaries flourished in such a political context. 
148Already during the 1857 events many Muslims, including Sayyid Ahmad, had actually sided with the 
British. 
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Empire and the heartland of high Muslim culture in the subcontinent. Ashraf families of 
the region were the highest strata of the Indian Muslims often combining landed wealth 
and a real or imaginary aristocratic lineage that tied them to the court. 
The first group of revivalists was both anti-British and anti-Hindu while the 
second group tried to remain neutral and apolitical. When the mass politicization of 
1920’s pushed the ulama into politics, the majority of them sided with the Congress 
against the British. The third group from the beginning was pro-British and their 
political adversaries were the Hindus rather than the British. However it was this group 
and their political actions which form the basis of the Muslim nationalism and the 
movement for Pakistan. Thus the revival of religious militancy or religious orthodoxy is 
not directly related with the notion of Muslim nationalism. The Muslim nationalism as it 
evolved in the subcontinent was more anti-Hindu than anti-British. In line with the 
general observations on anti-colonial nationalism, collaboration was a significant 
element in the birth and development of Muslim nationalism in a colonial context. We 
need to look at Sayyid Ahmad and his policies in more detail to see how an intersection 
of colonialism, collaboration and elite conflict lays in the roots of Muslim nationalism. 
Sir Sayyid was born in 1817 into a Muslim landholding ashraf family with a 
lineage as court servants. He started his career as a legal subordinate in the British 
government in 1839. When the Revolt started in 1857, he did not only remain loyal but 
went out of his way to save the British families. From this point onwards he insisted on 
loyalty to the British and on the importance of Western education if the Muslims were to 
be benefactors of this loyalty. His most lasting legacy was shaped when he founded the 
Anglo-Oriental College in 1875 which was later turned into Aligarh Muslim University 
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in 1920. The college and the university left an important mark on the history of the 
Muslims of the subcontinent as Aligarh became the center of Muslim educational and 
political activity and the leaders of the Aligarh institution became the leaders in Muslim 
political activities (Brass, 1974: 168)149. 
The emergence of Aligarh movement in late nineteenth century was not a 
coincidence. The British suppression of 1857 Revolt made it certain that they were not 
leaving soon. The initial British assessment of the 1857 Revolt mistakenly considered it 
as a Muslim dominated revolution; a final attempt of the previous masters of the 
subcontinent to regain their position. This was reinforced by the British assessment of 
Muslims being fanatical and Islam forbidding foreign rule, while Hindus, according to 
the British, were passive by nature and their religion did not forbid foreign domination. 
“'After 1857', wrote Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) in his autobiography, 'the 
heavy hand of the British fell more upon the Moslems than on the Hindus” (Hardy, 
1972: 70). The inevitable result of this British approach would be a rapid decline in the 
status of the Muslims throughout the subcontinent. Thus due to the British 
discrimination in post 1857 period Muslims fell way behind Hindus and could not 
benefit from the advantages of British modernization programs. They were uneducated 
and thus were unable to take part in the administrative posts open to the indigenous. 
This is a generally accepted position, or at least it was so at the time. 
Contemporary research provides a much more complicated picture and the hegemony of 
                                                          
149The crucial Simla Deputation which shaped the fate of Muslim politics in the subcontinent and found 
the ways for the formation of ML was headed by Mohsin-ul Mulk, the general secretary of Aligarh. Six 
presidents of ML and two prime ministers of Pakistan were graduates of Aligarh. Jinnah himself was not 
among the alumni, but he left a considerable amount of money to the university in his will. 
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the discourse on “Muslim decline” seems to be a powerful testimony to the fact-shaping 
nature of communal myths (Youıng, 1976: 297). In fact “so great were the differences 
between the positions of Muslims in one part of India and another that their standing 
relative to other communities can be defined only at a local level” (Seal, 1968: 307). 
The Muslims were definitely a backward community in Bengal, but certainly not so in 
north India and particularly not in the UP. In Punjab they were landlords and peasants, 
while the Hindus were peasants and urban money lenders. In Sindh and N.W.F.P they 
were such a majority that it was impossible to compare their situation to any other 
group. Yet the dominant narrative of Muslim backwardness was the theme upheld by 
S.A. Khan and it found resonance with the British authorities with in two decades of the 
Revolt. William Hunter’s 1871 book was a semi-official voice that argued that Muslims 
remained backward under the British rule and British should take measures to improve 
their position. His book concentrating on Bengal was relying on factual truths but the 
problem was the extension of his arguments to the rest of India. 
As a member of a Muslim ashraf family in the UP, S.A. Khan was certainly 
aware that his community in UP was not in a backward situation, but he was equally 
aware that they could become backward if the trend continued (Stern, 1993: 172). In 
1886-87 the Muslims were holding 45.1% of all judicial and executive posts open to the 
natives in the province while constituting only 13.4% of the population. Thus it is not 
only that they were not underprivileged but they were clearly over privileged. However, 
their proportion in the same posts was 63.9% in 1857 and through a steady decline fell 
into 34.7% in 1913 (Sarkar, 1983: 77). Thus there is a clear process of decline from over 
extreme over privilege to modest over privilege. 
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However, contemporary research reveals that this relative decline was not due to 
a disinterest on the side of the Muslims to the new system of government or to the 
English education and to all the benefits that comes attached with English education. 
Indeed the Muslims of the UP were even more responsive to English education 
compared with the Hindus, as they were a more urbanized and better educated group in 
relative terms. However, the sheer numerical superiority of the Hindus made it certain 
that no matter how well they organize and mobilize, the Muslims would lose the control 
of the province (Brass, 1974). Moreover it was not only the Hindu middle class of the 
UP, but also the Hindus from Bengal that threatened the supremacy of Muslim 
aristocracy in the UP. Since Bengal was the first region that British had established their 
control, the English education there had a much longer history and in any case of 
impartial admission through competitive examinations, the Western educated Bengali 
middle class (Bhadralock), which happened to be pre dominantly Hindu, would 
dominate all the government positions available. Thus opening the gates for middle 
class western educated and an indiscriminate admission of Indians on the basis of merit 
to government service would inevitably result with Hindu/Bengali domination. Thus the 
superiority of the Muslim aristocracy in the UP was threatened by the rise of a new 
middle class who, due to the demographic realities of the province, was Hindu 
dominated. The Muslim aristocracy in the UP that dominated the Aligarh movement 
resisted this trend by demanding special favors from the British through a policy of 
ultimate loyalty. This was in accordance with the British conservatism in post 1857 
India and their allergy towards the ever expanding and ever assertive babus. 
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Moreover, the position of Muslim elite in the UP and their relation with their 
Hindu counterparts were shaped by the very unique conditions of the province. Yet, the 
local developments of the UP created the pre-conditions of Muslim nationalism to find a 
base in this province. The elites of the UP would play the leading role in Muslim politics 
in the subcontinent until the very end and just before the formation of Pakistan. Even 
though Pakistan became a reality due to the spread of Muslim nationalism to the Muslim 
majority provinces, in its initial phase Muslim nationalism was led by Muslim minority 
provinces. The specific local conditions of the UP that made the province a fertile 
ground for the formation of Muslim nationalism was shaped during the decline of 
Mughal power in the eighteenth century. At this stage it is also important to remember 
that UP was the heartland of Mughal power and court life. The path breaking work of 
Chris Bayly (1983) had demonstrated that the decline of Mughal power created diverse 
career paths for the Muslim and Hindu elites of the UP. Throughout the eighteenth 
century while the Muslim elite, the ashraf, concentrated on the service gentry, the Hindu 
elites dominated the merchant class. Thus just like the divergence of the career paths of 
Ottoman Muslim and Christian elites in the eighteenth century impeded the 
development of Ottoman nationalism, a similar divergence in the UP created the suitable 
social base of community based politics. As the Mughal power declined, the fortunes of 
Muslim elites in the province also declined. However, as we have already mentioned, 
the eighteenth century was not a total decline of Indian society. Economic developments 
continued and the Hindu dominated merchant class continued to prosper. The Muslim 
service gentry did not hesitate to offer their service to the new masters as we can see in 
the example of S.A. Khan however in relative terms (both in comparison to the Hindu 
 243 
 
merchant class and in comparison to their previous positions) they still experienced a 
decline in fortunes. It is under these conditions that the Muslim service gentry of the 
province felt a threat to their career paths. 
This divergence between the career paths of Muslim and Hindu elites had given 
the British perfect opportunity to benefit from the divides within Indian society. 
Moreover it was also in conformity with the British desire to create vested interests in 
India. From their immediate indictment of Muslim “fanaticism” as the Mutiny’s primary 
cause, the British in post-Mutiny India soon came to the judgment that Muslim 
“separateness” from Hindus offered the Raj a political opportunity. The opportunity to 
use religious divisions among Indians to rule them (Stern, 1993: 170). 
In his social programme S.A. Khan, like Deobendis, put special emphasis on 
education but unlike the Deobendis his emphasis was on modern education. Since the 
main motive of his activities was concentrated on the improvement of the social 
standing of his community, the main thrust of his political and educational activities 
were targeting to increase the Muslims’ gain from administrative posts and political 
positions that British created. So his policies, like the early phases of the Congress 
movement, were collaborationist. Thus, in fact, Sayyid Ahmad and his followers shared 
a common agenda with the Congress movement in the sense that their initial focus was 
on better means of education and increased participation to the government positions. 
Yet, the Aligarh movement and the Congress were rivals particularly because they 
shared a common agenda were competing for the same limited government enterprises 
and positions. The existence of two rival groups for limited collaborationist positions 
created a difficulty for the British to placate such demands but it also enabled them to 
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play these groups against each other. In fact this remained a major dimension of British 
policy in the subcontinent and the main motive for the Anglo-Muslim conciliation. 
The Aligarh Movement differed from the Congress in terms of its social and 
ideological background as well. While the Congress was a body of English educated 
middle class, the Aligarh Movement under the leadership of S.A. Khan was led by the 
traditional gentry. The western educated elite were the first group with an all India 
outlook. English language helped them to transcend the local-provincial boundaries and 
in their political orientation they were more concerned on all-India matters. In contrast, 
S.A. Khan was clearly provincial, communal and feudal. While the Congress insisted on 
impartial admission to government posts, S.A. Khan was unabashedly aristocratic in his 
defense of family lineage over merit. In a speech he delivered in 1887 that directly 
criticized the Congress he made the following remarks: 
It is very necessary that for the Viceroy’s Council the members should be 
of high social position. I ask you- Would our aristocracy like that a man 
of low caste or insignificant origin, though he maybe a B.A. or M.A., and 
have the requisite ability, should be in a position of authority above them 
and have power in making the laws that affect their lives and property 
(Malik, 1982: 343-344) 
The aristocratism of S.A. Khan was perfectly in line with the conservative attitude of 
British in the post 1857 period. The gist of his policy was to provide loyalty to the 
British and since this political programme is based on the recognition of the British as 
the legitimate rulers of the Indian Muslims, he was inevitably against any pan-Islamic 
ideals. Thus, he was in a clear collision with al-Afghani who was in India during 1879-
1882 and tried to promote feelings of pan-Islamic unity among the Indian Muslims. The 
two went into bitter collisions accusing each other for heresy and attacking each other’s 
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innovations in religion. Yet despite an apparent disagreement on religious doctrines the 
real and underlying source of their disagreement seems to be their different attitudes 
towards the British rule, as Aziz Ahmad (1967) points both al-Afghani and Sayyid 
Ahmad were equally heterodox in their religious teachings. Though he passed away by 
the time Khlilafat Movement started, it is easy to predict how S.A. Khan would have 
resisted it just like Jinnah did. In his time, S.A. Khan never considered Abdülhamid II as 
a legitimate figure for Indian Muslims and rejected his use of Caliphate. 
In order to maintain Anglo-Muslim conciliation and to receive British support, 
Sayyid Ahmad advised his followers to remain aloof from politics. His way of receiving 
concessions was not political struggle but ardent loyalism. This way he opened up a 
venue to the British to collaborate with the non-nationalist groups and their natural 
leaders. Muslims of Sayyid Ahmad were not the only non-nationalist group that British 
collaborated with, but they were the most decisive for the future of subcontinent’s 
history. 
In accepting the offer of collaboration the British also accepted the image of 
Muslim as a backward community. The Government Commission's report spoke of 'the 
Muhammadans' as a 'class' who 'have fallen behind in the race of life under British rule' 
(Hardy, 1972: 122). Thus Muslims were represented as a backward group in need of 
corporate group concessions to protect them from the more advanced Hindu nationalist 
elite. The image benefited the Muslims. 150 It also justified British recognition of special 
                                                          
150One clear and early benefit was the increase in the proportion of Muslims enrolled in education. The 
initial impact was on lower levels rather than higher education, but the sharp rise in the decade after the 
publication of Hunter’s work in 1871 in Muslim enrollment is striking. Figures for 1871-2 showed that 
Muslims in the three provinces longest exposed to English education, Madras, Bombay and Bengal (with 
Assam), formed 4.4 per cent, 8.2 percent and 14.4 per cent respectively of the school and college 
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Muslim interests (Breuilly, 1994: 209-210). This alliance was also in line with the 
conservative polices the British adopted after 1857 and the importance they put on the 
natural leaders of the society. The ashraf of UP were considered as the natural leaders of 
the Muslims and representative of their interests. Not surprisingly “that interest was 
interpreted rather narrow terms related to the preoccupations of those elites. The concern 
with education and access to administrative positions resembled the concerns of the 
contemporary Congress leadership” (Breuilly, 1994: 209). Yet the British who dismissed 
Congress as a “microscopic minority” considered the demands and interests of ashraf as 
representative of the larger Muslim interests.  
In reality the UP Muslim ashrafs’ claim to be representatives of all Muslims in 
India was as hollow as that of the Congress leaders to represent Indians. “In so 
shapeless, so jumbled a bundle of societies, there were not two nations, there was not 
one nation, there was no nation at all. India was the mother of new nationalisms 
struggling to be born” (Seal, 1968: 339). Thus the problem was two-fold; British were 
assuming an India wide Muslim community, and were accepting the UP Muslim ashraf 
as their leaders. This was in line with the post 1857 British vision of India as a “social 
order comprised of a mosaic of separate communities, whose ‘natural leaders’ spoke for 
them” (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 133). And as we have seen above, the British 
administrative unity and electoral system was crucial in transforming local communities 
to an India wide scale and helping for the emergence of nationalisms in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
population and in 1881-2, 6.5 per cent, 14.7 per cent and 23.8 per cent. This represented a considerable 
improvement both absolutely and relatively to their proportion of the population in those provinces, which 
in 1881-2 was 6.1 per cent, 10.9 per cent and 28.6 per cent. In the North-Western Provinces and the 
Panjab in 1871-2, Muslims were 17.8 per cent and 34.9 per cent of the school and college population 
respectively and in 1881-2 16.8 per cent and 38.2 percent. (Hardy, 1972: 121) However, this rise of a new 
group of educated Muslim urban professionals would later on change the internal power balance with in 
the ML as well and open the ways of cooperation among the Congress and the ML for a while. 
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subcontinent. However, through their institutional arrangements the British made it sure 
that at least one of these newly emerging nations would be defined through religion. 
Collaboration transforms social categories to political realm (Scott, 1995: 209). 
By allying the ‘natural leaders’ with the Raj, the government included the UP elite to the 
collaboration network of the political system. Through this collaboration with the 
government, being a Muslim started to be a political asset and Muslim leaders acquired 
a vested interest in being Muslim. “Communalism became a positive political force only 
when linked with elite conflict. It only did this when, in a particular political context, the 
appeal to the religious identity became an important resource for some elites. This 
context was created by the way in which certain Muslim elites, not necessarily 
representative of the Muslim community as a whole combined with the government to 
create special communal forms of political action within the collaborator system” 
(Breuilly, 1994: 213). Electoral politics as we will see below was crucial for the creation 
of this political context. Politicization of corporate differences started with the 
introduction of communal electorates in 1882, where communal electorates were used 
for the first time. However, since the power of these bodies was quite limited so were 
their effects on the spread of communal politics. The real intersection of politics with 
communal differences started with the British promise of further political reforms in 
1906. 
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5.3.1 Separate Electorates, Weighted Representation and the Muslim League 
1906 marks the real turning point in terms of Muslim politics in India. Two events in 
this year, the formation of Simla Deputation to visit Lord Minto (the Viceroy) as the 
representatives of the Muslim community and the formation of the Muslim League 
sowed the seeds of the partition and the formation of Pakistan. Both events were led by 
the members of the Aligarh Movement and were in full accord with S.A. Khan’s policy 
of loyalty. However, unlike S.A. Khan, the formation of the ML would mean the entry 
of Muslims into the political arena, whereas SA insisted to remain aloof from politics. 
This can be better understood as a result of the changes in the political climate in India 
rather than a break from the tradition of SA. Resignation of conservative Curzon as 
viceroy in 1905 and his replacement by Minto was signaling the end of strictly 
paternalistic style of Curzon. The subsequent announcement of political reform in 1906 
by John Morley, the liberal Secretary of State for India, was hinting the changing nature 
of political scene and was an incentive for the Muslim leaders to form political bodies to 
negotiate with the British. Moreover the Congress’ ability to raise passions and 
surmount pressure over the government in 1905 on the issue of partition of Bengal151 
was also an inspiration for the Muslim elites. It is not a coincidence that the first session 
of the ML was held in Dacca even though the organization was clearly dominated by the 
UP elites. However, even though style was more political compared with the Aligarh 
movement, the ML was nevertheless in line with the tradition of loyalism and was 
                                                          
151 Curzon administration declared the partition of Bengal into East and West halves in 1905. This created 
outrage among the Hindu Bengalis who were dominant in the urban and rural life in the united province. 
The partition was annulled in 1911 due to strong opposition of the Hindu Bengalis. 
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formed as an anti-Congress movement. The objective of the ML as it was outlined in 
their founding resolution was “to promote among the Mussulmans of India feelings of 
loyalty to the British Government” (Embree, 1972: 51). 
On 1 October 1906 a delegation of thirty-five Muslim notables under the 
leadership of Aga Khan visited Lord Minto in his summer court in Simla. This 
deputation known as the Simla deputation is a landmark in the Muslim politics of the 
subcontinent.  The delegation was clearly dominated by the UP Muslims. In terms of 
class divisions it was reflecting the supremacy of the landed elite; a difference that 
marked the Congress from the Aligarh Movement from the beginning. 
The Panjab and Frontier provinces, with their fourteen million Muslim 
population, had seven members on the Simla deputation and East and 
West Bengal, with their twenty-five and a half million Muslim 
population, one. The U.P. with its seven million Muslim population, had 
eleven. The deputation included eight members of princely families or 
states' ministers and six zamindars. The middle-class professional man of 
the U.P. was 'represented' by two lawyers (Hardy, 1972: 157). 
 
The deputation made two important demands both of which found favorable audience. 
First of all, the deputy asked for the implementation of separate electorates for the 
elections of envisioned provincial councils. Secondly, the deputation argued that the 
share of the Muslims should be estimated not merely on their numerical strength but in 
respect to the political importance of the community and the service it had rendered to 
the defense of the Empire. This special treatment is usually called as “weightage.” Lord 
Minto replied that he is entirely in accord with the delegation. This granting of separate 
electorates was reflected in the diary of Lady Minto as “nothing less than the pulling 
back of sixty-two millions of people from joining the ranks of seditious opposition” 
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(quoted in Menon, 1997: 10; Sayeed, 1968: 29). David Page (1982: 14) also argues that 
the Raj strengthened the hands of traditional Muslim gentry who had so far been loyal 
allies in the collaborative system of the Raj. According to Page the traditional gentry 
was by the time under the pressure of a new group of western educated Muslim elite 
who were seeking for more concerted action with the Congress as a way of politics. 
Moreover, through weightage granted to the Muslims, Raj also weakened the potential 
power of the Congress in the UP. This tactic would be enlarged later in 1932 through the 
Communal Award. When Morley-Minto reforms were declared in 1909, both demands 
of the Simla Deputation were met. This could be defined as the first real victory on the 
side of the ML and the culmination of S.A. Khan’s policy of loyalty. However, as we 
will see below, its real effect will be evident upon the extension of electoral 
enfranchisement through the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in 1919. 
Introduction of separate electorates is the culmination of two interrelated 
processes and a turning point in the evolution of nationalisms in the subcontinent: (i) the 
religious differentiation among the elites and (ii) the building of a bond of unity among 
the elites and the masses. As it has been discussed in the third chapter, the imperial 
societies are marked by a hierarchical social structure in which a cosmopolitan elite 
often marked by an ideology and a courtly culture rather than ethnic or religious markers 
is strictly differentiated from the subject populations (see Gellner, 1998). The certain 
segments of the common mass might share ethnic or religious identities with the elite 
but are still separated from them as they do not possess the unifying cultural-
civilizational element. As it had been pointed in the third chapter, Persian, similar to 
Latin in Europe, was the unifying cultural element of the North Indian elite and court 
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life and it was shared by the Hindu as well as the Muslim elite. This court culture in 
India also helped to maintain a hierarchical organization of society and distinguished the 
traditional elites sharply from the masses. However modern states, and particularly its 
organs of elections and representations, create a tie among the elite and the ordinary 
man, which is a crucial stage of nation-building (see Gellner, 1983). The separate 
electorates in India created such a tie with the Muslim elite and the ordinary Muslim. 
The effect of such a tie became more important as the franchise was extended through 
the constitutional acts of 1919 and 1935. However, the more decisive effect of the 
separate electorates was the differentiation of the Hindu and the Muslim elites. Indeed 
this was a process ongoing since the removal of unifying Mughal court culture and 
system. However introduction of separate electorates was the most decisive point in this 
process of differentiation. Communalism became a positive political force only when 
linked with elite conflict. Separate electorates provided the necessary political context in 
which religious identity became an important political resource. 
Introduction of separate electorates are akin to the formation of millet system in 
the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the millet system, separate electorates did not imply any 
notion of communal autonomy. However, the separate electorate, like the millet system 
in the Ottoman Empire, did fix the religious community as a defined, bounded clearly 
separated (segregated) entity. Moreover by marking off a Muslim community and 
instituting elections within it, the British inevitably created arenas for ritual competition 
in which over time personal commitment to Islam melded with public assertions of 
religious solidarity. Introduction of elections and the organization of separate 
communities politicized these communities. The elections did not only separate the 
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Muslim elite from the rest. As the franchise extended, it also made it imperative for the 
Muslim elite to create ties with the Muslim masses and contributed to the formation of a 
Muslim nation in the subcontinent.  The 1877 elections in the Ottoman Empire which 
were conducted by the principle of separate electorates deepened the divisions of millet 
system and was an impediment for the development of a supra-communal Ottoman 
identity (see Kayalı, 1995). In a similar vein, the separate electorates provided the 
development of a new communal rhetoric, and ultimately, of the Pakistan movement. 
The Congress had to overcome the divisions coming as the burden of communal 
electorates. Its inability is also the story of the Congress to prevent partition (Metcalf, 
1994, 224-225). 
 
5.3.2 Attempts for Hindu-Muslim Conciliation 
The separate electorates and the weightage were rewards that the Muslim elite gained 
through loyalism. However, this position would start to change within a decade for two 
unrelated reasons. First shock to the ML was the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 
1911. This showed the limits of success to be gained through loyalism and “no bombs 
no boons” became the new slogan of the Muslim masses. Second, with the start of 
WWI, the British position and its strength appeared more fragile than it was assumed to 
be. Thus, the Muslims were more encouraged on raising their demands through political 
action. The process was also supplanted by the growing of a new western educated 
middle class among the Muslims partly owing to the prerogatives of their policy of 
ultimate loyalty. As this group of urban professionals joined the ML they formed a new 
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group with in it what was then called the liberal wing. Among these urban professionals, 
a famous Muslim lawyer from Bombay, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was also a leading 
politician among the ranks of the Congress also joined the ML in 1913. The liberal 
group increasingly raised its discontent against the traditional gentry’s policy of ultimate 
loyalty and urged for concerted action with the Congress against the British.  Moreover 
the entry of the Ottoman Empire and thus the Caliphate into the war on the side of 
Germans and against the British was also an element that made the British increasingly 
unpopular in the eyes of the large Muslim masses.  The shift of attitude on the side of 
Muslim leaders has been demonstrated on two occasions: (i) through the Lucknow Pact 
of 1916 and (ii) the launching of Khilafat movement three years later. 
The Lucknow Pact was master minded by Jinnah and earned him the reputation 
of the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity. It provided the Muslims a chance to protect 
their prerogatives as the Congress agreed to accept both the separate electorates and the 
weightage system, while the Congress could now become more assertive in its power 
struggle against the British and could make the claim that it is the representative of all 
India. The Lucknow Pact clearly had a bias towards the Muslim minority provinces as 
against the Muslim majority provinces, thus reflected the dominance of the UP and other 
Muslim minority provinces in the politics of the ML. According to the agreement 
“Congress agreed that in the Muslim minority provinces of U.P., Bihar, Bombay and 
Madras, Muslims should have 30, 25, 33 and 15 per cent of the elected Indian 
membership respectively. In the Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and the Panjab, 
however, they should have 40 and 50 percent respectively” (Hardy, 1972: 187). 
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The alliance stroke at Lucknow between the ML and the Congress was later 
developed and got a mass character through the Khilafat Movement. As a result of their 
victory in WWI, in 1919 the British occupied Istanbul; not only the capital of the 
Ottoman Empire but also the seat of Caliphate. This led to mass demonstrations all 
around India led by the All India Khilafat Committee (see Minault, 1982). Gandhi 
capitulated on the opportunity and supported the Khilafat Movement by declaring non-
cooperation movement. Thus, on the one hand, with the help of Muslim support, he 
gained the control of the INC. On the other hand, the mass movement phase of the 
nationalist movement had started. He also considered this a chance to overcome the 
communal divisions. However, the alliance fell apart when the Turkish government 
abolished Caliphate and Gandhi called off the non-cooperation movement. 
The Khilafat movement stirred up religious passions throughout the 
subcontinent, however its failure and the abolishment of Caliphate by the Turkish 
government also meant the end of pan-Islam as a political ideal. In this environment 
politico-religious passions aroused in the subcontinent turned inside and pan-Islamic 
solidarity was gradually replaced by the spread of Muslim nationalism. This can be best 
observed through the writings of Mohammad Iqbal on the issues of nationalism, pan-
Islam and Caliphate. Initially an ardent enemy of nationalism, considering it as an 
obstacle for the unity of ummah, Iqbal shifted to embrace Muslim nationalism and the 
demands for a Muslim nation-state in the subcontinent.152 
                                                          
152For an analysis of the transformation of Iqbal’s views on nationalism, see Jalal, 2002: 563-578. 
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With the collapse of Khilafat movement and the alliance Khilafatists made with 
Gandhi, the Congress-Muslim League alliance that started with the Lucknow Pact also 
came to an end. The lasting effect of the Lucknow Pact, however, was that it opened to 
negotiations with the Congress the questions of special position enjoyed by Muslims 
aristocracy in British India. British government continued to be a party to such 
negotiations, particularly through setting the administrative and constitutional 
framework that both the Muslim League and the Congress operated. But in the end, it 
was with the Congress that Muslim politicians had to settle (Stern, 1993: 176). This 
proved to be an impossible task as the Congress increasingly tended towards a mono-
cultural and centrist conception of nationhood. 
Thus the Hindu-Muslim unity which dominated the political scene for almost a 
decade starting from the Lucknow Pact had disintegrated rapidly and dramatically. The 
unity was replaced by communal conflicts and violence that dominated the scene 
through 1920’s. This religious frenzy and violence can not only be explained through the 
arousal of religious feelings by the Khilafat movement. More important seems to be the 
effects of the 1919 Constitutional Act. As it is mentioned above, with the amendments 
made, the electoral franchise was enlarged enormously which linked the local politics to 
the provincial politics. This brought the masses into the politics for the first time and 
Gandhi was the symbol of the extension of mass politics in India. However this sudden 
extension of franchise had its due effect on the inter-communal harmony. The 
pioneering works of Jack Snyder (2000) David Mansfield (Snyder and Mansfield, 1995, 
2005) and Michael Mann (2005) demonstrated the risk of rising violence in the early 
stages of electoral transitions. Professional politicians in need of mass support and 
 256 
 
mobilization often refer to cultural elements which in turn arouse fear and suspicion in 
the other cultural community. Thus Snyder and Mansfield (1995) concludes, early 
phases of democratic transition in many countries come with the burden of ethnic 
conflict if necessary safeguards are not taken by the administration. The Raj had few 
incentives to take such safeguards and for the British any inter-communal conflict would 
only perpetuate the underlying ideology of colonialism in India, i.e the necessity for the 
continuation of British rule as an arbiter among various factions of Indian society. 
Moreover the constitutional arrangements, most notably the communal electorates, 
which organized the political life through religious ascriptions, resulted that in India 
violence is not ethnic but religious-communal. The communal electorates did not only 
channel the violence from ethnic to religious (in any case both were community 
bounded), but also intensified the violence due to the logic of electoral system. Any 
politician had to drew support only from his religious community and did not need, or 
even was not allowed, to garner support from other communities. Such an electoral 
design would definitely radicalize the politics and lead to violence which in turn would 
bolster communalism. This vicious cycle dominated the Indian politics until the end and 
placed the communal problem to the center of Indian politics and Indian nationalist 
movement. 
Muslim political movement in India was initially about the recognition of 
corporate Muslim identity and the political arrangements and benefits this recognition 
brought, rather than the establishment of an Islamic state or even a Muslim state. Thus 
this kind of political arrangements, which found their best example through the separate 
electorates, can be called communal. Yet as long as they are not related with territorial 
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separation, they cannot be called Muslim nationalist. The demand for territorial 
arrangement either in the form of federation, confederation or partition came much later 
than separate electorates. Mohammad Iqbal raised the issue for the first time in 1930 and 
it became the official the ML policy only after the Lahore Resolution in 1940. Although 
there was a demand of a separate territorial organization for Muslims, the language of 
Lahore Resolution was deliberatively vague to ensure that confederation or even 
federation would have sufficed rather than partition. 
At this point we should note that separate electorates/weightage and federation 
were two different strategies that benefited different segments of the Muslim groups in 
the subcontinent. Roughly said, it could be said that the first formula favored the 
Muslim minority provinces particularly the Muslim elite from UP, while the second 
formula favored Muslim majority provinces. In that regard it was not a coincidence that 
starting from the Simla deputation, defenders of separate electorates were dominated by 
the Muslims from minority provinces and the arrangements which gave special statuses 
to the elites of minority provinces always worked to the detriment of the majority 
provinces. In Bengal, the Muslims were so backward that given the limited franchise 
their slight majority would never translate into political dominance in the province. In 
Punjab, the Muslim landlord elite followed a non-communal politics through the 
Unionist Party. Here a cross communal alliance of Hindu and Muslim landlords 
dominated political scene to the benefits of landed elite (that was Muslim and Hindu 
alike) and to the detriment of urban money lenders, who were almost exclusively Hindu. 
The British later on would include the Muslim Punjab elite to its base of local allies 
through the granting of the Communal Award in 1932. The Communal Award which 
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basically meant an extension of separate electorates to all the groups defined as 
minorities in India (Christians, Sikhs, Princes, Business interests, Anglo-Indians, 
Depressed Classes) reserved 51% of the provincial council in Punjab for the Punjabi 
Muslims, thus ensured their control of Punjab. Secured the helm of the control of their 
own province, Punjabi Muslims had little interest in joining the activities of the UP led 
ML. 
As long as the political scene in India was confined to the provincial level, the 
ML had no chance of victory as its sole power base would remain the Muslims of 
minority provinces. This was best reflected in the terrible results the ML gained in the 
1937 elections. According to the election results the ML had no support in the Muslim 
majority provinces, and its power base was confined to the urban UP. This would at least 
be sufficient to make them coalition partners in the UP, but the overwhelming Congress 
victory among the Hindu constituencies of the UP made it sure that Congress didn’t 
need any ML support to form the provincial government in the UP either. This left the 
entire political apparatus of ML out of power. It is surprising to see that ML swept the 
election polls only nine years later in 1946. This could be understood in the changing 
nature of political organization in the subcontinent as the locus of politics shifted 
upwards from province to the national level. This led to a change of attitude among the 
Muslims of majority provinces as now they had their own reasons for being against the 
Congress domination. Their protection however was not separate electorates/weightage 
but federalism. Yet INC’s insistence on a strong center pushed these provinces to 
support the movement for Pakistan. As these provinces resisted against the domination 
of center, Pakistan movement gave them to create their own centers (Page, 1982: 259). 
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Congress victory in the 1937 elections created the first chance of a national 
government. With the perception that British were sooner or later to leave India, it 
became certain that the Congress would be the new raj and control a powerful central 
state apparatus. In this coming scenario, Muslims would either demand a strong 
presence in the central power apparatus through separate electorates and reservations in 
the center, or they would demand provincial freedom which would undermine the 
central power. Thus the power would either be shared at the central level, or it would be 
dissolved to the provinces. “Pakistan grew as a part of a search for power sharing. Two-
nation theory and Islamic ideology (discourse) matured under the impetus of this 
frustration and search, not the other way round” (Hayes, 1984: 51). Partition of India 
along religious lines also means the inability of such a power sharing. This was partly 
related to the inability to find a space for a corporate Muslim identity in the larger 
umbrella of Indian nationalism. Muslims could of course be Indian nationalists, as many 
nationalist Muslims like Azad were, however Congress couldn’t manage to come up 
with a plural Indian nationalism that would not only recognize the corporate Muslim 
identity, but also would strike some sort of power sharing with the corporate Muslim 
body. 
Unlike the Ottoman case, in India Muslim nationalism did not start from a state 
but targeted the formation of a nation-state. In the previous chapter we have seen that 
the evolution of Ottoman state from an empire to a nation-state, then to a Muslim 
nation-state led to the emergence of Muslim nationalism. In the Indian case, it has a 
reverse order; first the Muslim nation and nationalism was formed and second this 
nationalism achieved statehood. Muslim political movement in India was initially about 
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the recognition of corporate Muslim identity and the political arrangements and benefits 
this recognition brought, rather than the establishment of an Islamic state or even a 
Muslim state. The inability to protect this corporateness in a centralizing/intervening 
state transformed this corporate political identity into a nation and nation-state. As it will 
be discussed in the next chapter this shift also changed the course of intra-Muslim 
politics. 
 
5.3.3 Nationalism and Diversity  
Similar to what happened in the Ottoman Empire, and in any empire for that matter, the 
evolution of an all-inclusive national idea created a hitherto non-existent problem of the 
relationship between this larger identity and sub categories of identities, as well as the 
relationship between sub categories. In that regard anti-colonial nationalism does not 
differ from official nationalism. The Congress and the newly emerging Indian 
nationalism also faced the same challenge of accommodating provincial, religious and 
linguistic diversity within the frame of all inclusive Indian nationalism. 
In the previous discussion with regard to the similar dilemmas faced by the 
official nationalisms of nineteenth century we have depicted that there are two 
approaches to the problem of diversity; the federal Habsburg model and the centralist 
Romanov model. Just as debates on nationalism in the nineteenth century Ottoman 
Empire can be understood as a struggle among alternative visions of an Ottoman nation, 
most of the debates among Indian nationalists can better be understood as alternative 
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visions of an Indian nation. There emerged two alternative and rival conceptions of 
nationhood; one composite and plural, other monolithic and individualistic. 
The idea of a composite Indian nation lies behind the notion of separate 
electorates, the Lucknow Pact and the Khilafat movement. This was also in line with the 
vision of early nationalist movement. Initial swadeshi movement was in favor of 
federalism and coexistance of a multiplicity of identities (linguistic, religious, regional). 
In early 1920s, the Provincial Congresses were reorganized along linguistic lines, thus 
linguistic plurality was accommodated, as it reflected the pluralist nature of the 
nationalist movement (Young, 1976: 283). However, Congress couldn’t achieve the 
same when it was faced with religious plurality. 
Moreover, the ulama and other Muslim leaders who supported the Congress 
through the Khilafat Movement also saw India as a minimal federation of religious 
communities in which Muslims would be allowed to become members of an imperium 
in imperio. They were not to form a separate state, or a nation in any sense acceptable to 
Western political thought but they were to form a separate legal and religious 
community with self-governing institutions of their own (Hardy, 1972: 194-195). 
Here the dilemma of Ottomanism vis-a-vis the millet system was replicating 
itself. The Muslims that were willing to pursue a joint struggle with the Congress was 
demanding something akin to the millet system. The Ottoman system in its attempt to 
create a modern Ottoman nation had weakened the most important ally of the system; 
the millet leaders. Similarly the Congress leadership could not find a way to reconcile 
their united vision of nationhood with the communal leadership. In the process they 
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weakened the hands of their most important allies and strengthened the separatist 
Muslims. 
It was the Ottoman desire to strengthen the central power that prevented them to 
create a plural framework of Ottomanism that could accommodate religious diversities 
and the millet establishments. The nature of nationalism in India was entirely different. 
Official nationalism was non-existent, despite the fact that colonial state provided the 
political and institutional framework for the evolution of a national imagination. 
However this national imagination was anti-colonial, in that it had a claim of 
representing the people of India against the colonial administration. It claimed to capture 
the colonial state in the name of the people who were now defined as the Indian nation. 
For four reasons this anti-colonial nationalism was unable to accommodate pluralism: 
First of all, the emphasis put on unity against the colonial invader prohibited the 
chances of plural accommodation. Since anti-colonial nationalism tries to capture the 
colonial state, it is obliged to confront the main arguments of the colonial state. Thus, 
the emphasis on unity “was to a great extent a reaction to the colonial thesis of India’s 
hopeless divisions, which needed an imperial hand for the establishment of peace, order 
and cohesion” (Sen, 1998: 18). Gandhi emphasized the syncretic character of Hinduism 
as a source of unity while secular Nehru denied this but still claimed there was an 
essential unity of India (Sen, 1998: 18-19). The British desire to foment divisions within 
the society in order to prevent the transfer of real power forced the Congress to promote 
a notion of indivisible unity. Religion was only one among many instruments that 
British emphasized in order to keep real power with themselves. They also tried to make 
use of diarchy, 1932 communal award and 1935 attempts of federation through the 
 263 
 
support of princes (Stern, 1993: 145-147). This forced the Congress to take a firm stance 
on unity against the colonial desire of divide and rule. 
Secondly, the ideological leanings of the Congress high command, prototypically 
represented by Nehru, were in favor of individual secularism that abhorred the idea of 
communally organized politics. The Nehruvian secularism was not only against Muslim 
communalism but also against Hindu Mahasabha. Moreover, this was also the point of 
divergence between Nehru and Gandhi, as the latter put emphasis on religious identities 
and argued that India can unite different religious communities. However, in the scheme 
of mass politics and electoral representation, the denial of communal representations 
meant the denial of minority communalism. Due to the electoral logic of 
majoritarianism, non ascriptive universal individualism works in favor of the majority 
community. Thus individualistic nationalism threatened the minority communalism that 
feared infinite domination due to its minority status. This was the logic of the demand 
for separate electorates and various constitutional safeguards. 
Muslim nationalism in contrast was a very radical but a definite solution to the 
problems of majority and minority. Asserting that Muslims were a nation avoided the 
logic of numbers. As a community, they were confined to being a minority, as a nation 
they were equal partners (Jalal, 1994: 52) 
Thirdly, This fear of domination felt by minorities could have been overcome by 
a federal framework which put more power to the provinces rather than center. Indeed 
the later politics of Muslim League was dependent on the strengthening of provincial 
powers that would provide a safeguard against the majoritarian domination. Once again 
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the ideological leanings of the modernizing Congress, elite who considered a strong 
center necessary for rapid modernization prevented such a federal framework (once 
again the Congress high command was at odds with the anti-modernist critique of 
Gandhi). The contradiction between social pluralism and the assumed need for a strong 
center was also a factor that afflicted Ottomanism with a paradox. Here the Congress 
experienced exactly the same problem. 
Finally, the contradiction between a desire to strengthen the center and the 
peripheral and minority demands of provincial-federal framework was not only an 
outcome of ideological clashes but was shaped by the political framework of the 
colonial state administration. In their desire to lengthen their actual control over India, 
the British considered the inclusion of Indian elements to provincial administration and 
keeping a strong center firmly under their own control as a mechanism to delay the 
transfer of actual power. 
For reasons of imperial administration, the Raj adhered to the vision of a 
conglomerate India, where diverse groups could be rallied in support. In the process of 
becoming the Raj, the Congress tried to overcome this by promoting an opposite vision 
of India based on individualism rather than communal, ascriptve identities. In the final 
analysis, it was this “one nation-one party” approach of the Congress that prevented the 
pluralistic formulation of nation that transformed Muslim communal consciousness into 
Muslim communal politics and to Muslim nationalism. Failure in the management of 
religious diversity pushed the Muslims elites to create their own one nation-one state 
that would at least solve the question of religious plurality through destroying it and 
creating religious homogenization. 
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The colonial administration insisted on the divided nature of India to justify the 
continuation of colonial rule. To counter this narrative the Congress had to define India 
through its unity. However, it proved to be impossible to combine this unity with the 
institutionalized (and politicized through elections) diversity of India. In this context 
Muslim leaders countered Congress’s notion of unity through emphasizing their 
difference and tried to reach a power sharing agreement with the Congress. “In order to 
have a meaningful political power at the center, the League and other Muslim leaders 
had to accept an equation with ML and the Muslims of the subcontinent. This equation 
brought unity to the Muslims, but simultaneously excluded non-Muslims” (Jalal, 1994). 
Thus in order to overcome the unity underlined by the INC, which prevented a 
satisfactory power sharing, the Muslims opted to create their own unity through 
separation of the subcontinent along religious lines. As we will see in the next chapter, 
the newly formed Pakistan was in fact a mirror image of the INC, which underlined 
“essential unity of India,” as the Pakistani leaders underlined the unity of the Muslims of 
the subcontinent. It is no surprise that Pakistan itself would go through the same crises 
as the Congress and would fail to accommodate the diversity, this time couched in terms 
of linguistic and ethnic identities. 
In fact, one can easily say that the modern Indian state still struggles with the 
same problem and the creative solutions the Indian state developed with regard to the 
linguistic and religious divisions attracted widespread interest and appreciation from the 
scholars with diverse backgrounds. With a century old history of diversity 
accommodation, today Indian secularism is presented as an ideal model of religious 
accommodation and promoted as an example to the continental Europe (see Bhargava, 
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2006). The success of Indian secularism is yet to be seen although the success of Indian 
scholars on expanding the horizons of debate on secularism and in formulating creative 
strategies to overcome the contemporary problem of diversity management deserves full 
appreciation. The Indian model is also equally applauded, with more justification, for its 
peaceful management of a linguistic diversity in a state that has 13 official languages 
(see Stepan and Linz, 2011). However, it should be noted that contemporary Indian 
solutions to these problems of diversity represents a fundamental difference form the 
1930’s Congress policy of one nation, one party. In that regard it is not the success of 
Nehruvian enlightened doctrine of individualistic, secular nationalism that enables 
peaceful accommodation of diversity, but on the contrary it is the retreat of Indian state 
from this ideal that enabled this accommodation. In that regard one can easily say that 
India today is less national than it had been a century ago. Its political organization 
resembles a middle ground between the imperial-federalist framework of pluralism and 
nation-state centralism. In that regard Stepan and Linz define India not as a nation-state 
but as a new form of polity which they label as state-nation. Therefore the contemporary 
framework of Indian politics and the Congress should not be confused with the pre-
partition politics. Indeed one can argue that the current creativity of the Indian model is 
a result of the previous failure of Nehruvian nation-state.  
 
5.4 Religion and Nationalism Among Hindus and Muslims 
In terms of religious diversity the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires showed 
considerable similarities. Both empires were ruled by nominally Muslim dynasties and 
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Islam was an arm of state power and an important instrument of legitimation. However, 
the majority of the population remained non-Muslim153 and both states showed 
remarkable levels of tolerance with regard to their relations with the non-Muslim 
subjects. In general a peaceful coexistance was the norm for the pre-modern period. 
However, they had a remarkable difference with regard to their religious policies; while 
the Ottoman Empire developed a policy of accommodation through creating corporate 
religious bodies called millets, the Mughals did not have any such system. Instead 
syncretism was more evident in the Mughal way of religious life and it is often believed 
that Indian Islam was the most syncretic of all Islamic traditions. Devotional cults and 
Sufi practices that evolve around the interception of Hinduism and Islam were quite 
dominant particularly in rural India. Indeed Marshall Hodgson (1974: 59) considers the 
lack of any system resembling Ottoman millet system as one of the reasons for the 
earlier collapse of the Mughal dynasty in comparison to the Ottoman dynasty. 
In the previous chapter we noted the exaggerated orthodoxy that considers a 
direct lineage between the millet system and the later day nationalisms of the Christian 
communities. A similar debate exists on the subcontinental history. Where should we 
find the cultural roots of religious nationalisms, or communalism to employ the more 
widespread usage, in the subcontinent? In line with scholars like Pandey, Chatterjee and 
Freitag, this chapter demonstrated that it was during the British rule that communalism 
emerged. However, this strand of argument is criticized for going to the extreme 
position of denying of any pre-modern existence of communal consciousness. For 
                                                          
153 In the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims became majority of the empire in the sixteenth century after the 
conquest of Arab Middle East. However, non Muslims continued to constitute a substantial part of the 
population of the empire. 
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instance in reviewing various contributions made to the study of Islamic revival in the 
nineteenth century India, Francis Robinson (2000a: 256) asserts that “there is an Islamic 
reality and that the historian must accept this before genuinely and profitable study can 
begin,” implying that constructionist approaches deny the pre-existence of 
communal/religious identities.  
This is an unfair criticism that misrepresents the constructivist approach to 
nations and nationalism and confuses communal consciousness with communalism (for 
this point also see, Bayly, 1985). The modernist/constructivist approach to nations and 
nationalisms do not negate the pre-existing marker of identities. But only with the 
advent of modernity and modern state formation these markers become politicized for 
distinctively different political purposes. Similarly in the Indian case religious identiteis 
always existed, but got politicized in the particular way they did only under the context 
of colonial state. To pinpoint the politicization of religious identities under the 
framework of modernizing colonial state do not need a negation of the religious 
identities themselves. 
Colonial government in India created the necessary structural transformations for 
the emergence of the idea of a nation and an ideology of nationalism. Yet on the other 
hand the colonial policies also deepened and fixed the already existing communal and 
cultural divisions and politicized these divisions through transforming real life-local 
identities to a supra local imagined level. Thus the colonial government on the one hand 
created the sub-strata of nationalism on the other hand it created the impediments for the 
evolution of an atomized individualistic national consciousness. The only alternative 
was to formulate a national culture that would be accommodative of the deepened 
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divisions of the society. This was the official Congress policy at least as it was defined 
by Gandhi. However this option was subverted by the colonial regime’s desire to 
manipulate and divide and rule tactics and also by the centrist-modernist ideology of the 
Congress establishment. 
Critiques of this view such as Van der Veer (1994: 20) argues that seeing the 
foreign hand as the only explanation of the origin of religious nationalism denies Indians 
political agency and conceals the “indigenous” ness of Indian nationalist politics. 
However, the issue is not about foreign vs indigenous as much as it is about the impact 
of centralized sovereign state. There was a Hindu-Muslim divide before colonialism as 
well but colonialism did three things: (i) sharpened the divide, (ii) gave these 
communities supra local and all India identification, (iii) enumerated and transformed 
them into majorities and minorities. The modernizing nature of British had many 
unifying influences in India, however the colonial nature forced British to take a stance 
against political unity. Thus it is certain that divide and rule was always a card on the 
British administration. However, as Sayeed (1968: 6) says, “if the British had planned to 
divide Hindus and Muslims, it seems that Congress and Muslim League leaders did little 
to frustrate the British designs”. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Muslim elites acquired a vested interest through British policies that could only be 
preserved by certain political and constitutional arrangements such as weightage or 
federation. As religion defined the electoral base of the Muslim elites and became the 
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source of their political power vis-à-vis the Congress and the Raj, demands for political 
recognition of this religious bond led the formation of Muslim nationalism. Congress in 
contrast insisted on the abolishment of all such prerogatives. In their own version of 
nationalism, they rightly considered these as obstacles to the development of an 
individualistic/liberal Indian nationalism. 
Whether the Muslim League really demanded or wished an independent 
Pakistan, or used this demand as a bargaining chip in order to force the Congress to 
accept a weak center/strong province formula does not change much in depicting the 
evolution of Muslim nationalism. In either case, an Islamicate identity would be both the 
uniting bond with the elites and the common folk and more importantly, it would be 
represented by a political structure, either in the form of an independent state or in the 
form of autonomous strong provinces in a weak federation. In either case it would be the 
state of Muslims for the benefit of Muslims. In contrast Congress insisted on a strong 
centered India with a notion of Indian nation made up of individuals. Thus what is often 
defined as a struggle between Muslim communalism and Indian secularism is in fact a 
struggle between alternative forms of nationalisms and alternative visions of nation-
states; one with a plural/composite national character and federative political 
organization and the other with a individualistic/non-ascriptive (or alternatively 
homogenous) national character and centralized political organization. The second 
option prevailed, partly due to ideological preferences, miscalculations and to the 
administrative and ideological legacy of the Raj and Pakistan came into fruition. Thus, 
when Nehru and Jinnah agreed upon partition, they also agreed on the notion of Pakistan 
as a Muslim nation-state. Since Pakistan was a state for the Muslims and this also 
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implied the exclusion of non-Muslims from the nation. However this does not 
necessarily meant the physical exclusion of Hindus and Sikhs on a purposive plan. In 
contrast, mostly for economic and strategic reasons, Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was one 
with a considerable non-Muslim minority represented in the white strap in the Pakistani 
flag. However, they were minorities; not members of the nation. They might have even 
preferential statuses but whatever their political and legal rights would be, they would be 
defined as minorities. Jinnah was planning to benefit from the Hindu middle class and 
from their expertise particularly in the economic field. But more importantly, the large 
Hindu and Sikh minority in Pakistan would be a safeguard for the remaining Muslim 
minority in India. Thus, he argued, the partition would do no harm to the Muslims that 
remained on the other side of the border line, while the ones that remained in Pakistan 
will finally have a state of their own. However naïve his vision might be, and 
miscalculated as the horrors of partition proved, he did not insist for a forceful 
population exchange. But his notion of Muslim nationalism made it almost inevitable 
that religious homogenization that occurred through the shifting of borders would be 
accompanied with the shifting of peoples over the newly created borders as well. 
Thus, the emergence of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state, with the final 
agreement of all parties, Jinnah, Congress and the British, also meant that a centralized 
state with a homogenous nation continued to shape the policies of Pakistani state. Post-
partition Muslim nationalism continued to be a homogenizing ideology and the state an 
instrument of this homogenization. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  
Academic debate on the relation between religion and nationalism in general and the 
relation of religion to Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms in particular, is polarized 
around two conflicting approaches: Either nationalism is considered an essentially 
secular ideology, whereby nation-building turns into a secularizing process, or religion 
is positioned in alliance with nationalism and as an important instrument of nation-
building. Nevertheless, both approaches are reductionist and incapable of explaining the 
contingent and paradoxical relationship between religion and nation-building.  
In order to comprehend the role of religion in nation-building, this dissertation 
offers to examine the homogenizing function of religion. This is especially the case 
when nations are fashioned out of diverse, imperial societies. The inability of modern 
states to co-opt the plurality and diversity of society is intertwined with nation-building 
and homogenization, which occurs either through assimilation or exclusion. Though 
most of the literature on nationalism focuses on the assimilationist policies deployed 
with the formation of the nation-state, this dissertation concentrated on the transition 
from empires into nation-states and on the exclusionary role of religion in this transition. 
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Historically, nation-building has been shown to be a process of boundary-drawing that 
determines who will be included as part of the nation and who will be excluded from it. 
In both cases of the Ottoman Empire and the Indian subcontinent, religion helped 
demarcate the boundaries of the nation and contributed to national homogenization by 
excluding non-Muslim elements from the national community. However, the historical 
legacy of homogenization did not end with nation-state formation; instead, both nation-
states persisted as homogenizing political entities by attempting to homogenize their 
already relatively homogenous religious populations through standardization and 
assimilation. In this conclusion, I will briefly address the processes of homogenization 
that were guided by the newly formed nation-state. In addition, I will point to the 
continuities and ruptures vis-à-vis the previous process of homogenization that paved 
the way for the nation-states. 
The previous chapters examined how the inherent diversity of imperial society 
became troublesome for the course of modernization-centralization. Nation-state 
formation, then, brought a concurrent process of religious homogenization as well. 
Thus, through the course of transition from empire to nation-state, this diversity was 
partly eliminated through religious exclusion. The nation-states forged out of the Raj 
and Ottomans were fairly homogenous in terms of religious divisions.154 Further, after 
                                                          
154 Although this dissertation primarily considers Turkey and Pakistan, religious homogeneity existed in 
other heir states as well. In particular, the Balkan states emerged as predominantly Christian states and 
India became more Hindu than ever before, despite retaining a substantial religious minority of Muslims 
and other religions. On the one hand, this enabled the strengthening of Hindu nationalism, which came to 
power during the 1990s. However, on the other hand, the lessons learned by Congress leaders from 
Partition led them to develop a more plural form of secularism in comparison to European ones. For the 
evolution of Hindu nationalism and the rise of the BJP, see Jaffrelot (1996). For Indian secularism and its 
pluralist nature, see Bhargava (1998; 2007).  
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the initial stages of nation-state formation, including large-scale population exchanges 
and sectarian conflicts, both Turkey and Pakistan became nation-states for Muslims with 
small non-Muslim communities that were legally defined as minorities. However, even 
after this, both states continued to deal with the problem of diversity since the 
overwhelmingly Muslim population possessed a high degree of internal diversity in 
itself, too. This diversity can very roughly be defined according to two parameters. 
Firstly, this nominally Muslim population was internally divided by sectarian divisions 
and variations in religious practices. Therefore, the exclusion of non-Muslims resulted 
in only a certain dose of religious homogeneity while religious heterogeneity continued 
to exist among members of the same religion. Secondly, the nominally Muslim subjects 
belonged to diverse ethno-linguistic and cultural communities. Overshadowed by the 
dominance of religious divisions in the pre-nation-state period, this heterogeneity 
became the central problem of newly formed nation-states and the main target of their 
drive to further homogenization. 
Unlike the previous period when diversity was overcome through a process of 
divisions, boundary creation/maintenance and subsequently exclusion, in the nation-
state period the dominant strategy of homogenization was assimilation. This of course 
does not mean religious exclusions ended after nation-state formation. Even the tiny 
religious minorities of both states continued to decline as exclusionary politics of the 
states continued to operate after nation-state formation and to an extent still continues 
(Oran, 2005; Malik, 2002). 
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6.1 The Constant State of Religious Exclusion 
This dissertation argues that as the founding ideology of the formation of Turkish and 
Pakistani states, Muslim nationalism functioned as the boundary marker in the definition 
of the nation, and, hence exclusion of non-Muslims from the national identity. However, 
in the nation-state period, non-Muslims acquired a liminal status as they became the 
citizens of the new nation-states even though their exclusion from the national identity 
continued. Thus a discord between the legal notion of citizenship and the socio-political 
notion of nation emerged. Practical solution to this discord was granting minority 
statuses to non-Muslims. This discord, however, was manageable as long as non-
Muslims remained an insignificant and marginalized minority.155 The nation-state period 
witnessed the continuing exclusion of non-Muslims to ensure their marginalization. In a 
way it was the continuous exclusion of non-Muslims that made these states essentially 
Muslim nationalist. Moreover, nation is not a reified category but it is continuously re-
defined and re-constructed. The exclusionary practices that transformed the imperial 
society to a nation, continued after the formation of nation-state. Exclusion of non-
Muslims in the nation-state period had two dimensions: discriminatory practices 
targeting the specifically non-Muslim citizens and legal separation of non-Muslims 
through their identification as minorities. Discriminatory policies can be orchestrated by 
the state or it can be initiated by the social actors. I will not get into details of 
discrimination towards non-Muslims in these two different political settings as reports 
on such cases are abundant (see Bhargava, 2004; Malik, 2002; Aktoprak, 2010; Oran, 
                                                          
155 As Gellner (1983: 2-3) maintains there is no sacred percentage figure below which a minority will be 
benignly treated and above which he will become offensive in a nation-state. However it is certain that the 
principle of nationalism opens room only for a small number of non-nationals in a country. 
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2005). In any case, as a result of these discriminatory acts, the tiny non-Muslim 
populations of these two countries have shown a steady decline (Fargues, 2001). In that 
sense, the nation-state period has witnessed to a continuing process of homogenization 
through religious exclusion.  
In terms of the contionous process of religious exclusion, what is more telling 
than the dwindling numbers of non-Muslims and discrimination they are facing is their 
continuing status as minorities. Non-Muslims in both countries are legally minorities. 
This separateness was established by the Lauzanne Agreement in Turkey and was 
sustained through the decisions of Constitutional Court. In Pakistan this minority status 
was even more developed as non-Muslims, against their wills (Rais, 2007:113), were 
granted right to separate electorates as well as a ministry dealing with the affairs of non-
Muslims. This status is actually assigned as a way of protecting these communities from 
discriminatory acts. In fact, whether this legal status helps to fight with discriminatory 
practices is open to debate; however, it clearly keeps defining the nation in terms of 
religious identification and indeed performs as the basis for the religious exclusion in 
socio-political terms. Thus, from the prospect of defining the nation even if the non-
Muslims were treated positively as long as they were granted a corporate minority 
status, this means that they are outside the line that draws the boundaries of the nation. 
In fact, further this status is established, the firmer is the exclusion of non-Muslims from 
the national body.  
Constant demarcation of national identity along the religious lines reflects itself 
most clearly over the migration patterns in both countries. As it was discussed in the 
preceding chapters, migration had already played an important function in the process of 
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the nation-state formation. It was through the population exchanges that religious 
homogeneity of the both nation-states was secured. This process, however, did not end 
with the nation-state formation. As Kemal Kirişçi rightly points out, “immigration and 
refugee policies of a state is an important indicator of the country’s nationalization 
policies. Policies over migration and the decision who is to be admitted is invariably 
closely linked with prevailing definitions of national identity” (2000:3). Thus, migration 
policies of the nation-state period are important indicators of the continuing 
exclusionary function of religion in the homogenization process.  
In the Turkish case, the exclusionary function of religion can be best observed 
with regard to the denial of the migration of Gagavuz Turks into Turkey in 1930s (see 
Grigoriadis, 2013). Gagavuz people were Christian Turks mostly living in Romania. 
When they demanded to migrate into Turkey during the 1930s, the high noon of 
assertive secularism in Turkey, their demands were rejected. However in the meantime, 
many Muslim communities of the Balkan Peninsula, like the Albanians, Bosnians and 
Pomaks, who did not have any ethnic affinity and did not speak Turkish were admitted 
and even encouraged to migrate into Turkey.  This is a clear indicator that the process of 
religious exclusion continued after the formation of the nation-state. Similarly, the 
migration patterns of Pakistani state also exhibit that the fundamental criteria for the 
inclusion into the nation is the religious affilitaiton. As an illuminating example, 
throughout the 1950s communal violence in East Pakistan led to the forcible departure 
of the entire Hindu population to India (Samad, 2013). However, after the secession of 
East Pakistan, the remaining Bihari community in Bangladesh was allowed to migrate 
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into Pakistan. Thus, while non-Muslims were pushed to migrate from Pakistan, Muslim 
migration into Pakistan was accepted. 
 
6.2 Further Research Areas 
The migration patterns clearly reveal that homogenization through religious exclusion 
continued after the formation of nation-state. Homogenization is an ongoing process, 
since perfect homogeneity is unattainable. While this dissertation approached 
homogenization from a very particular perspective; exclusionary function of religion, 
there are other means of homogenization. These alternative means of homogenization 
can be religious or non-religious (mostly linguistic), and the strategy of homogenization 
can be based on assimilation as well as exclusion. It is possible to develop this research 
also by taking into consideration of alternative means of homogenization. Before ending 
this dissertation I will first briefly point to the new functions of religion in 
homogenization and then the non-religious aspects of homogenization and nation-
building. Through these remarks, a comparison between the homogenization processes 
of pre-nation-state and nation-state periods will be presented. Such a comparison will 
reveal in what ways this research can be extended. 
 
6.2.1 Who is a Muslim-What is a Muslim: Homogenization through religious 
assimilation 
While homogenization could be attained either through exclusion or assimilation, the 
focus of this dissertation was on exclusion. In other words it was more interested in the 
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boundary drawing itself (a la Barth, 1969), rather than the definition of what remained 
within the boundary. This was also true for the nationalist movements that created 
Turkey and Pakistan. Through the period of nationalist mobilization, a positive 
definition of the nation (rather than a negative one which only clarifies the “other”) and 
the role of religion to this nation were left deliberately vague.  
However, upon nation-state formation, the state had to deal with defining what is 
inside the boundary. Religion in this period continued to be the boundary drawer; thus it 
was an instrument of exclusion. On the other hand, through definition of within 
boundary, it also became, to a certain extent, an instrument of assimilation. In other 
words, once religion and national identity became congruent, defining religion became 
inevitable for the definition of nation. Thus, the question “who is a Muslim?” 
transformed to “what is a Muslim?” Turkish state developed a comprehensive effort in 
defining Islam through state institutions. This process was based on the denial of 
alternative interpretations of Islam and development and promotion of a unique and 
monopolized religious discourse by the state.  
Series of legislation changes on 3 March 1924 marks the core of Turkey’s policy 
on religion. Three changes are important for the purpose of homogenization and nation-
building; unification of education (tevhid-i tedrisat) which meant the abolition of all 
madrasas, abolition of the office of Shayh-ul Islam and of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti), and the formation of 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) and Evkaf Umum 
Müdürlüğü (Directorate-General for Pious Foundations). A year later, these policies 
were supplanted by the banning of religious orders (tariqat) and the closing down of all 
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shrines and dervish lounges. The Law on the Dissolution of Dervish Lounges also made 
it mandatory that only Diyanet personnel can use religious titles. Thus through Diyanet 
and its personnel, the state established control over religion. The unification of 
education strengthened this control as it enabled the state to control the production and 
dissemination of religious knowledge. Thus, these measures did not only aim to make 
religion subservient to the state, as is often pointed, but it also aimed to monopolize the 
religious discourse. Through this monopoly the state interfered into the non-political 
realm as well, and as such, Zurcher rightly points that these reforms constitute a radical 
break with the previous secularization processes of the Ottomans (2004: 187). This 
monopolization can be observed more closely through Diyanet, which is authorized to 
oversee ‘‘all cases concerning the Exalted Islamic Faith which relate to beliefs (itikadat) 
and rituals of worship (ibadat)’’ (Davison, 2003: 337). By turning all religious people 
into paid employees of the state, Diyanet becomes a crucial institution for the state 
control over Islam (Toprak, 1995:35). But its more significant function is promoting a 
singular interpretation of Islam in order to reinforce national unity. This is made evident 
through one of its stated objectives, “to give service in protecting and strengthening 
social stability, peace, national unity, and solidarity.” (Pınar, 2013: 510). 
Thus, through this state version of Islam, religion acquired a new function of 
homogenization. While Islam, like all other religions, is multi-vocal, the state attempted 
to homogenize the religious discourse through monopolizing Islamic discourse. This led 
to the denial of alternative readings of Islam particularly the Alevi Islam. Thus the 
Kemalist state policy on religion was based on the denial of Alevism (see Pınar, 2013). 
This is often considered as a paradox since Alevi Islam is more in line with the secular 
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ambitions of Kemalism and Alevis have been staunch supporters of the Kemalist 
reforms (Bruinessen 1996; Shakland, 2003). However, from a perspective of 
homogenization this denial is perfectly in line with the policies of nation-building. At 
this point it is important to remind that Islam promoted by Diyanet was considered as a 
threat by many Islamist circles as well (Ulutaş, 2010). What matters at this stage is not 
necessarily the version of Islam that is promoted but the fact that a monopolization of 
religious discourse is pursued as a corollary to other policies of homogenization. Aside 
from institutional changes and the replacement of all diverse religious institutions by 
state controlled Diyanet another crucial policy that enabled homogenization of religious 
discourse was the unification of education. By asserting its control over religious 
education, Turkish state managed to create a monopoly over the production of religious 
knowledge. This monopoly was another significant aspect of the attempts on the 
homogenization of religious discourse. Its significance will be revealed when Pakistan’s 
religious policies are discussed. Thus on the one hand Turkish state asserted its control 
over all the traditional power bases of ulama and high Islam, while on the other hand it 
demolished alternative forms of social Islam (low Islam) by demolishing dervish 
lounges and banning tariqas. (On the difference between high Islam and low Islam, see 
Gellner, 1981; Güngör, 2012). “Through these processes one state-favored religion is 
promoted and replaced the diverse interpretations and practices of Islam” (Soner and 
Toptaş, 2011). 
The problem of defining a Muslim emerged in Pakistan more clearly around the 
debates on the Ahmadi community.156 During the process of nation-state formation the 
                                                          
156 On Ahmadis see Friedmann, 1989 
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focus was on the boundary, thus on the question of who is Muslim rather than what does 
it mean to be a Muslim. Thus when inquired about the status of Ahmadis in 1944, three 
years before the partition, Jinnah would say 'Who am I to declare a person non-Muslim 
who calls himself a Muslim? (Saeed, 2010: 25).157 However, upon the formation of 
nation-state, it is no longer possible to avoid the controversies on defining Muslim and 
Islam (question of what is a Muslim). Hence the status of Ahmadis became a 
contentious issue in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.158 Around the question of 
Ahmadis was of course the larger issue of defining Islam; a matter not relevant to the 
drawing of boundaries (emergence of the group) but directly related to the definition of 
the community within the boundary (definition of the group).   
In this endeavor Pakistani state was muck weaker than the Turkish state and it 
couldn’t single handedly define what a Muslim is. Instead a long struggle marked by the 
anti-Ahmedi riots of 1949, 1952-3 and the subsequent formation of Munir Comission in 
1954 represents the delicate attempt of secular state elites finding a common ground 
with the ulama. As it had been discussed in the fourth chapter, Indian ulama largely 
                                                          
157 In a similar vein Sunni-Shi’a distinction was also largely irrelevant in the process of partition. 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman (1998: 691) approvingly quotes W.C. Smith’s justification for having little to 
say on the Shi'a in his study of modern trends in Indian Islam: “there is nothing in the differences between 
Sunni and Shi'a fundamentally relevant to those processes (of modernization). The two groups diverge 
over what answers are to be given to questions which today do not arise.” It might be also helpful to 
remind that both Aga Khan, the first president of the Muslim League, and Jinnah himself were Ismaili 
Shi’a. 
158 A slightly similar controversy exists with regard to the Dönme community in Turkey. Dönmes were 
included in the forced population exchange as Muslims, and they were forced to migrate to Turkey. Just 
like Ahmedis, their self-declared Muslimness was sufficient to be considered as nominal Muslims. 
However, once the state acquired the duty of defining the Muslim, their status also became controversial. 
They were included in the wealth tax in 1942 as a separate community. They were forced to pay double 
the tax Muslims paid but they weren’t subject to the same amount as non-Muslims (see, Aktar, 2006). 
Thus they are a fringe case that emerged as a result of the question on the definition of Muslim. 
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avoided any support to the idea of Pakistan. However, once Pakistan is formed as a state 
of Muslims through a period of high usage of Islamic vocabulary, they tried to capitalize 
on the possibility of turning Pakistan into an Islamic state. This inevitably got into a 
crush with the modernist secularizing ideology of ML. The secular state elite was 
committed to the notion of Muslim nationalism, thus observing religion as the boundary 
drawer but had no intension on making Islam the primary element in defining inside of 
the boundary. The ML leadership remained true to this nationalist tradition and resisted 
the ulama in their attempt to hijack the Pakistani movement. Thus, they made lip service 
to Islamist demands while trying to formulate a nation on secular cultural terms. 
However the Ahmedi problem also showed the state elite of the urgent need to define 
Islam. As the Munir Report in 1954 discovered, when it is left to the ulama, “no two 
learned divines can agree on the definition of Muslim” let alone the issue of a good 
Muslim. In this endeavor Pakistani state took steps very similar to Turkey. 
Soon after the publication of the Munir Report, Pakistani state took steps to 
nationalize and homogenize religion and assert a monopoly over religious discourse. 
The first step was the establishment of Auqaf (Endowments) Depratment and 
nationalization of waqfs in 1960 (Cesari, 2014: 50-53; Malik, 1996:55-85). While 
Turkish state abolished all shrines, Pakistan nationalized them and took them under state 
control. Thus while sufi loges were shut down and sufi leaders were banned from having 
religious titles in Turkey, in Pakistan they became state officials and their seminaries 
and lodges became state property. In this vein they became instruments for spreading 
state ideology. Moreover, through appointing imams and khatibs to the mosques 
affiliated with the waqfs and shrines, the Pakistani state tried to control the Friday 
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sermons as well. Another aspect of the nationalization of the awqaf was that state now 
controlled the curriculum of the religious institutions controlled by these waqfs. 
Same year The Central Institute of Islamic Research was formed which would 
later change its name to Islamic Research Institute (IRI). In 1962 formation of Council 
of Islamic Ideology (CII) accompanied IRI159 (Malik, 1996: 33-54). Both institutions 
were formed to develop a “true version” of Islam. Just like Turkish Diyanet they were 
“to define the fundamentals of Islam in a liberal and rational manner” (Saeed, 1994: 95). 
These two efforts were accompanied by Ayub governments’ consistent attempts to 
marginalize the ulama and autonomous religious forces. In fact both the CII and Auqaf 
Department has a similar goal with Diyanet; enable the state to be the sole authority in 
defining Islam thus homogenizing the religious discourse and thus instrumentalizing 
religion in the quest of homogenous nation.  
Another aspect of religious homogenization is related to religious education. 
Education is always an important instrument of nation-building. It is through mass 
education that modern state promotes the idea of nation to its citizens (see Gellner, 
1983). Thus every nation-state pays particular attention to education in its policies of 
nationalization. Religious education is also crucial for the relation between religions and 
nation-building. For the nationalizing states religious education aims the “blurring of 
sectarian divisions to promote a singular and unified Islam” (Cesari, 2014:88). In order 
to homogenize education in general and religious education in particular, Turkish state 
took more radical steps compared to the Pakistani state. The law on the unification of 
                                                          
159 Both of these institutions were preceded by the formation of a Board of Talimat-i Islamiya consisting 
of ulama in 1949, with the aim to advice on matters, which might have come out of the Objectives 
Resolution. The Board’s recommendations were, however, rejected as being impractical (Binder, 1963).  
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education abolished all madrasas and forbade private religious instruction. Thus Turkish 
state maintained complete monopoly on the production and dissemination of religious 
knowledge. As a result of this monopoly, within a generation, the entire corpus of 
religious clergy were educated and indoctrinated through the state institutions. Through 
this process, monopoly of the singular state version of Islam was maintained. As the 
republican history would reveal, diverse interpretations of Islam developed only in 
realms outside the reach of state control.   
In Pakistan, the state was never as radical as the Turkish state and it was unable 
to extend its control over religious education. It is not only that madsarahs not being 
outlawed; in fact they flourished through the Pakistani history. At the time of its 
formation there were 147 madrasas in Pakistan. By 2005, the number is estimated to be 
around 13.000 (Nasr, 2010: 142; ICG Report, 2005: 6). Aside from the very few 
controlled by the provincial auqaf (which were nationalized in 1960), the majority of 
them belong to private sector. Moreover, not only the ownership but also the entire 
decision of curricula is controled by the responsible mullah. This not to deny the fact 
that there are traditions; but each mullah is free to choose his approach and curricula as 
major policy decisions regarding doctrinal preferences, curriculum and the selection of 
teachers and students remain the exclusive prerogative of the ulama (Ahmad, 2000: 
186). In order to establish Government control over religious education, in 1962 the 
Ayub government took the initiative and set up a committee to discuss the syllabus of 
madrasas. However no binding decision could be taken. A similar effort was repeated 
through the Report of 1979 again with no success in establishing control over the 
madrasas (Zaman, 1999: 310-314). This reflects lack of Pakistani state’s control over 
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religious education, thus its inability to define what a Muslim is. It also sits in stark 
contrast with the Turkish case which abandoned all madrasas within a year of its 
foundation and monopolized religious education.  
Only in 2001, after 9/11 and amidst surmounting international pressure, Pakistan 
Madrasa Education Board was set up and in 2002 the government issued the Madrassa 
Registration Ordinance to regulate religious schools by bringing them under the formal 
educational system of the country. According to the ordinance, Madrassas must register 
to the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board and the respective Provincial Madrassa 
Education Boards (Looney, 2003: 265). The plan was only partially successful since the 
sanction on madrasas that did not register was limited to cutting financial aids.160 “Even 
this limited incentive is undercut by the fact that most of the schools receive little or no 
government funding to begin with.” (Looney, 2003: 266). 
 
6.2.2 Comparing the Homogenization Before and After Nation-State Formation 
While retaining its function of exclusion, religion gained a new function of assimilation 
in the nation-state period. Thus while “religion as an identity marker” was 
instrumentalized as a boundary drawer to exclude certain groups from the fold of the 
nation, “religion as a faith” was instrumental for assimilating those that fell into the 
boundaries of the nation. While it is possible to say that nation-state forms a rupture as 
the assimilationist aspect of homogenization dominates the policy realm, it is also 
possible to say that there is continuity with regard to the process of homogenization. In 
                                                          
160 They might face fines or even closure but in practice this has not been the case (Looney, 2003: 266).  
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fact, the process of nation-building starting from late imperial times to the nation-state 
period can be read as a process of augmenting homogeneity. Since nation-building is a 
continuous process, homogenization is also a continuous process that links the 
transitional phase from an empire to a nation-state and the nationalizing policies of the 
nation-state era. Thus through different stages of nation-building, continuity is observed 
with regard to the process of homogenization, while the means of homogenization 
represents a radical break. This break can partly be observed and briefly discussed 
above, with regard to the changing function of religion as religion acquired an 
assimilationist function in the nation-state period. However this break can be better 
observed if other instruments of assimilation such as ethnicity and language and their 
function of homogenization are taken into picture. Thus, a topic for further inquiry 
would be the relation between other forms of assimilation and religion in the nation-
state period. Some tentative hypothesis can be reached based on the perspective 
provided in this dissertation. These hypotheses need to be scrutinized and can form the 
starting point of future studies.    
While the focus of this dissertation had been on the initial (pre-nation-state) 
period of nation-building and on the exclusionary function of religion in the 
homogenization process in this period, homogenization in the nation-state era is largely 
shaped by assimilation. This difference is already pointed with regard to the changing 
function of religion in these two periods. Moreover, while religion was the sole criterion 
of exclusion it now became only a criterion of assimilation. In other words, religious 
exclusion almost exclusively serves homogenization in the process of transition from an 
empire to nation-state while other means of homogenization enters and dominates the 
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policy realm in the nation-state period. Thus, in the nation-state period, the means of 
homogenization multiplied, inevitably leading to the decreased importance of religion. 
Moreover, the newly acquired function of assimilation necessitated that religion became 
under state control. Thus, the same institutions that are used as means of religious 
assimilation also served as means of religions’ subjugation to state authority. As such it 
also means the denial of religion to control the state and also to define the nation. In fact 
it is possible to say that the contradiction and tension between the religions’ being the 
sole authority in drawing the boundaries of the nation and its inability to define the 
nation is a continuous source of friction and political crisis in both countries.  
Thus as assimilation dominated over exclusion, (defining within the boundary 
over drawing the boundary) non-religious criteria such as ethnicity, culture and language 
became the dominant (over religion) means of assimilation.  In other words, religion 
single handedly defines the nation in negative terms (who does not belong to the nation), 
whereas ethnicity, culture and language define the nation in positive terms. These two 
different phases can be summarized as religious exclusion and linguistic assimilation. 
Thus assimilation of religious discourse in the nation-state period is only a step towards 
further homogenization. As it had been pointed above, internal diversity of the Muslim 
population had two different dimensions. The population was still religiously 
heterogeneous in terms of sects and religious practices. Policies on religious assimilation 
targeted this diversity. However, more importantly, this nominally Muslim population 
belonged to diverse ethnic, linguistic and cultural communities. Assimilation of this 
diversity was the dominant theme of the nation-building in the nation-state period. 
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6.2.3 Homogenization Through Linguistic Assimilation 
In the nation-state period, both Turkey and Pakistan were based on a mono-cultural 
notion of nationalism with the one nation- one culture-one language approach that was 
the hall mark of a nation-state. The homogenizing tendency continued after the 
formation of the nation-state as the multiple identities were denied recognition in favor 
of a uniform national identity. However, the style of Pakistan and Turkey in their search 
for a homogenous nation was different.161 Turkey having a considerable ethnic majority 
and a powerful state apparatus smoothly associated the nation with the dominant 
ethnicity and executed a policy of ethnic assimilation (see Yıldız, 2001). Language as 
was the case in Pakistan was central to this process of assimilation. However, Pakistan 
lacked such an ethnic base that could be associated with the homogenous nation. Thus, 
the Pakistani leaders opted for a more integrationist strategy hoping that through the 
modern forces of communication and integration, a mono-cultural nation would emerge 
in time. But their approach was not pluralist either and was based on the denial of 
diversity. Jinnah’s 15 June 1948 speech at the Quetta Municipality reflects the mood of 
Pakistani nationalism: “We are now all Pakistanis- not Baluchis, Pathans, Sindhis, 
                                                          
161 This difference is also related with the position of modern state in the emergence of Muslim 
nationalism in these two contexts. In the Turkish case, Muslim nationalism emerged among the ranks of a 
modernizing state as it became increasingly difficult for this modernizing/interventionist state to maintain 
social plurality and diversity. The Muslim nationalism of India is a splinter ideology. It developed in 
reaction to the threat of a modern/interventionist state in which the Muslims would be a perpetual 
minority. It lacked the state apparatus in its evolution as much as it lacked the ethnic core. Moreover the 
leaders of the new state were ethnically and culturally the minority of the new state. Unlike the Turkish 
case where the state went through a period of official nationalism that witnessed to the policies of 
“stretching the tight skin of nation to the empire” the leaders of the new state didn’t go through such a 
phase in Pakistan. And they lacked the demographic and institutional capabilities to do so.  
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Bengalis, Punjabis and so on…we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and 
nothing else” (Jinnah, 2000: 268). 
 A very powerful center was considered necessary in both contexts to create this 
homogenous nation. In Turkey this showed itself as an overly centralized state in which 
the whole power is concentrated at the center. This overwhelming power of the center 
transformed state society relations to a form of center-periphery relations (Mardin, 
1973). In Turkey the issue of further nationalization/nation-building meant the extension 
of state and its ethnic/cultural identity even to the most remote regions of the country 
and assimilation of cultural/communal/ascriptive identities to the state centered national 
identity. As such this further homogenization had a clear ethnic dimension. 
 In Pakistan however, nation-building involved the problem of 
ethnic/provincial/linguistic identities with the newly emerging national identity. Unlike 
Turkey where the assimilationist strand left no room for micro identities, the 
integrationist nationalization of Pakistan had to co-ope with the micro identities along 
with the expectation that in the long run they would disappear through the forces of 
modernization and the extension of state control. In Pakistan administrative organization 
is a federation in form, but in practice it had been a highly centralized, top-down style of 
control associated with authoritarian rule (Samad, 2013). In fact particularly during the 
early periods of Pakistan, the federal units were defined as administrative and 
geographic units rather than reflecting their ethno-linguistic nature (Kazi, 1994). This 
was in line with the vision of Jinnah who never hided his disgust for provincial identities 
and called people to give up their provincial identities in order to build up a nation 
(Jones, 2009: 44). Similarly many nationalist leaders after him “have regarded 
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provincialism as a threat and have never seemed able to build on it, preferring instead to 
work against it” (Hayes, 1984: 54).Thus, through the Pakistani history a monolithic 
notion of Pakistani nation was promoted instead of a multi-national or even a multi-
ethnic Pakistan. However, the dominant ethnic group, the Punjabis, saw the 
opportunities of letting their demographic superiority to the service of the integrationist 
nation-building process, and equated themselves with the nation. This is the process of 
“Pakistan becoming Punjabistan” (Samad, 1995). Hanif Ramay, former chief minister of 
Punjab, argues that in this process “Punjab lost its identity in order to gain a larger 
Pakistani identity, it began to perceive itself alone as Pakistan, while others started 
calling Pakistan the greater Punjab” (Ahmad, 1998: xix). 
 
6.2.4 Linguistic Assimilation 
Thus, nation-building in the nation-state era continued to be a process of 
homogenization. Diversity was not tolerated as the ultimate aim was to create a 
homogenous nation in line with the western liberal nation-state model. This tendency 
was the most evident in issues regarding the problem of national language. Language 
would play a key role in the integration/assimilation process and the emergence of a 
mono-cultural nation. In both cases, the desire of creating a uniform citizenry and a 
homogenous nation was largely shaped through policies of linguistic assimilation. 
Language is so central in the nation-state period that it is possible to claim linguistic 
assimilation serves as the center of the nationalization policies. Hence my hypothesis is 
that the nation-building in both cases can be roughly defined in a bi-phased expression; 
religious exclusion and linguistic assimilation. 
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Unlike religion, language has always been a central concern of the nationalism 
literature. Both Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) accord language a central place in 
the emergence of nationalism and the process of nation-formation. As Hans Kohn 
pointed out language is directly related with the notion of other and the leading 
nationalist ideologues of the nineteenth century like Fichte, Herder or Mazzini all have 
defined nations through language (Sadoğlu, 2010: 27).  
As it was discussed in the first chapter, unlike religion language provides 
opportunities of assimilation. Considering that assimilation is one of the main, and the 
prioritized strategy of nation-building and homogenization, language is integral to 
almost every nation-building case. While religious assimilation is limited to 
standardization of intra-religious discourse and assimilation of the members within the 
religious community, linguistic assimilation can include diverse linguistic 
communities.162 Moreover emphasis on linguistic unity is also related with the well-
functioning and administrative efficiency of the modern(izing) state. Thus assimilation 
of diverse people into a single language is a common theme of nation-building projects, 
be it official nationalism of empires, separatist nationalisms or the post-colonial 
nationalisms. This is valid for the Turkish and Pakistan nation-buildings as well.  
                                                          
162 However, the integrative capacity of language is limited by the religious differences. In the 
Subcontinent, language became a function of the divisions between the Hindus and Muslims where a 
common lingua franca was divided as Hindi and Urdu. Hindi and Urdu are basically the same two 
languages written with different scripts. Thus while in most cases nationalists try to assimilate multiple 
language groups into the dominant linguistic group in the Indian case, the religious nationalisms had led 
to the pluralization of a single dominant language along the lines of religious divisions. Limitation of 
linguistic assimilation by religious differences can be observed in the Ottoman case as well. Namik 
Kemal’s views on the language and religion with regard to nationalism are very instructive. He claims that 
it is not possible to teach our language to Greeks or Bulgarians, but it is quite possible to teach it to 
Muslims such as Lazs or Albanians. If the necessary precautions are taken Albanian or Laz will be 
entirely forgotten in twenty years’ time (Sadoğlu, 2010: 78-79). Thus he hints that religious difference is 
an obstacle in spreading nationalism. 
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Both countries applied similar state policies as they established language to the 
center of nation. Thus both states developed a policy of “language planning” (see 
Fishman, 1972) as a part of nation-building. The project was further homogenizing the 
multi-ethnic Muslim nation with a linguistically homogenous nation. In Turkey, Turkish 
was not only considered as the single official language, speaking “vernacular languages” 
in the public was also outlawed.163 State designed campaigns, like “Citizen Speak 
Turkish” were promoted in order to enforce the public use of Turkish. In Pakistan, Urdu 
was considered the only official language, despite the fact that Urdu was spoken by less 
than ten percent of the population. Moreover, in East Pakistan -today’s Bangladesh-, 
which constituted slightly more than half of the population, Urdu was completely an 
alien language. Thus both state pursued mono-linguism as part of nation-building 
processes (for a detailed analysis, see Rahman, 1996; Ayres, 2009; Aslan, 2007; 
Sadoğlu, 2010). In both countries institutions were formed and supported to spread the 
usage of Turkish and Urdu. Türk Dil Kurumu and Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu was 
supported as part of the efforts of language planning (Aytürk, 2008; Jaffrelot, 2002). 
These policies were guided by a perception that equates modern nationalism 
with language. Thus Atatürk would equate being Turk with speaking Turkish (Türk 
demek dil demektir), claim that speaking Turkish was the prerequisite of being a Turk. 
Without speaking Turkish one could not belong to the Turkish society thus had to 
remain outside the boundaries of the nation (Sadoğlu, 2010: 214). Jinnah would claim 
                                                          
163 This constituted a major violation of the 39th article of the Lausanne Agreement, which guarantees the 
use of vernaculars in public life and in certain public offices like the courts. For example, this article 
guarantees the right to have an interpreter in courts for those who can’t speak Turkish. The ban on the 
public use of vernaculars was lifted in 1991. However, Turkish continues to be the sole language of public 
offices.  
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that a mono-linguistic society was necessary for the functioning of modern state; 
“without one state language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and 
function… the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language.” 
(2000: 150). Similar to Jinnah, Liaqat Khan would also claim that “it is necessary for a 
nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language” 
(Farroqi, 1972: 69). 
Thus, the national communities which were previously delineated along religious 
lines were now defined as Turkish speaking Turks and Urdu speaking Pakistanis. 
However, unlike the religious delineation this would not mean the exclusion of members 
of ethno-linguistic communities but their assimilation into the linguistic nation. Both 
Jinnah and Atatürk were aware of the incongruence between the linguistic communities 
and the nation. However, language was instrumentalized as a mean of homogenization 
and nation-building. In Ziya Gökalp’s definition “members of the nations are not those 
who speak the national language but are the ones who will speak the national language 
in the future” (Sadoğlu, 2010: 164). 
Thus, linguistic assimilation was an integral part of the attempts of erasing 
diverse identities and creating a uniform and homogenous nation in both cases. In 
Turkey, except from the larger Kurdish minority, all non-Turkish Muslim communities 
were linguistically assimilated into Turkishness (Türklük) through Turkish (Türkçe) 
language. However, in its attempt to assimilate diverse ethno-linguistic communities to 
Urdu speaking Pakistanis, Pakistani state failed largely. Today even tough Urdu is 
largely understood around Pakistan, it is the first language of less than ten percent of the 
population (Jones, 2009: 74).This failure was first became apparent in the emergence of 
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Bengali nationalism, around demands of parity for Bengali with Urdu, and the partition 
of Pakistan in 1971. Even since then, various ethno-linguistic groups are mobilized in 
demands for separation or linguistic recognition. As was the case with regard to 
religious assimilation, Turkish state was relatively more successful than the Pakistani 
one in achieving linguistic assimilation. Before concluding this dissertation some 
suggestions will be provided to explain this difference. 
 
6.2.5 Structural Differences 
Through this dissertation parallels in the Pakistani and Turkish cases were underlined. In 
both cases, religious exclusion helped demarcate the boundaries of the nation, while the 
assimilation of people within this boundary took place after the nation-state formation. 
However while both states share a nationalizing ideology and a mono-cultural definition 
of nation, the structural conditions in both countries were enormously different. Before 
concluding this brief analysis on the nation-state period, these differences need to be 
pointed. This difference also accounts for the contemporary differences between two 
countries despite a parallel historical evolution.   
With regard to its struggle with ulama two facts weakened the hand of Pakistani 
leaders: as it was discussed in the previous chapter as of its inception ML has been 
dominated by the Muslim minority provinces which now remained on the other side of 
the border. This meant that the real power base of most ML politicians disappeared upon 
the partition. Jinnah himself was from Bombay and his lieutenant Liaqat Ali Khan was 
from the East Punjab both of which now remained in India. ML was barely organized in 
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the provinces which made Pakistan and lacked the institutional infrastructure and 
popular support.  Extension of ML organizations into these provinces started only few 
years before the partition and was largely incomplete at the time of state formation. 
Thus Samuel Huntington (1968: 422) defines the birth of Pakistan as “pre-mature.” 
With this limited power base, ML leaders lacked the institutional power to confront the 
more traditionally established ulama. Second decisive factor was the sudden deaths of 
the Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, the only two leaders with a national stature and popular 
support, soon after the partition. Jinnah died of tuberculosis in 1948, only a year after 
the formation of Pakistan and Liaqat Ali Khan, who replaced him, was assassinated in 
1951. Thus within four years of independence ML remained without a leader that would 
have a nation-wide legitimacy. What followed was a period of collapse that not only 
witnessed to power struggles among different factions of politicians, bureaucracy and 
the army but also to a struggle in defining the identity and the orientation of the country. 
The role of religion in the state administration was the central part of this struggle. 
Throughout the movement for Pakistan the state religion relations and the role of Islam 
in state administration were left deliberately vague. This vagueness on the one hand 
contributed to the Pakistani movement as it enabled people with different degrees of 
religiosity to rally behind the idea of Pakistan while on the other hand it created a 
Pakistan that is “insufficiently imagined” (Oldenburg, 1985). Pakistan meant different 
things to the Punjabi rural people, to the urban notable from UP, to the Sindi supporters, 
to the Bengalis of East Pakistan, to the ulama and to the lawyer-politicians of ML. This 
vagueness on the identity of Pakistan and the weakness of ML leadership to single 
handedly push its agenda delayed the declaration of the constitution until 1958, 11 years 
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after independence. When compared with the Turkish republic which declared its 
constitution in 1924, a year after its formation, the severity of the ideological fight on 
identity and the weakness of leadership can be better observed. 
What made the situation even worse was the limited state capability. Pakistan 
was the splinter of the Indian Raj and the main areas that benefited from the 
modernizing projects of the colonial rule were left at India. Moreover, in West Pakistan 
eighty percent of industrial bases were owned by non-Muslims (Cohen, 2004: 49). Since 
Raj was a colonial state, all top leaders and decision makers were British. There were 
only a handful of Indians in the administrative body among whom even a more little 
margin were Muslims who became Pakistani citizen. Thus, at the time of partition there 
were only a hundred and one Muslim civil servants (out of a thousand and four hundred) 
in the ALL-India Services (AIS) and merely four Muslim military officers (out of six 
hundred) of the ranks of Lt. Colonel in the army (Niaz, 2010: 65; Cohen, 2004: 41). 
Under these circumstances, British hastily declared in 3 June 1947 that their withdrawal 
and the partition would take place by 14 August, meaning that institutions of the federal 
government had to be built from scratch in less than three months. The task of 
reconstituting the executive apparatus of the state was taken by an initial corps of about 
a hundred and sixty civil servants out of which about forty were British who stayed on 
for a while. Of the Muslim members, many of them were in fact juniors with less than 
ten years of experience but they were elevated to senior positions out of despair (Niaz, 
2010: 94). 
This stands in stark contrast to the Turkish case with regard to the state 
capability as well as the leadership. Turkish state was a direct inheritor of the Ottoman 
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Empire both in terms of state institutions as well as the state cadres.164 Dunkwart 
Rustow (2000: 376) maintains that at the time of its formation Turkey inherited eighty-
five percent of Ottoman bureaucracy and ninety-three percent of its military. Thus, there 
was a functioning state from the very beginning. This state machinery already proved its 
strength as it was powerful enough to conduct a two years long armed struggle in 1920-
1922. The republican leadership was drawn largely from the CUP cadres which were 
already ruling the empire since 1908 (Zurcher, 1984). Thus there was direct continuation 
of institutions and personnel. Despite the Republic’s rhetoric of a clear rupture, there 
was only a smooth transition in terms of state institutions. Thus, it is safe to say that in 
the Turkish case, the state was there and it had to deal with nation-building whereas in 
Pakistan both the state and nation had to be built simultaneously. This had detrimental 
effects on the nation-building process of Pakistan (Jahan, 1972).   
  
6.3 Expansion of the Argument  
This study argued that one way of approaching to the role of religion could be done 
through looking at religion’s function in the process of homogenization. It is also argued 
that this function primarily reflected itself in the process of exclusion. In contrast, 
assimilation often took place within the same religious community and often constructed 
around ethno-linguistic identities. How generalizable are these arguments to other cases 
of nation-building? Is this a unique feature of Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms or is it 
generalizable?  
                                                          
164 For a comparative analysis, in a different setting, which points to the role of institutional continuity for 
state power and stability, see, Anderson (1986). 
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Israel is a prime example of a nation-building through religion drawing its 
boundaries. Moreover, openly secular composition of the founders of the Zionist 
movement also testifies to the secular nature of religious nationalism. In Israel, like in 
many other cases, religion serves the function of exclusion, while assimilation of the 
members of the same religious community have taken place only in the nation-state era.  
While Israel is a special case with regard to the relation of religion and nation-
building, the arguments of this dissertation can be generalized to a much larger sample, 
particularly to the cases that involve a process of nation construction in an extremely 
diverse setting, mostly in cases of transition from empire to nation-states. Thus a similar 
pattern can be observed in many post-Ottoman states like Greece. Greek nationalism 
was initially shaped by a process of religious exclusion. All non-Greek-Orthodox 
people, mainly Muslims but Serbs as well, were excluded from the nation. While Greek 
Orthodoxy drew the boundaries of the nation in the process of nation-state formation, 
various ethnic communities were linguistically assimilated into Greek nationality only 
after the nation-state formation (Kitromilides, 1989). Thus, nation-building involved 
religious exclusion and augmenting homogenization. It would be fruitful to extent this 
analysis to other cases of transitions from an empire to nation, particularly to the post-
Romanov states. 
However, there are also important exceptions among the post-Ottoman cases, 
particularly if the given community is thoroughly multi religious; if the religious 
minority is too numerous and well established to the fabric of society. Albania and 
Egypt are prime examples of this. In such cases due to the inability of religious 
exclusion nation-building processes did not include a process of religious 
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homogenization. However, it is important to remember that dominant form of 
nationalism is often challenged by rival versions of nationalism. Thus, even in the 
thoroughly multi-religious societies, secular nationalisms can be confronted by a more 
parochial religious nationalism. In Bosnia, the rivalry between Bosnian nationalism and 
the Bosniac nationalism is a case in point (Magas, 2003).  
A similar rivalry can be observed in the Indian subcontinent as well. India is a 
battle ground between secular composite nationalism of the Congress and the Hindu 
nationalism of the BJP. In a BJP style nationalism, the boundaries of the nation is drawn 
through the lines of Hinduism and Sanskrit serves a function of linguistic assimilation. 
However, accommodation instead of homogenization is always an option; though it 
needs political skills to manage it. The Congress party whose vision is based on 
accommodation rather homogenization, and thus pursues policies of plurality and 
diversity is a deviant case that often raises interest among the political scientists. Since 
the Congress version of nation-state is pluralist rather than homogenizing, Alfred Stepan 
and Juan Linz (2011) claim that India is a new model of political organization. They 
define India not as a nation-state, but as a state-nation. Bangladesh on the other hand is a 
typical case of nation-state shaped by homogenization. However, the Bengali 
nationalism has been developed in reaction to Pakistan. Thus from its inception, it has 
been based entirely on secular-cultural terms and ethnicity. However, taken from a 
larger perspective, the emergence of Bangladesh is also a case of religious exclusion 
followed by linguistic assimilation since the modern day Bangladesh has been initially 
shaped by the partition of the Bengal province along religious lines. Thus, contemporary 
Bangladesh is also formed by an initial phase of religious exclusion and then a process 
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of linguistic assimilation. Thus, three years after its bloody partition from Pakistan on 
entirely secular terms, in 1974 Bangladesh changed its name to Islamic Republic of 
Bangladesh. From a historical perspective it is possible to claim that Muslim 
nationalism emerged first, which was later replaced by an ethnic Bengali nationalism 
and which was later replaced by a more Islamic Bangladeshi nationalism. In other 
words, while Pakistan forms the “other” of Bangladesh in ethnic/linguistic terms, India 
(and West Bengal province in India) continues to be the “other” in religious terms. 
Bangladeshi nationalism emphasizes both religion and ethnicity/language and represents 
a further process of homogenization (Van Schendel, 2004). 
Thus the conflict between the diverse nature of societies and the homogenizing 
impulse of nation-building can be observed in most cases. It would be fruitful to extent 
this analyses into other cases of nation-building from diverse societies. Diversity is a 
social fact, whereas pluralism is a political choice. However, nation-builders seldom 
make this choice. 
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